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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF CoRPORATE PHILANTHROPY

Public corPorations I are not presently required to disclose any information regarding their donations 2 to charitable organizations,3 despite the
existence of a broad disclosure mandate established by Congress4 and made
applicable to public corporations through the federal securities regulations
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC").5
More particularly, the federal securities regulations do not require disclosure
1. This Article addresses corporate charitable giving by public corporations. Although the
issues addressed herein have relevance to minority shareholders' interests in the context of close
corporations, the latter context is sufficiently distinct to warrant separate consideration beyond
the scope of this work.
2. As used herein, the terms "contribution(s)," "donation(s)," and "gift(s)" denote corporate transfers to charitable organizations having qualified for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994), when the transfer is made without
the expectation of a direct quid pro quo. The use of the aforesaid terms is not meant to resolve
the issues pertaining to the motivation or resultant effects of these contributions (which are the
subject of Parts III through VI hereof). The terminological and analytic difficulty surrounding socalled "profit-maximizing" "charitable" contributions is explicitly addressed in Part VI.
3. Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended, I.R.C. §§ 1-9722 (the "Code" or "Tax Code'). Organizations that are
exempt from federal income taxes (on income arising in connection with their exempt purposes)
pursuant to § 501(~)(3) of the Code are commonly referred to as "charitable organizations" and
"charities," and are so referred to herein. In order to qualify for charitable status under
§ 501 (c)(3)-according to the express language of the Code-such organizations must be organited
and operated exclusively to perform one of the charitable purposes enumerated in § 501(c)(3).
These purposes include "religiOUS, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition ... or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). (Although "charitable"
is one of the descriptive categories employed within § 501(c)(3), all the enumerated purposes
identified above are commonly referred to in the aggregate as "charitable" purposes.) Additional
requirements pertain to qualification under § 501(c)(3). Of particular relevance to the discussion
in Part V, charitable organizations are prohibited by the express terms of § 501(c)(3) from participating in elections for public office and from attempting to influence legislation as a "substantial
part" of their affairs. Id.
4. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994); Securities Exchange Act of
1934,15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78U (1994) (collectively herein, the "Securities Acts"). In particular, in
§ 14(a) Congress granted the Securities and Exchange CoInmission authority to regulate proxy
voting "as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994). The Securities Exchange Act also requires public companies to file
periodic reports with the SEC, which reports present extensive, detailed corporate information.
Securities Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a). In accordance with this mandate the SEC
has enacted a broad-based system of mandatory corporate disclosure. See infra notes 5, 7.
5. The SEC has enacted a comprehensive, integrated di~closure system to fulfill the mandates of the Securities Acts. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 33-6383,24 SEC Docket (CCH) 1262 (Mar. 26, 1982).
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of whether a corporation has made any charitable contributions, 6 what the
value of such contributions may have been, or which organizations may
have received such contributions. 7
6. The definition of corporate charitable contributions employed herein is based on that
elaborated in § 170 of the Code (as is generally consistent with common usage, as well as the
accepted definition within the states' corporate philanthropy laws). Section 170(a)(I) of the
Code provides the basis for the deduction of charitable contributions both by individuals and by
corporations. Section 170(c) defines the term "charitable contribution," providing in pertinent
part:
Charitable contribution defined.-For purposes of this section, the term "charitable
contribution" means a' contribution or gift to or for the use of
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund or foundation(A) created or organi~ed in the United States ... or under the law of the United States,
,
any State, the District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States;
(8) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals;
(0 no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual; and
(0) which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason of
attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf
of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
I.R.C. § 170(c) (1994). Contributions that relate to a taxpayer's bUSiness, but that are made with
a "reasonable expectation of financial return commensurate with the amount of the transfer" may
be deductible for the taxpayer as business expenses under § 162-instead of as charitable contributions under § 170. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(c)(5) (1996).
7. The S-K regulations prescribe the specific informational content of the narrative portions of shareholder proxy statements and SEC filings. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.915 (1996). There
is no provision of the S-K regulations that specifically calls for disclosure of corporate charitable
contributions as a general matter. However, disclosure of contributions structured as "charitable
awards" is required pursuant to Item 402(g) of S-K. Id. § 229.402; see Executive Compensation
Disclosure, Release No. 33-6962,34-31327,57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (Oct. 21, 1992); infra notes
171-176. Outside of charitable awards, it is unlikely that disclosure of corporate charitable contributions would be required pursuant to the existing S-K disclosure requirements. For example,
disclosure would be required under Item 303 of S-K ("Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations") only if the donations were so substantial in size
as to materially adversely affect the corporation's overall financial position. 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.303(3) (1996). Because many public companies have tens of millions of dollars in annual
earnings, millions of dollars are contributed to charity without triggering this disclosure standard.
For the SEC's requirements applying to financial statement presentation and disclosure, see
Regulation S-X, ill. §§ 210.1-.12. In particular, see ill. § 210.5.03(b)(9) ("Non-operating
Expenses") (requiring explicit, separate presentation of "material amounts included under miscellaneous income deductions" (emphasis added». Because there is no absolute standard of materiality, even in a narrow, quantitative sense, corporations have interpreted this requirement
loosely, and have generally eschewed making any disclosure of their charitable contributions.
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Disclosure requirements beyond the federal securities regulations,
including generally accepted accounting principles,s also fail to redress this
informational failure. 9 With the exception of contributions arising from
separately constituted corporate foundations,lo corporations are free to
make gifts to charitable organizations without creating any public record of
the amount of such gifts or the identities of the recipients. While many
corporations voluntarily make some anecdotal disclosure of their
contributions-either directly to shareholders (most commonly in the
annual report)1I or in the popular media (especially where public relations
benefits are. anticipated)-corporate managers are unlikely to permit discl<Y
sure of gifts that might appear self-serving or prove controversial.
Compounding the significance of this informational failure is the fact
that state corporation laws have adopted an extraordinarily laissez-faire
approach to corporate charitable giving. 12 As described below in Part II,
8. The most relevant is ACCOUNTING FOR CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED AND
CONTRIBUTIONS MADE, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 116 (Financial
Accounting Standards Bd. 1993). FAS-116 does not require corporations' financial statements to
state expressly the amounts of any charitable contributions made.
9. Moreover, even a highly motivated shareholder could not compel a charitable organization to disclose the names of corporate contributors. Privacy interests and First Amendment
rights of free association protect organizations from compelled disclosure of the identities of contributors or members, absent a compelling state interest. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,64-68 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding constitutionality
of FECA's mandatory disclosure and reporting provisions). In addition (except in the case of
private foundations), the Code specifically exempts the names of contributors from the information that charitable organizations are required to make public. I.R.C. § 6104(b) (1994). For
discussion of the principal sources of charitable contributions information, see infra note 22.
10. Private foundations (including corporate foundations-i.e., foundations established and
funded by corporations) are themselves charitable organizations qualified under § 501{c){3) of the
Code. (private foundations are to be distinguished from the class of "public charities" described
under § 509{a){I)-{4) of the Code.) Private foundations are subject to numerous requirements in
addition to those under § 501{c){3). For example, Chapter 42 of the Code imposes certain taxes
on foundation investment income, as well as regulatory excise taxes under §§ 4940-4945. Most
importantly for our purposes, private foundations are required to disclose both to the IRS and to
the public detailed information regarding their finances and affairs on their annual exempt organization returns (the "Form 990-PF") pursuant to § 6033{c). Public charities are not required to
submit such detailed information to the IRS. See I.R.C. § 6033{a), (b) (1994). For discussion of
the extensive rules pertaining to corporate foundations, see Lauren Watson Cesare, Private
Foundations and Public Charities-Definition and Classification, 296-3d Tax Mgmt. (BNA)
(1992). See also JAMES J. FISCHMAN &. STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES AND MATERIAL'> 580-66 (1995).
11. See 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-3(b) (1996).
12. The regulation of corporate internal affairs and the definition of corporate powers has
been traditionally a matter left to the individual states. Therefore, it is state law that defines the
power of business corporations to contribute to charity. Certain corporate legal scholars have ar-
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the current laws represent the rejection of an earlier regulatory tradition in
the states' approach to corporate charitable giving. In stark contrast to
their legislative antecedents, the modern corporate philanthropy statutes
impose neither substantive limitations nor procedural safeguards on cor'
porate charitable contributions. Most importantly, the modern statutes
have abrogated the requirement that corporate charitable contributions be
made for the purpose of benefiting the donor corporationY In rejecting
shareholder wealth maximization as the lodestar of managerial decision,
making, the modern philanthropy laws depart from the traditional frame'
work of state corporation law. 14 This departure from the traditional
normative concerns of corporate law is more dramatic for the fact that the
modern laws fail to supply an alternative analytic framework to govern
corporate charitable giving. 15 Therefore, in promulgating the modern
philanthropy provisions, the states have acted to authorize genuinely phil,
anthropic corporate contributions, while they have affirmatively declined
to regulate corporate charitable giving.
Thus, corporate charitable giving exists in a relative regulatory
vacuum. The absence of substantive regulation in the states, in conjunc,
tion with the absence of a disclosure requirement under the federal securi,
ties regulations, reflects an outmoded and speciously simplistic view of
corporate charitable contributions. Such contributions have been regarded
as "merely a form of advertising," or alternatively, corporate "pocket
change" benefiting the community. This Article provides a reconsideration
gued that state corporation law has universally abandoned the role of protecting shareholders.
The debate has therefore turned to the appropriateness and efficacy of implementing federal
standards of corporate governance. The classic writings are William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Re/kctions upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974), which argues in favor of implementing federal standards, and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Th~ory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977), which argues against implementation.
13. The states' elimination of the benefit-to-the-business requirement is discussed infra Part

II.B.
14. The model of the corporation as an engine of shareholder wealth maximization is central to corporate law and mainstream corporate legal scholarship. See, e.g., ALI, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (1994). For an alternative perspective, see MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995). See also PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
15. Of course, state legislators have had an interest in facilitating increased corporate charitable contributions in order to offset, in some measure, the burdens of taxation. See A.P. Smith
Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 589 (N.J. 1953) ("In encouraging and expressly authorizing
reasonable charitable contributions by corporations, our State has not only joined with other
states in advancing the national interest but has also specially furthered the interests of its own
people who must bear the burdens of taxation resulting from increased state and federal aid upon
default in voluntary giving. ").
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of the contemponiry dimensions of corporate charitable giving as it bears on
shareholders' rights l6 and corporate law paradigms. 17
Accordingly, Parts III through VI analyze the diverse causes and explanations for corporate charitable contributions and relate them to corporate
legal norms. This analysis proceeds under the headings of: (i) managerial
self-interest; (ii) corporate social responsibility; (iii) politicized philanthropy;
and (iv) profit-maximizing charitable contributions. First, as described in
Part III; in the absence of any form of accountability, corporate managers
are apt to use their control over corporate charitable contributions to confer benefits on themselves, rather than to benefit the firm or the community. When managers use the' firm's donations to pursue their personal
philanthropic objectives, such donations represent a form of agency costs,
and are inconsistent with the fiduciary obligations imposed by law. Second, as discussed in Part IV, when donations are made in the name of
corporate social responsibility (as opposed to traditional commercial objectives), corporate managers have failed to offer adequate justification for
their exclusive control over such decisions. Third, as described in Part V,
corporate charitable contributions to politicized nonprofit organizations
represent an· increasingly significant form of corporate political speech.
Such contributions, especially when they are made in the absence of disclosure, jeopardize the free speech and associational interests of corporate
shareholders. IS Finally, as discussed in Part VI, although corporate executives increasingly tout the "strategic benefits" accruing from corporate
16. Because corporate contributions are funded from corporate profits, they are paid forand therefore of special concern to-corporate shareholders. Nevertheless, a corporation's charitable contributions may frequently be of interest to nonshareholder constituencies as wen (e.g.,
customers, employees, and the public). In practice, if firms are required to disclose their contributions in reports to shareholders or SEC filings, nonshareholder constituencies will also gain
greater access to this information. (In light of the fact that shareholders fund corporate contributions (at least those that do not result in a net benefit for the firm), it is ironic that significant
solicitude has been paid to employees' charitable preferences-through the establishment of employee matching grant programs, for example-but not to shareholders'.)
17. The central thesis of this Article is that the separation between ownership and control
in the modem public corporation, in combination with an overly laissez-faire system of state and
federal regulation in the area of corporate philanthropy, has created the potential for gross managerial abuse of shareholders' property and speech interests. See ADoLF A. BERLE, JR. &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 68 (1932) ("[IJn
the corporate system, the 'owner' of industrial wealth is left with a mere symbol of ownership
while the power, the responsibility and the substance which have been an integral part of ownership in the past are being transferred to a separate group in whose hands lies control. ").
18. Because the business corporation is regarded as a private body, shareholders' liberty
interests do not obtain federal constitutional dimensions. However, the classification of business
corporations as private entities does not diminish the gravity of shareholder coercion in regard to
nonconsensual corporate political speech in my opinion. For further discussion, see infra Part V.
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contributions, without disclosure there is no means t~ assess whether the
firm's gifts have been structured according to value-maximizing criteria. In
addition, the inherently contradictory nature of profit-maximizing charitable contributions deserves further consideration.
The absence of substantive regulation, in combination with the
absence of a disclosure requirement, has meant that corporate senior executives have had a blank check to make corporate charitable contributions
independent of both business objectives and shareholder preferences. In no
other area of corporate affairs do managers enjoy the same degree of discretion with such a concomitant lack of accountability.19 As a response to
this failure of accountability, this Article argues that the SEC should
amend the federal securities regulations to require corporations to routinely
disclose to their shareholders accurate and comprehensive information
about the corporation's charitable contributions. 2o In particular, both the
aggregate total and the individual amounts of the firm's charitable gifts, the
identities of recipient nonprofit organizations, and the existence of any
shared directors on the boards of the corporation and the charities receiving
its contributions21 should routinely be disclosed to shareholders. In particular, the SEC should require that summary information be presented in the
annual report, while affording shareholders a right to obtain a comprehensive, detailed report of the company's charitable contributions upon
request.
While disclosure is not a panacea, obligatory disclosure of contributions information is likely to benefit shareholders in several respects.
Required disclosure is likely to deter corporate managers from using corporate contributions to pursue narrow, personal objectives, because it will
require them to sacrifice a portion of their professional capital if they are
unable to justify their firms' philanthropic practices according to established shareholder preferences or accepted commercial norms. Secondly,
requiring disclosure of corporate contributions is a first step in democra19. For instance, managerial discretion in the area of traditional corporate political activity
is cabined by the operation of the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") and other laws and
regulations. For an overview of FECA's requirements, as they relate to corporate expenditures,
see infra notes 246-263.
20. Corporations already maintain detailed records of their charitable contributions in order
to support the deductibility of such contributions under § 170. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13
(1996) ("Recordkeeping and return requirements for deductions of charitable contributions.").
Therefore, SEC-mandated disclosure of contribution data should not impose any significant additional information-gathering costs on corporations.
21. For a discussion of the "corporate governance" problems raised by common directors
serving on the board of the corporation and the charities receiving its contributions, see infra
note 133 and accompanying text.
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tizing the debate over corporate social resporisibility, so that shareholderswho fund such expenditures-may be afforded a greater role in elaborating
how, when, and according to what criteria the firm should allocate its
philanthropic capital. Thirdly, disclosure will afford shareholders the
option to withdraw their investment if they are opposed to the corporation's politicized charitable contributions, or to voice their opposition
through various forms of shareholder activism. Finally, disclosure will
afford both analysts and shareholders alike the opportunity to assess the
profit-maximizing claims made in regard to corporate contributions, and
will facilitate scholarly progress in the study of corporate philanthropy.
I. A BRIEF QUANTITATIVE AND PRACTICAL SURVEY OF
CORPORATE PHILANTI-IROPY

A.

Quantitative Perspectives

Corporate charitable contributions amount to several billion dollars in
aggregate on an annual basis,zz Direct 'corporate grants and grants by ~or22. Because ther~ is widespread misunderstanding regarding the availability of ~~q,orate
contributions information, I will describe the principal sources of this data. Since 1936, the
Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") has compiled and published statistical information on
corporate charitable contributions. These figures are made publicly available by. the IRS, on an
aggregated and company-blind basis, in a volume entitled Statistics of Income, Corporation Income
Tax Returns (the "SOl"). Unfortunately, there is a substantial delay in the publication of the
SOl, which seriously compromises the usefulness of this data. For example, the most recent
corporate contributions figures available in the SOl are for 1993. The SOl's corporate charitable
contributions figures represent the total dollar valuation assigned to direct corporate contributions
to qualified charitable orgariizations for which a deduction under § 170 has been claimed in the
year (together with carryovers), including 'transfers to corporate foundations. (To avoid double
counting, the SOl data does not reflect corporate foundations' transfers to "third-party" charitable organizations.) Despite certain technical caveats, as well as a substantial delay in its
publication, the SOl has been the single most important source of quantitative information on
corporate charitable contributions, providing the basis of almost all econometric study and
general quantitative analysis: See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND
CHARITABLE GIVING 195-96 (1985). A3 mentioned above, the crucial shortCOming of the SOl
data, in relation to corporate shareholders' interests, is that the SOl does not present any contribution data on a company-specific basis. Its findings are therefore of no use to shareholders (or
anyone else) interested in studying the philanthropic behavior of particular firms.
The other important source of data on corporate philanthropy is a joint survey conducted
annually by the Council for Aid to Education (the "CFAE'') and The Conference Board. These
survey results are published annually in the organizations' separate reports. The CFAE's data is
published by the American A3sociation of Fund-Raising Counsel (the "AAFRC") in its annual
report entitled, Giving USA. The Conference Board publishes its annual report on ,corporate
charitable contributions under its own name. In these cases, too, the data is presented on a
company-blind basis. There are slight methodological differences between these' three reports,
leading to slight discrepancies between the figures reported therein. Because of their greater
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porate foundations totalled $7.4 billion in 1995,23 without including con~
tributions arising from cause~related marketing, corporate special~event
sponsorships, or corporate public affairs departments. 24 Nontraditional
corporate "assistance" expenditures are also unreflected in the $7 .4~billion
charitable contributions figure. 25 The vast majority of corporate chari~
table contributions, approximately 75%, are made directly by corporations,
as opposed to through corporate foundations. 26 Cash predominates as the
most popular currency for corporate contributions. Cash transfers have
typically constituted more than 80% of the total value of corporate con~
tributions, with the remainder representing donations of products, property,
and equipment. 27 Although there are no established sources of company~
specific data,28 the IRS publishes aggregated contributions data based on
industry classifications. 29 From this data we know that certain industriesespecially pharmaceuticals; food, beverage, and tobacco; petroleum, gas,
and mining; and telecommunications companies-have consistently been
among the largest corporate contributors. 3o
timeliness, the figures presented in the text are based on the CFAE and The Conference Board's
survey results.
23. AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA 1996: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON
PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1995, at 89 (1996) [hereinafter GIVING USA 19961. Although
$7.4 billion is unquestionably a substantial sum, it should be recognized that corporate contributions represent only a small fraction of total annual charitable contributions. For 1995,
which was roughly typical of previous years, they represented 5.1 %. Id. Individuals are by far the
largest class of contributors, being responsible for about 80 cents of every dollar annually contributed to charity. Id. at 55. Nevertheless, corporate contributions appear to function as a bellwether for contributions from other sources, and are thus regarded by some as having importance
exceeding their individual amounts.
24. Id. at 89. For a discussion of contributions arising from cause-related marketing programs and corporate special-event sponsorships, see infra Part VI.
25. AUDRIS D. TILLMAN, THE CONFERENCE Bo., CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS, 1994, at
15 (1995) [hereinafter CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS, 19941.
26. GIVING USA 1996, supra note 23, at 89. According to Foundation Center and CFAE
data for 1994, corporate foundations' grants accounted for $1.6 billion out of a total of $6.9
billion in corporate charitable contributions. See also AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY,
GIVING USA 1995: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1994, at 79 (1995)
[hereinafter GIVING USA 19951.
27. The Conference Board reported the 1995 statistics, which reflect a slight decrease in
cash giving in comparison to recent years: 78% cash, 19% corporate product, and 3% property
and equipment. AUDRIS D. TILLMAN, THE CONFERENCE Bo., CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS IN
1995: AN ADVANCE REPORT 8 (1996) [hereinafter CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS IN 19951.
28. See supra note 22.
29. See, for example, U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME,
1993-CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS 1993.
30. According to The Conference Board's figures for 1995, the most heavily contributing
industries were (1) pharmaceutical companies, $325 million, (2) food, beverage, and tobacco
companies, $211 million, and (3) petroleum, gas, and mining companies, $165 million.
CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS IN 1995, supra note 27, at 6.
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Notwithstanding methodological variations31 and incomplete data,32
there is widespread agreement that corporate contributions have increased
substantially over the past twenty years33 despite inconsistent trends in
corporate profits. 34 Recent estimates put corporate charitable giving for
1975 at $3.72 billion (in "constant" or inflation-adjusted dollars).35 The
$7.4 billion figure for 1995 thus represents double the slim of twenty years
earlier. Assessing the magnitude of corporate charitable contributions, one
commentator observed that the $6.5-billion aggregate corporate contributions figure of the late 1980s was on par with the entire annual U.S. foreign
aid budget at that time. 36

31. Variations exist in regard to statistical sampling techniques, companies represented
(public-only or public and private), carryovers from year to year, and the inclusion of corporate
transfers to corporate foundations versus foundation payments to third-party charities, for
example. Both Giving USA and The Conference Board's annual reports include detailed
descriptions of their research methodologies.
32. Researchers have persistently complained about inadequate disclosure of corporate charitable contributions data, describing the resultant informational gaps as impediments to their
analysis. See, e.g., AAFRC TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA 1992: THE ANNUAL
REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1991, at 25 (1992) [hereinafter GIVING USA 1992]
("Nonprofit managers, their donors, and researchers who study them would also benefit from
accurate reporting and access to accurate information about the sector."); STEVEN R. NEIHEISEL,
CORPORATE STRATEGY AND THE POLITICS OF GooDWILL 8-9 (1994) ("The majority of corporations do not want the public to know how much they are contributing and to whom they are
contributing. Reliable data are therefore very difficult to obtain."); see also JAMES T. BENNETT,
PATTERNS OF CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY #5, at 10 (1989) ("It is highly disturbing that many
corporate managers are so secretive about the distribution of company funds for public affairs
purposes; in many cases even shareholders are denied access to such information."). Further
evidence that many fitrnS resist releasing this data upon shareholders' requests is prOVided by
corporations' efforts to exclude shareholder proposals (under the federal proxy system) calling for
such disclosure. See infra note 223.
33. In addition to gross dollar analysis, corporate giving is also analyzed as a percentage of
pretax corporate income. The average rate of corporate contributions as a percentage of corporate income was 0.82% in 1975; it was 1.24% in 1995. GIVING USA 1996, supra note 23, at 90.
The highwater mark was reached in the mid-1980s, when giving briefly exceeded 2% of pretax
income. Interestingly, although total corporate giving has increased on a gross dollar basis since
1992, on a percentage of income basis, giving has decreased during this period. This partly reflects the increases in corporate profits occurring during the previous few years. CORPORATE
CONTRIBUTIONS, 1994, supra note 25, at 11. Such average statistics hide substantial discrepancies among individual fitrnS, of course. For example, various groups of business organizations in
major cities have established "Five Percent" and "Two Percent" clubs to encourage corporate
contributions at such levels. KENNETH A. BERTSCH, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY REsEARCH CTR.,
CORPORATE GIVING IN THE REAGAN YEARS 1 (1985).
34. For an illustration of comparative rates of corporate contributions and corporate profits,
see AUDRIS D. TILLMAN, THE CONFERENCE Bo., CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS, 1993, at 13
(1994).
35. GIVING USA 1996, supra note 23, at 88. The contributions data derived from Giving
USA and presented in the text is presented in constant dollars.
36. Usha C.V. Haley, Corporate Contributions as Managerial Masques: Reframing Corporate
Contributions as Strategies to Influence Society, 28 J. MGMT. STUD. 485,485 (1991).
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Examining the pattern of contributions over this period in closer de,
tail, increases are represented as being continuous between 1975 and
1987.37 Thereafter, beginning in the late 1980s, a period of stagnation
occurred. 38 This stagnation, which amounted to a series of incremental
decreases when inflation was taken into account, had been regarded as
continuing through the mid,1990s. Research reports published in 1995
indicated that giving had slowed, and incrementally decreased in light of
inflation between 1988 and 1994.39 However, researchers have recently
altered their estimates of corporate contributions levels in the early to mid,
1990s. Reports based on data through 1995 suggest that the total con,
tributions figures for 1993 and 1994 had previously been underestimated, so
that the magnitude and duration of the decline had been overstated. 40
Giving USA 1996 indicated that contributions increased in both current
and constant dollars in 1993, 1994, and 1995.41 Contributions for 1995
represented a 4.56% increase over the prior year measured in constant
dollars (7.5 % in current, unadj usted dollars). 42 And companies responding
to The Conference Board's survey for 1995 predicted that moderate in'
creases incorporate philanthropic giving would continue throughout 1996
and 1997.43
Furthermore, analysts have revised their view of the relationship be,
tween traditional corporate charitable contributions and contributions
arising from corporate public affairs and marketing budgets. In reports
issued in 1995, commentators suggested that marketing,oriented, "strategic"
giving was supplanting traditional corporate philanthropy.44 In contrast,
Giving USA 1996 indicated that there may be a synergistic effect between
traditional corporate giving and public affairs and marketing,oriented con'
GIVING USA 1996, supra note 23, at 88.
1d. But see Hayden W. Smith, Corporations Are More Generous Than You Think,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 22, 1991.
39. GIVING USA 1995, supra note 26, at 77.
40. Giving USA 1995 reported that contributions had failed to keep pace with inflation for
seven consecutive years. 1d. at 77.
41. GIVING USA 1996, supra note 23, at 88.

37.

38.

42.

1d.

43. CoRPORATE CoNTRIBlITlONS IN 1995, supra note 27, at 3-4.
44. GIVING USA 1995, supra note 26, at 77. At a press conference announcing the
AAFRCs charitable contributions figures for 1994, the chairman of the AAFRC stated: "Traditional giving, directed by a philanthropy staff and the interests of executive officers, is giving way
to more strategic and less statistically observable programs overseen by financial officers and
housed in marketing and public affairs departments." AAFRC Trust for Philanthropy, Voluntary
Contributions to Non-Profits Continue to Rise, Individual Contributions Lead the Way,
Corporate Giving Going Through Changes, Affecting Level of Corporate Donations (May 25,
1995) (press release, on file with author) (emphasis added).
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tributions, so that both forms of corporate giving are seen to be increasing. 45 In addition to the traditional forms of corporate contributions, corporations continue to make "corporate assistance expenditures," including
subsidizing employee volunteering and executive consulting programs, the
use of corporate facilities and services, and below-market transactions (including commercial loans)-all of which, again, are not reflected in the
$7.4 billion contributions figure. 46
B.

The Role of Corporate Senior Executives

While in certain corporations the contributions function has been
decentralized, in most public corporations senior executive officers still
exert extraordinary influence over the size of gifts and the selection of
beneficiary organizations. Trends in contributions-based marketing and
strategic alliances with corporate public affairs departments have affected
the administration of corporate charitable contributions in certain instances,47 but a host of studies and commentaries attest to the continued
control and influence exerted by senior corporate executives in relation to
their firms' philanthropic practices. 48

45. GIVING USA 1996, supra note 23, at 89.
46. The Conference Board reported the value of such "corporate assistance expenditures"
reported by survey respondents at $157 million for 1994, $186 million for 1993, and $99 million
for 1992. CORPORATE CONTRIBlTfIONS, 1994, supra note 25, at 15. For further commentary,
see Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Discretion of Corporate Management to Do Good at the Expense of
Sharehokkr Gain-A Survey of, and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7
(1988), and, though not as timely, Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social
Crisis, 50 B.U. L. REV. 157 (1971), both of which discuss the variety of channels for corporate
altruism and the sources of legal authority therefor.
47. See Craig Smith, The New Corporate Philanthropy, 72 HARv. Bus. REV., May-June
1994, at 105.
48. NEIHEISEL, supra note 32, at 54 ("CEO influence is important not only where we might
expect-at the level of goal setting-but it is also deep in that it extends to even determining
specific beneficiaries. This is quite extraordinary given the size of the contributions function
relative to other corporate functions."). (Neiheisel's work also emphasized the importance of the
professional contributions staff.) A number of studies assay the power that senior executive officers and corporate directors retain over corporate contributions. See, e.g., JAMES F. HARRIS &
ANNE KLEPPER, THE CONFERENCE Bo., CORPORATE PHILAmHROPIC PuBLIC SERVICE
ACTIVITIES (1976) (finding that top management plays a major role in setting the goals, priorities,
and budget levels of the contributions function); KATHRYN TROY, THE CONFERENCE Bo., THE
CORPORATE CONTRIBlTfIONS FUNCTION (1982) (contributions managers reported meeting with
their CEOs on at least a monthly basis and rated the CEOs influence on program content and
grant size as about a four on a five-point scale); Arthur H. White & John Bartolomeo, Corporate
Giving: The Views of Chief Executive Officers of Major American Corporations, COUNCIL ON
FOUNDS., May 1982, at 49, 50 (reporting that 81% of respondents surveyed indicated that the
CEO had total or a large degree of influence over budgets and 68% said that the CEO had a large
degree of influence in selecting specific recipients). (These studies are cited in NEIHEISEL, supra
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Corporate Charitable Foundations

In contrast to direct corporate grant-making, certain firms have established separate charitable foundations to administer a portion of their philanthropic giving. 49 The principal function of these foundations-which
are themselves charitable organizations qualified under § 501(c)(3)-is to
disseminate the donor corporations' grants to third-party charitable organizations. 5o Private. foundations are subject to special regulatory requirements and penalties, in addition to those under § 501(c)(3).51 Most
significantly for our purposes, private foundations are required by the IRS to
file a detailed informational return, the '.'Form 990-PF," and to make. it
available for inspection by third partiesY The Form 990-PF indicates the
individual amounts of the foundation's grants,. and the identities of the
recipients. Such required disclosure of foundation-based corporate grantmaking contrasts markedly with the absence of disclosure in regard to direct
corporate grant-making. 53
note 32, at 53-55.) See also Richard 1. Morris & Daniel A. Biederman, How.to Gille Away Money
InteUigently, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 151, 153 ("[Chief executive officers') peers
approach them constantly to support pet causes, and they reciprocate. A company's full contributions budget can easily be committed in this way, and large slices of the CEO's time are consumed in the process. "). For discussion of the philanthropy laws' construction of decisional
authority in regard to corporate contributions, see infra note 95 and accompanying text.
49. For an overview of key Code provisions pertaining to 'corporate foundations, see supra
note 10 and the citations therein. For discussion of the historical development and public policy
controversies surrounding private foundations, see, for example, COMMISSION ON FOUNDS. AND
PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY, FOUNDATIONS, PRIVATE GIVING AND PUBLIC POLICY: REpORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON FOUNDATIONS AND PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY
(1970).
50. See supra note 10.
51. See Cesare, supra note 10.
52. See I.R.C. § 6033(c) (1994). However, it should be noted that the usefulness of such
foundation disclosure is compromised by the relative inaccessibility of the Form 990-PFs. Foundations are required to allow inspection of Form 990-PFs at their premises, but are not required to
copy them or to allow them to be removed from their premises. See id. § 6104(d). The logistical
problems historically associated with obtaining the informational returns of nonprofit organizations are discussed in GIVING USA 1992, supra note 32, at 28-29. On July 30, .l996, Congress
enacted the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996), which
(among other changes) revised § 6104(e) to make Form 990 reports of public charities readily
available to individuals upon request (and payment of a small fee). Curiously, the legislation did
not affect private foundations' filings (the Form 990-PF), so that corporate foundations' reports
remain relatively inaccessible.
53. The Form 990-PF disclosure requirement pertaining to private foundations' affairs grew
out of the public controversy that surrounded corporate foundations' activities in the late 1960s.
This controversy led to various investigations by private commissions and a congressional response thereto in the Tax Reform Act of 1969. See supra note 49. The absence of regulation in
the area of direct corporate grant-making may represent a classic catch-22: The absence of a dis-
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While distinct patterns and rules pertain to foundation-based corporate
grant-making,54 it is important to recall that corporate foundations are not
the source of most corporate charitable contributions. As mentioned previously, approximately 75% of all corporate contributions are made on a
direct basis. 55 Also significant is the fact that even where firms have established a separate foundation, a substantial portion of their donations
have continued to be made on a direct basis. 56 No rule requires a corporation to disseminate its gifts through its charitable foundation merely because such a foundation has been established. Thus, where confidentiality
is considered important, a firm may simply elect to make any "sensitive"
contributions directly, thus avoiding a disclosure requirement.
Furthermore, the establishment of a corporate foundation need not
curtail the influence of a corporation's senior officers. It is common practice for a company's high-level officers to serve on the board of directors of
the foundation, or to closely monitor the foundation's affairs,51 Therefore, the existence of corporate charitable foundations has largely functioned to recapitulate the issues pertaining to corporl;lte grant-making-as
they relate to shareholders' interests-on another institutional level.
In conclusion, in light of the absence of meaningful substantive standards or other mechanisms of accountability, the contemporary legal
critique of corporate charitable giving must address a situation in which
corporate executives maintain control over billions of dollars of corporate
(and corporate foundation) resources which they may allocate to charitable
entities independent of commercial considerations and according to their
own pleasure.
closure requirement may be based on the relative absence of information-which may explain the
absence of attention paid to the subject. It is also possible to make a public cholce-oriented
interpretation of the confidentiality and permissiveness that characterize the legal posture toward
corporate charitable contributions; i.e., politicians derive benefits from corporate gifts to politicized charitable organizations serving their policy objectives, see infra Part V, and from any reduction in taxes attributable to voluntary corporate charitable support, and are thus unlikely to
advocate .measures intended to increase oversight in this area.
54. A thorough treatment of foundation-based corporate grant-making and its significance
vis-a-vis legal policy is beyond the scope of this Article. For an analysis of the economic aspects
of corporate charitable foundations' affairs, see Natalie Jeanette Webb, Company Foundations
and the Economics of Corporate Giving (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University).
55. See supra note 26.
56. Webb, supra note 54, at 44.
57. ld. at 65-71. A particular example is supplied by Mary Cunningham Agee's appointment to the presidency of Morrison Knudsen Corporation's charitable foundation. See Brian
O'Reilly, Agee in Exile, FORTUNE, May 29,1995, at 51, 56.

44 UCLA LAW REVIEW 579 (1997)

594
II. THE STATES'

DECISION NOT TO REGUlATE
CoRPORATE PHIlANTHROPY

Over the course of this century, the states' approach to corporate
charitable giving has undergone a complete about-face. At the tum of the
century, in light of the operation of the ultra vires doctrine, the pervasive
statutory silence concerning corporate charitable contributions was interpreted by the courts as prohibiting true corporate philanthropy. By midcentury, the majority of states had enacted laws that validated corporate
philanthropic authority, but these statutes typically imposed substantial
limitations and requirements on the practice of corporate charitable giving.
Mter mid-century, these "regulatory" philanthropy laws were universally
repealed in favor of open-ended enabling laws. These modem laws license
truly philanthropic corporate giving; furthermore, in light of the statutory
history preceding them, they must be regarded as reflecting a decision on
the part of the state legislatures to forego the regulation of corporate charitable giving. But in failing to supply any objective standards or safeguards to
govern corporate executives' decisions in this area, the modem corporate
philanthropy laws have failed to protect shareholders' best interests.
A. The Legal Background of the Modem Philanthropy Provisions
1.

The Ultra Vires Problem

From the late nineteenth century through the early twentieth century,
the most pressing legal question concerning corporate charitable contributions was whether businesses had the legal authority to make them. 58
Under the doctrine of defined corporate powers, corporations were regarded
as having only such powers as were granted by the state and reflected in the
58. See, e.g., Brinson Ry. v. Exchange Bank, 85 S.E. 634 (Ga. Ct. App. 1915); McCrory v.
Chambers, 48 Ill. App. 445, 452-53 (1892) (directors of bank were without authority to contribute to a fund collected for purpose of retaining manufacturing firm within city's limits, despite
indirect benefits that might be obtained by company and community generally); Davis v. Old
Colony R.R. 131 Mass. 258 (1881) (finding railroad company's guarantee for payment of music
festival's expenses unlawful, despite probability that company would benefit from the festival).
As Phillip Blumberg noted, these decisions did not involve gifts to established charitable organizations, and are thus distinguishable from the modem corporate philanthropy decisions. See
Blumberg, supra note 46.
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corporation's. charter. 59
All other acts were "ultra vires" -literally
"beyond the powers" of the corporation: 60 Thus, charitable expenditures
by business corporations were originally regarded as "waste" because, prior
to the 1930s, almost all the states' incorporation statutes failed to include
corporate philarithropic authority within the corporate powers enumerated
therein. 61
.

2.

Incidental Powers as Authorization for Contributions

In the initial process of legal liberalization, various courts relied on the
notion of "incidental corporate' powers"62 to uphold the legality of nontraditional expenditures when it could be demonstrated that the corporation,
and not merely the surrounding community in general, would foreseeably
59. For an early treatment of the ultra vires doctrine in the area of corporate philanthropy,
see Samuel Davis, The Application of the Doctrine of Ultra Vires to Expenditures of Corporations
Outside the Usual Course of Business-Some Elementary Principles Recalled, 1 B.U. L. REV. 99
(1921), See also Hyarnsy. Old Dominion Co., 93 A 747, 752 (Me. 1915) ("[C]orporate powers
are limited to those expressly granted and incidental implied powers necessary to carry into effect
the powers so expressly granted. "). For discussion of the early contributions cases, see Blumberg,
supra note 46, at 168-73; Theodore W. Cousens, How Far Corporations May Contribute to Charity,
35 VA. L. REV. 401 (1949); Davis, supra note 46, at 57-64; and J.J. Marticelli, Annotation,
Power of a Business Corporation to Donate to a Charitable or Similar Institution, 39 AL.R.2d 1192
(1955).
.
60. The longeviry of the ultra vires concern in the context of corporate charitable contributions is reflected in the fact that as late as 1953, in the landmark case of A.P. Smith
Manufacturing Co. II. Barlow, the New Jersey Supreme Court specifically addressed itself to the
question of Smith corporation's legal authoriry to make the charitable gift. AP. Smith Mfg. Co.
v. Barlow, 98 A2d 581 (N.J. 1953). And, of course, the ultra vires doctrine explains the rhetorical posture of the modem corporate philanthropy laws, which speak to the matter of corporate
power expressly.
61. See infra note 66.
62. The classic description of the scope of 'incidental corporate powers is provided in
Steinway II. Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S. 718, 720 (Sup. Ct. 1896): "If that act is one which is
lawful in itself, and not otherwise prohibited, is done for the purpose of serving corporate ends,
and is reasonably tributary to the promotion of these ends, in a substantial, and not in a remote
and fanCiful, sense, it may fairly be considered within charter powers." From the perspective of
incidental corporate powers, foreseeable financial benefits validated the legaliry of contributions
(and other corporate acts), because the corporation's fundamental purpose was to maximize
profits. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("The difference
between an incidental humanitarian expenditure of corporate funds for the benefit of employees,
like the building of a hospital for their use, and the employment of agencies for the betterment of
their condition, and a general purpose to benefit mankind at the expense of others is
obvious .... A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. ").
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benefit therefrom. 63
Nevertheless, the incidental powers doctrine
represented an infirm legal footing for corporate philanthropy: Differing
interpretations of the directness of the required benefits gave rise to substantial variation in the interpretation of the scope of permissible versus
impermissible contributions. 64 In addition, the relative infrequency of
litigation in the area meant that the earlier, more conservative holdings
retained their precedential stature in many jurisdictions. Thus, throughout
the first several decades of the twentieth century, there was substantial
variation among the state jurisdictions in the law governing corporate
charitable giving.
3.

Early Legislative Prescriptions

Uncertainty regarding the legal authority for corporate charitable
giving was regarded as i~ibiting the practice of corporate philanthropy in
some measure. 65 In response to this uncertainty, state corporate philanthropy law underwent yet another evolutionary step. Starting from around
1920, several states enacted philanthropy provisions as part of their corpo63. Charitable giving is described as an incidental corporate power in Hutton (I. West Cork
Railway, 23 Ch. D. 654, 673 (1883) (Bowen, J.): "[C]harity has no business to sit at boards of
directors [as) charity. There is, however, a kind of charitable dealing which is for the interest of
those who practice it, and to that extent and in that garb ... charity may sit at the board but for
no other purpose." See also Richelieu Hotel Co. v. International Military Encampment Co., 29
N.E. 1044 (Ill. 1892); Virgil v. Virgil Practice Clavier Co., 68 N.Y.S. 335 (Sup. Ct. 1900). The
liberal interpretation of incidental corporate powers is exemplified by AnnstTOng Cork Co. (I. H.A.
Meldrum Co., 285 F. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1922), which upheld the legality of the corporation's commitment to fund the business curriculum at a local college and university on the grounds that the
business might have benefited therefrom, notwithstanding the company's intervening bankruptcy.
64. See Ray Garrett, Corporate Donations to Charity, 4 Bus. LAW. 30 (1948); George D.
Gibson, Corporate Contributions to Charity and Enabling Legislation, 14 Bus. LAW. 439 (1959)
("The old cases requiring that public gifts be 'reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the
company's business for the company's benefit' or 'reasonably tributary to the promotion of those
[corporate) ends' are among the most strained, technical and contradictory doctrines of the law,
which should be gladly interred and forgotten." (foomotes omitted».
65. See Miguel A. de Capriles & Ray Garrett Jr., Legality of Corporate Support to Education:
A SuTtley of Current Developments, 38 A.B.A. J. 209 (1952) (expressing the need for continued
statutory reform in order to legitimate and facilitate increased levels of corporate giving). Of
course, the continued prevalence of the incidental powers doctrine (and thus the direct benefit
requirement) represented a substantial legal impediment to the validation of corporate philanthropy at the nationalleve!' See Garrett, supra note 64, at 28-39 (describing certain contemporary corporate giving initiatives as resting "solely upon public approval and the current general
acceptance of the idea by stockholders" rather than on secure legal grounds).
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rations codes. By 1949, thirteen states and Hawaii had passed statutory
provisions expressly licensing certain corporate charitable contributions. 66
Nevertheless, with Texas' unqualified corporate philanthropy
provision as the exception,67 the philanthropy statutes enacted prior to
mid-century were highly prescriptive in nature, imposing substantial requirements and limitations on corporate charitable contributions. 68 For
example, the early statutes almost universally required express board of
director approval to authorize corporate contributions. 69 The laws frequently limited the permissible amount of annual corporate contributions
66. These states include Texas (1917), Ohio (1920), New York (1923), Tennessee (1925),
New Jersey (1930), Massachusetts (1933), Michigan (1935), Missouri (1937), Delaware (1941),
Maryland (1945), North Carolina (1945), Pennsylvania (1945), and Virginia (1947). Hawaii
enacted a provision in 1947. (Illinois had enacted a contributions provision in 1917, but until
1949 it applied only to wartime donations.) For discussion of the early statutes, see Gibson, supra
note 64, at 434; Bert S. Prunty, Jr., Lolle and the Business Corporation, 46 VA. L. REv. 467 (1960);
F. EMERSON ANDREWS, CoRPORATE GIVING app. C (Transaction Publishers 1993) (1952) ("Permissive Legislation in the States and Territories"). I have relied on Andrews' statutory appendix
for the citations to the early philanthropy laws that are presented herein. (The reader is directed
to these laws for the fulfstatutory citation and for a noteworthy treatment of the early history of
corporate charitable giving practices.) For additional citations, see Garrett, supra note 64, at
34-39. For further commentary on the development of corporate philanthropy, see RICHARD
EELLS, CoRPORATION GIVING IN A FREE SOCIETY (1956); MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH,
PHILANTHROPY AND THE BUSINESS CoRPORATION (1972); Peter Dobkin Hall, Business Gilling
and Social Inllestment in the United States, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING 221 (Richard Magat ed.,
1989). Also of relevance is JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CoRPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970).
67. Law of Feb. 13, 1917, Ch. IS, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 25.
68. A good example is prOVided by New York's first (extra-wartime) contributions provision,
enacted in 1923. Appearing in Chapter 25 of New York's General Corporation Law, it prOVided:
§ 45. Expenditures for social and economic benefit. Nothing contained in this chapter
or in any other law shall be deemed to make it unlawful for any corporation or jointstock association to cooperate with other corporations and With natural persons in the
creation and maintenance of instrumentalities conducive to the Betterment of the social
and economic conditions under which such corporation or joint-stock association is
operating, and its directors or trustees may appropriate and expend for such purposes such
reasonable sum or sums as they may deem expedient and as in their judgment will contribute to the protection of the corporate property and tend to promote the interests of
the corporation and its stockholders.
CAHILL'S CoNSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK 785 (James C. Cahill ed., 1923).
69. Board approval was required in the laws enacted by Ohio (1920), New York (1923),
Tennessee (1925), New Jersey (1930), Massachusetts (1933), Missouri (1937), Delaware (1941),
Maryland (1945), North Carolina (1945), and Virginia (1945). ANDREWS, supra note 66. In
contrast, board approval was not explicitly mandated under Texas' (1917) or Michigan's (1933)
statutes. ld. Pennsylvania's law, enacted in 1945, provided that contributions could be made to
the extent provided for in the corporation's bylaws or "by resolution of its shareholders." Id.
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by establishing a maximum level of contributions within the exclusive
discretion of the board, with larger gifts being permissible in the absence of
a shareholder veto. 70 Pennsylvania's and Hawaii's early philanthropy laws
required shareholder approval for corporate contributions. 71 Some states
required corporations to make donations to charities located neru;-by the
business' operations, thus imposing a loose geographic version of the
common law's benefit-to-the-business requirement. 72 Many 'states also
imposed a requirement that the company's contributions be made in con70. For example, New York's wartime contributions provision, enacted in 1918, provided
directors with the following authority:
That during the continuance of the war any corporation organized under the laws of this
state may co-operate with other corporations and with natural persons in the creation
and maintenance of instrumentalities conducive to the winning of the war, and its directors or trustees may appropriate and expend for such purposes such sum or sums as they
may deem expedient and as, in their judgment, will contribute to the protection of the
corporate interests, provided that whenever the expenditures for such purposes in any
calendar year shall in the aggregate amount to .one per centum on the capital stock outstanding, then, before any further expenditure is made during such year for such purposes
by the corporation, ten days' notice shall be given to the stockholders in such manner as
the directors or trustees may direct of the intention to make such further expenditure,
specifying the amount thereof, and if written objection be made by stockholders holding
twenty-five per centum or more of the stock of the corporation, such further expenditure
shall not be made until it shall have been authorized at a stockholders' meeting.
Law of Apr. 16, 1918,ch. 240, § 1, 1918 N.Y. Laws 885. Ohio (1920) and New Jersey' (1930)
enacted philanthropy provisions (which were not limited to wartime contributions) containing a
similar shareholder-veto term. ANDREWS, supra note 66. New York repealed the above statute
in 1923 and enacted a'more general philanthropy law, which did not contain the shareholder
veto term..
71. Pennsylvania's earliest law (1945) required that fintis' philanthropic contributions be
sanctioned by the corporation's bylaws or, otherwise, "by resolution of its shareholders."
ANDREWS, supra note 66. Hawaii's 1947 statute provided simply that donations "may be authorized by the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the stock of any such corporation."
Id.
For example, New York's 1923 statute authorized contributions to "instrumentalities
conducive to the betterment of the social and economic conditions under which such corporation or
joint-stock association is operating." CAHILL'S LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 68, at 785 (emphasis
added). Similarly, Massachusetts' statute, enacted in .1933, provided as follows:
Every corporation organized under the laws of this commonwealth and doing business or
operating therein may, by vote of its directors, or of its officers having the powers of
directors, contribute such sum or sums of money as said directors or officers may determine to be reasonable to any general fund being raised by a relief committee or agency
approved by the commissioner of public welfare, as evidenced by a writing filed in his
office, and formed for the purpose of raising money to be used for, the betterment of
social and economic conditions in any community' in which such corporation is doing busi-

n.

nw.

.

Acts of Feb. 9, 1933, ch. 8, § 1, 1933 Mass. Laws 18, 19 (emphasis added). Missouri's statute,
enacted in 1937, provided that corporations could make charitable contributions to any charitable corporations organized under the laws of Missouri. See Laws of Mar. 25, 1937, 1937 Mo.
Laws.
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cert with other corporations' or natural persons' contributions,73 which
perhaps reflected a concern that corporate directors might otherwise exploit
their newfound discretion to subsidize pet charities of their own creation.
In some cases the scope of authorized donations was limited to those "furthering the corporation's interests" (or some analogous criteria)-which
meant that these statutes represented only a minor liberalization from the
previous common-law direct benefit requirement. 74 Finally, at different
times, both Ohio75 and New York7 6 imposed a disclosure requirement on
corporate charitable contributions, which mandated that both the amounts
of the contributions and the identities of the recipients be disclosed.
The corporate philanthropy statutes enacted prior to mid-century were
an experiment in legislative balancing. A variety of factors had. mandated
greater legal authority for corporate charitable contributions, yet the states
had historically looked to protecting corporate shareholders' property interests. Although the state legislatures acted throughout the first half of the
twentieth century (and thereafter) to legitimize the contributions function
as a valid corporate power, the highly prescriptive nature of the early laws
reflected the legislatures' sensitivity to the potential for waste and abuse in
73. This requirement is present in the early statutes of Ohio (1920), New York (1923), New
Jersey (1930), Massachusetts (1933), and Delaware (1941). ANDREWS, supra note 66.
74. Such states include, for example, Ohio (1920) (authorizing contributions as would "contribute to the protection of corporate interests"); New York (1923) (authorizing contributions
which would "contribute to the protection of the corporate property and tend to promote the
interests of the corporation and its stockholders"); New Jersey (1930) (authorizing contributions as
would "contribute to the protection of corporate interests"); Delaware (1941) (authorizing contributions as "will benefit or contribute to the protection of the corporate interests"). See id.
75. Ohio's original legislation, from 1920, imposed the following disclosure requirement:
All such corporations making appropriations and expenditures under the provisions of
this act shall report annually to the secretary of state the sums so appropriated or expended and the name or names of the community funds or philanthropic, charitable or
benevolent instrumentalities in whose behalf such sums are appropriated or expended.
Act of Feb. 4, 1920, 108 Ohio Laws 1245. The disclosure requirement was eliminated in 1927,
upon the enactment of Ohio's General Corporation Act.
76. New York enacted a disclosure requirement for the first time in 1950. It provided:
A domestic corporation which submits an annual report to its stockholders and which,
pursuant to the authority of this section, appropriates, spends or contributes a sum or
sums aggregating in excess of five hundred dollars to or on behalf of anyone donee,
during the period covered by such report, shall include in such report the identity of
each such donee together with the total amount appropriated, spent or contributed to it
or on its behalf during such period. If such corporation does not submit such an annual
report to its stockholders it shall send to each one a statement of the total amount of all
such appropriations, expenditures and contributions made during each fiscal year and any
stockholder, upon written request, shall be entitled to an itemized list of such donees and
amounts. The corporation need not comply with such a request regarding any year more
than five years prior to that in which such request is made.
Act of Mar. 30, 1950, ch. 297, § I, 1950 N.Y. Laws 974, 975 (repealed 1951).
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the area of corporate philanthropy. The imposition of precisely defined
requirements and limitations in regard to corporate charitable contributions
was thus intended as an accommodation between the potentially conflict,
ing priorities of shareholder wealth maximization and corporate,funded
social activism.
4.

The Organized Bar Advocates "New or Improved" Corporate
Contributions Statutes

The balancing, approach characteristic of the early philanthropy stat,
utes proved short' lived. In .light of congressional validation of corporate
charitable giving,77 increased statutory recognition of corporate philan,
thropic authority in the states,78 and corporate practice established over
the course of two world wars,79 the organized bar took up the cause of
liberalizing the states' corporate philanthropy laws.
Ray Garrett; Jr., chairman of the American Bar Association's (the
"ABA") Committee on Business Corporations,80 addressed the ABA's
annual meeting in 1948, and advocated broad,based statutory reform. S!
Garrett admonished those present: "If we believe that business corporations
should be entitled to make donations to charity, it seems that we, as law,
yers, should seek means to legalize them so far as possible. "82 Garrett
promptly formulated "a proposal that the states be urged to enact unrestric,
tive statutes authorizing donations to community chests and to charitable,
scientific and educational institutions in such amounts as the board of
77. The historical context surrounding Congress' enactment of the corporate charitable
deduction in 1935 is discussed in Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Gilling, 44 DEPAUL
L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1994). The enactment of the corporate charitable deduction was viewed as
congressional "encouragement" of corporate charitable giving. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v.
Trustees, Inc., 329 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah 1958) ("In 1935 Congress encouraged corporate contributions to eleemosynary causes by allowing a deduction for tax purposes in such cases." (emphasis
added».
78. As indicated previously, Ray Garrett observed that by 1949 thirteen states and Hawaii
had enacted some form of statutory authorization for corporate philanthropy. Garrett, supra note
64, at 31.
79. For historical treatments of the development of corporate charitable giving, see supra
note 66. In addition, the opinion in A.P. Smith II. Barlow describes the social and economic
developments that had mandated in favor of expanded corporate philanthropic authority. A.P.
Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
80. The ABA's Committee on Business Corporations was subsequently renamed the "Committee on Corporate Laws." See de Capriles & Garrett, supra note 65, at 211.
, 81. See de Capriles & Garrett, supra note 65, at 209-12. The full text of Mr. Garrett's
speech to the ABA Committee on Business Corporations was published in The Business Lawyer.
See Garrett, supra note 64.
82. Garrett, supra note 64, at 33.
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direetors may deem proper,"83 and submitted the proposal to the ABA's
Committee on Business Corporations immediately thereafter. 84
In 1949 and 1950, the ABA's Committee on Business Corporations
circulated the proposal advocating the adoption of unrestrictive corporate
philanthropy laws to all secretaries of state and state bar association presidents. 85 The Committee's model philanthropy provision, which was characterized by the absence of any language qualifying the scope of corporate
philanthropic authority, was codified as section 4(m) of the ABA's Model
Business Corporation Act, first published in 1950.86 Thereafter, the pace
of legal reform accelerated dramatically. Many state legislatures enacted
unqualified corporate .philanthropy provisions of the kind endorsed by the
ABA. ,Other states, having .previously enacted detailed, prescriptive philanthropy provisions, repealed them in favor of the pared-down, "modernized" version endorsed by the ABA.87
Liberalization in the courts' approach to corporate charitable contributions was also apparent at this time. Most notably, the landmark case of
A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, decided by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in 1953, reflected the changing view of corporate philanthropy.88 In upholding the validity of Smith Corporation's $1500 contribution to Princeton University, the court endorsed what it viewed as
evolving expectations of "corporate citizenship"89 and elaborated on busi-

83.

Id.

84.

See de Capriles &. G'arrett, supra note 65, at 211.

85.

Id.
Id. The original Model Business Corporation Act was a product of the collaborative ef-

86.

forts of Mr. Garrett's ABA committee and the American Bar Foundation. The first edition of
the Model Act was published in The Business Lawyer. See Model Business Corporation Act, 6 Bus.
LAW. 75 (1950) ("Section 4. GENERAL POWERS. Each corporation shall have power: ... (m)
To make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes; and
in time of war to make donations in aid of war activities.").
87. As described supra note 66, only 13 states and Hawaii had enacted some statutory
authorization for corporate charitable contributions by 1949. Yet only five years later, in 1953,
the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that 29 states had enacted statutes authorizing corporate
philanthropy. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 587 (N.J. 1953). In 1959, George
D. Gibson indicated that 42 states had enacted statutes authorizing corporate charitable contributions. Gibson, supra note 64, at 434-35.
88. The A.P. Smith opinion provides an extended examination of the legal, historical, social, and economic changes that mandated expanded corporate philanthropic authority. For
example, the court noted the "increased" calls by the public for corporations to make additional
donations and thereby "assume the modem obligations of good citizenship." A.P. Smith, 98 A.2d
at 586, 589-90. In the same vein, see de Capriles &. Garrett, supra note 65, at 209-12.
89. A.P. Smith, 98 A.2d at 586 ("[Mlodem conditions require that corporations
acknowledge and discharge social as well as private responsibilities as members of the communities within which they operate."); see also Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 329 P.2d 3~8,
400-01 (Utah 1958) ("The new concept of corporate social responsi~ility seems to have become
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ness' obligation to support the conditions facilitating free enterprise. 90 In
contrast, it devoted only scant attention to the issue of shareholders' pr~
perty interests.
B.

The Current State of the States' Philanthropy

Laws~

The legal progeny of the unrestrictive philanthropy provision endorsed
by the ABA, the modem philanthropy laws appearing within the states'
corporation codes have assumed three distinct formulations. In twenty,four
states and the District of Columbia the provisions state simply that corpora,
tions shall have power "to make donations for the public welfare or for
charitable, scientific or educational purposes. "91 Delaware, the state in
which close to tw~thirds of the Fortune 500 are incorporated, has a philan,
thropy provision of this kind. 92 In nineteen other states, two provisions
govern corporate contributions. One authorizes contributions "furthering
the business and affairs of the corporation," while the other authorizes truly
fait accompli. ").
90. AP. Smith, 98 A.2d at 586 ("More and more [businesses] have come to recognize that
their salvation rests upon sound economic and social environment which in tum rests in no
insignificant part upon free and vigorous nongovernmental institutions of learning.").
91. These states are as follows: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Dela·
ware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Illinois; Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, and
West Virginia. See ALA. CODE § 10·2A·20(13) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.010(13) (Michie
1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10"()04(A)(13) (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26·204 (Michie
1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33·291(d) (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (1993); HAw.
REv. STAT. § 415·4(13) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 30·1-4(M) (1994); ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN.
5/3.10(m) (West 1994); KAN. CORP. CODE ANN. § 17-6102(9) (West 1995); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:41(12) (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 2·103(13) (1994); MICH.
COMPo LAWS § 450.1261(k) (West 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.385(12), (15) (West 1994);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21·2004(13) (1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 78.070(6) (Michie 1993); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 5J.11-4(M) (Michie 1994); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(0) (Banks·Baldwin
1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1016(9) (West 1994); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1502(a)(9)
(1994); R.1. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-4(13) (1993); S.D. CODIAED LAWS § 47-2·58(13) (Michie 1994);
TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(14) (West 1994); W. VA. CODE § 31·1·8(M) (1996).
The District of Columbia also has this kind of contributions provision. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 29·505(13) (1994). Arkansas and Maryland have statutes that generally follow this format but
also require board of director approval. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4·25·103 (Michie 1994); MD. CODE
ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS § 2·103(13) (1994). Nebraska's law requires that corporations make
donations "in the territory in which it operates." NEB. REv. STAT. § 21·2004 (13) (1993). The
states differ slightly in their enumeration of authorized philanthropic purposes, but the differences
are largely semantic. In all cases the language employed is very general.
92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (1993) ("Specific Powers.-Every corporation created
under this chapter shall have power to: ... Make donations for the public welfare or for chari·
table, scientific or educational purposes, and in time of war or other national emergency in aid
thereof.").
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philanthropic contributions, as it contains no such limiting language. (The
latter provisions are thus identical to the first class of laws described above,
which simply authorize donations for charitable, scientific, and educational
purposes.) 93 Seven other states-including California, New York, and
New Jersey-have enacted laws authorizing corporations to make charitable
contributions "irrespective of corporate benefit." The abrogation of the
benefit-to-the-business requirement is made express in the language of these
statutes. 94 Exhibiting only minor semantic differences, the modern philanthropy laws are uniform in their significance. They authorize seemingly
unlimited philanthropic contributions from corporate capital without regard
to whether the firm will be benefited thereby.
As the above discussion illustrates, these statutes function to validate
corporate philanthropic authority, but they do not regulate the practice of
corporate charitable giving. In contrast to the early statutes, the modern
laws fail to define any quantitative parameters for corporate charitable
giving. They also fail to prescribe a decisional framework for corporate
philanthropy: They are absolutely silent on the matter of who shall have
decision-making authority over corporate charitable contributions. This
silence vis-a-vis decisional authority abrogates any statutory claim on the
part of corporate shareholders to have a right to participate in corporate
philanthropic decision-making, because the states' corporations codes allo-

93. States having such twin donations provisions include Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi (which requires also that the contributions be accounted for as
an operating expense), Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Vermont, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See COLO. REv.
STAT. § 7-103-l02~, (n) (Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0302(12), (14) (West 1993); GA.
CODE ANN. § 14-2-302(13), (16) (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-22-2(13), (15) (Michie 1994);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.302(13), (15) (West 1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271B.3-020(m), (0)
(Michie 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-3.02(13), (15) (1993); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-115(13), (15) (1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:3.02(13), (15) (1995); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-3-02(a)(13), (15) (1994); OR. REv. STAT. § 60.077(2)(n), (P) (1993): S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 33-3-102(13), (15) (law. Co-op. 1995); TENN .. CODE ANN. § 48-13-102(13), (14) (1995); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 16-10a-302(13), (15) (1994): VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 3.02(13), (15) (1993):
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-627(A)(12), (13) (Michie 1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 23.B.03.020(2)(0), (q) (West 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0302(13), (15) (West 1994): Wyo.
STAT. § 1H6-302(A)(XIlI) (Michie 1994).
94. Such provisions have been adopted in California, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New York, and North Dakota. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(e) (West 1995) (providing authority for charitable donations "regardless of specifiC corporate benefit"); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13-A, § 202(G) (West 1994); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. B, § 9(k) (1994); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § A.161(11) (West 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-4 (West 1995); N.Y. BuS.
CORP. LAW § 202(12) (Consol. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-26(11) (1993). Additionally,
New Jersey and two other states require board of director approval of corporate contributions.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-204 (Michie 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'NS.
§ 2-103(13) (1994).
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cate plenary authority to directors and only specific, prescribed powers to
shareholders. Thus, in affording them full decisional authority in regard to
corporate contributions, these laws have conferred extraordinary power and
discretion on corporate managers. 95
In fact, the issue of decisional authority in regard to corporate contri~
butions has another important dimension. By failing to require board
approval for corporate contributions, the law permits delegation of philan~
thropic authority to individual corporate executives. Full board review is
the most common mechanism of intrafirm accountability within state cor~
poration law. The absence of a requirement of board of director approval
has thus contributed to lax oversight of the contributions function, and has
allowed individual executive officers to pursue narrow, personal objectives
in the administration of corporate charitable contributions.
The significance of this permissiveness in the modem philanthropy
provisions is, of course, amplified dramatically by the eradication of the
benefit~to~the~business requirement, which has meant that corporate philan~
thropic behavior is not constrained by the usual institutional imperative of
profit maximization. In no other area of corporate affairs are managers
authorized to make decisions affecting the allocation of corporate capital
without regard to how they will affect the firm's financial interests. 96 In
all other instances, corporate and shareholder wealth maximization operates
as the fundamental, governing norm within corporate law. 97 In recogni~
tion of managers' expertise in commercial matters, and in the name of
enhanced efficiency,98 state corporation law imposes few mandatory rules

95. According to state corporation law, it is the board of directors th)lt has authority over
the business and affairs of the corporation, and thus (by default) its charitable contributions. The
absence of a specific grant of authority or participation rights on behalf of shareholders means
that they have no legal right to participate in corporate philanthropic decisions. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (ConsoJ. 1994).
96. The corporate philanthropy laws are far more significant, therefore, as a departure from
traditional profit-oriented corporate norms, than are the constituency statutes enacted by many
states in the 1980s. The latter, curiously, have received far more attention. For further discussion of the constituency statutes, see infra notes 213-215 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., ALI, supra note 14, § 2.01.
98. For a defense of the primacy of economic (market) forces and the centrality of efficiency
concerns within corporate law, see, for example, FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). For a more political interpretation, see Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REV.
1276 (1984), which argues that corporate law empowers corporate management and disempowers
corporate shareholders as part of law's rationalization of bureaucracy and the status quo.
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on the governance of business corporations. 99 But the flexibility within
state corporation law is otherwise intended to afford corporate directors and
officers the freedom to operate the firm most profitably and efficiently.loo
In contrast, the unregulated nature of corporate philanthropic giving affords
corporate managers the authority to depart from profit maximization. In
this regard, the philanthropy provisions are sui generis within corporation
law.
C.

The Modem Judicial Treatment of Corporate
Charitable Contributions

Because they authorize corporate executives to make philanthropic
donations of corporate assets irrespective of benefit to the firm, but fail to
articulate any meaningful limits or requirements in relation thereto, the
modem philanthropy statutes have posed an interpretive dilemma for the
courts. 101 In light of the legislatures' deliberate failure to delineate objec,
99. In responding to the transformation of the states' corporation codes into broad, "enabling" laws, Bayless Manning remarked: "[C]orporation law, as a field of intellectual effort, is
dead in the United States.... We have nothing left but our great empty corporation statutestowering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but
wind." Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal RellU!dy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE
L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962). A 1989 symposium conducted by the Columbia Law Review was dedicated to the discussion of which (if any) corporation law rules should be mandatory. Symposium,
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 CoWM. L. REv. 1395 (1989). For an argument that
state corporate law notrnS are increasingly marginal, see Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law
Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542 (1990).
100. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 {Del. 1984); Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6
(Sup. Ct. 1944) ("To encourage freedom of action on the part of directors, or to put it another
way, to discourage interference with the exercise of their free and independent judgment, there
has grown up what is known as the 'business judgment rule'. "). For a comprehensive overview of
the subject, see DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DunES OF
CoRPORATE DIRECTORS (4th ed. 1993).
101. Despite the numerous questions left unresolved by the states' philanthropy provisions,
corporate charitable contributions have rarely been the subject of shareholder suits. After midcentury, there are only four cases importantly addressing the scope of corporate philanthropic
authority and the propriety of particular contributions. See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98
A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953); Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 329 P.2d 398 (Utah 1958); Kahn v.
Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 {Del. 1991); Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 {Del.
Ch. 1969). The absence of litigation in this area reflects several factors: the lack of publicly
available information regarding most corporate charitable contributions; the fact that the statutes
appear to sanction any corporate charitable contributions; and the fact that the governing legal
standards are sufficiently broad as to make a successful shareholder suit unlikely. In addition, aca-
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tive criteria, according to what guidelines or principles should the courts
adjudicate the propriety of particular challenged donations? Because the
modem philanthropy laws represent the legislatures' deliberate decision to
deregulate corporate charitable giving (in light of the earlier existence of
highly prescriptive statutes), it would seem highly inappropriate for the
courts to impose a substantial scheme of judicial oversight in this area. On
the other hand, a rule permitting corporate managers to make any and all
contributions of corporate capital to charitable organizations seems unten,
able in light of the' traditionally shareholder, centered orientation of corp0'
rate law.
In responSe to this dilemma, the courts have' resorted to a permissive
standard of "reasonableness" in adjudicating the propriety of particular
contributions. While the early statutes and cases occasionally spoke in
terms of "reasonable" donations,Io2 it was Theodora Holding Corp. v.
Henderson, decided by the Delaware Chancery Court in 1969, that ex,
pressly adopted "reasonableness in amount and purpose" as the appropriate
standard for defining the permissible scope of corporate contributions. lo3
The standard of reasonableness was also endorsed by the Delaware Supreme
Court i~ Kahn v. Sullivan,l04 and it appears, to date, to be the authorita,
tive standard.
In' both Theodora and Kahn, the courts constructed the normative
parameters of reasonableness on the basis of the Internal Revenue Code's
charitable contributions provisions. IDS The Code's annual ceiling for de'
ductible corporate charitable contributions of ten percent of taxable corp0'
demic commentators generally have failed to focus on the duty of loyalty issues arising in the area
of corporate charitable giving, thereby contributing to their continued transparency. (Given the
centrality of the problem of managerial accountability within modem corporate legal scholarship,
the paucity of attention devoted to the subject of corporate philanthropy is indeed surprising.)
Previous commentators have generally attributed the absence of litigation in the area to a consensus in favor 'of corporate charitable giving. See, e.g., de Capriles & Garrett, supra note 65,
at 210.
'
102. See, e.g" Armstrong Cork: Co: v. H.A. Meldrum Co., 285 F. 58 (W.D.N.Y 1922);
Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Pacific Grape Prods. Co., 290 P.2d 481, 484 (Cal. 1955).
103. Theodora, 257 A.2d at 405 ("I conclude that the test to be applied in' passing on the
validity of a gift such as the one here in issue is that of reasonableness, a test in which the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code pertaining to charitable gifts by corporations furnish a helpful
guide.").
104. Kahn, 594 A. 2d at 61 ("Thus the Court of Chancery (in the opinion in Theodora
Holding Corp. v. Henderson) concluded that the test to be applied in examining the merits of a
claim alleging corporate waste 'is that of reasonableness, a test in which the provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code pertaining to charitable gifts by corporations furnish a helpful guide.' We
agree with that conclusion." (citations omitted».
105. See supra notes 103-104.
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rate profits (as defined under § 170(b)(2», 106 has been adopted as the
appropriate upper limit for annual corporate charitable contributions under
. Delaware corporation law. 107 And satisfaction of § 501(c)(3)'s require~
ments for status as a charitable organization has been used to define the
scope of appropriate beneficiaries-Le., the "reasonable purposes" for corp~
rate charitable contributions. 108
Delaware's adoption of the Tax Code as the principal heuristic in
defining the reasonable parameters of corporate contributions has affected
both the theory .and practice of corporate philanthropy. From a practical
perspective, reliance on the aforementioned tax~based, quantitative stan~
dards has failed to impose any substantial constraints on corporate charit~
able giving. Ten percent of ~ual corporate profits is an extraordinarily
generous "allowance" in the context of large public corporations. 109
And, as mentioned above, Delaware has answered the question of the
reasonable purposes for corporate charitable contributions by reference to
the kinds of charitable beneficiaries qualifying under § 501(c)(3) of the
Code. 110 Here again, the applicable tax~based standards are very liberal.
In light of the relevance of constitutional guarantees of liberty and due
process, the IRS has had difficulty delimiting which causes and groups
should not be eligible to claim "charitable," "educational," or "religious"
status. 111 Thus, because an extraordinary variety of organizations may
qualify as charitable, educational, or religious for purposes of § 501(c)(3),
corporate charitable contributions may be made to an extraordinarily broad
spectrum of groups pursuant to this standard.
106. The enactment of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 raised the ceiling for the
deductibility of corporate charitable contributions from 5% of taxable corporate income (without
regard to any net operating loss or capital loss carryback) to 10%. I.R.C. § 170 (b)(2) (1994).
107. See supra notes 103-104.
108. See supra notes 103-104.
109. In fact, I believe that is inapposite to view the 10% figure as having been intended as a
true "allowance" or "limit." In enacting the corporate charitable deduction in 1935, in the
aftermath of the Depression, Congress sought to stimulate corporate giving, not to limit it. And,
in 1981, when Congress increased the upper limit from 5% to 10% of corporate pretax profits, it
was operating from a similar perspective. The ten-percent-of-profits figure represents more of a
target-a hortatory appeal for increased corporate largesse-than an aUowance, as such. This view
is also supported by the fact that large corporations typically contribute only 2% to 5% (or less) of
their annual profits-far below the maximum allowable deduction of 10% of profits. I.R.C.
§ 170(b)(2). For annual corporate contributions rates as a percentage of corporate pretax income,
see GIVING USA 1996, supra note 23, at 90. The average annual rate of contributions as a percentage of pretax corporate profit was estimated at 1.24% for 1995. ld.
110. Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48,61 (Del. 1991); Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson,
257 A.2d 398, 404 (Del. Ch. 1969).
111. See, e.g., Dellelopments in the LAw-Nonprofit CorpOTations, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1578,
1612-34 (1992); see also infra Part V.
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Because it is presently the last word on the subject-and in view of the
precedential nature of Delaware corporate law decisions-the opinion in
Kahn merits special consideration. The Delaware Supreme Court's resort to
the tax-based standards described above (in adjudicating the acceptable
parameters of Occidental Petroleum's planned charitable contributions)
functioned as a handy short-cut therein,112 as it had earlier in
Theodora. 113 But, while reliance on the standards operative under the
Tax Code has lent objectivity to these determinations, it has also allowed
the courts to resolve disputes about corporate charitable contributions
without focusing on shareholders' interests. More particularly, an analysis
of whether a corporation's gifts have conformed to the Tax Code's standards for deductibility (that is, Congress' determination of what is socially
desirable in regard to charitable support) is not a proxy for an examination
of shareholders' interests in regard to corporate-based altruism. The class of
charitable organizations qualifying under § 501(c)(3) does not supply a
definition of the reasonable purposes of corporate charitable contributionsthat is, the rationale for encouraging charity at the level of the corporation,
as opposed to the individual level. The invocation of the Code's tenpercent-of-corporate-profits standard appears similarly perfunctory.
If
donations are good for the firm, why should state law limit them? If they
represent managerial largesse with the shareholders' money (either in favor
of society or, even more problematically, themselves), what principle within
corporate law justifies them in the first instance?
Of course, courts have had good reasons to avoid confronting the
trenchant issues raised by corporate charitable contributions. Little consensus has existed regarding the causes and explanations for corporate charitable contributions. Inadequate information has existed regarding the effect
of corporate philanthropy on corporate performance. And substantial
disagreement has existed (and will probably continue to exist) regarding the
propriety of corporate-based altruism. In addition, the overall managerial
bias within corporate law has meant that courts have had little difficulty
justifying their deferential posture towards corporate philanthropy. 114
112. The court's approach, admittedly, was affected by the procedural posture of the litigation: The supreme court was reviewing the chancery court's approval of a shareholder derivative
suit settlement. Kahn, 594 A.2d at 48.
113. Theodora, 257 A.2d at 404.
114. See, e.g., Steiner v. Meyerson, [1995 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
'98,857, at 93,148 (Del. Ch. July 18, 1995):
Absent an allegation of fraud or conflict of interest courts will not review the substance of corporate contracts; the waste theory represents a theoretical exception to the
statement very rarely encountered in the world of real transactions. There surely are
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The legislatures' rejection of a regulatory approach to corporate charitable
giving may appropriately reflect the complexity of the contributions function within modem corporate affairs, and, consequently, the courts may be
unequipped to address the problem, but the potential for abuse arising from
managerial control over corporate giving necessitates that some system of
accountability be established. In order to address the void left by the modem laws and cases, and in order to illustrate the interests and issues at stake
in this area, the remainder of this Article analyzes contemporary corporate
giving practices in relation to corporate legal norms and shareholders'
interests.

III. CoRPORATE PHILANTI-IROPY AND MANAGERIAL SELF- INTEREST
Corporate charitable contributions may be used by corporate executives to confer substantial personal and professional benefits on themselves.
Because traditional mechanisms of accountability are absent in this area,
corporate philanthropy represents· an area of corporate conduct in which
managerial self-interest may flourish.
Conflicts of interest on the part of management and the potential for
managerial opportunism in general are subjects of importance within corporate law and legal theory.115 The problem of self-interested conduct on
the part of corporate management has been addressed through the promulgation of fiduciary standards of loyalty, 116 statutory and common law standards of fairness,117 and requirements of ratification by disinterested parties. 118 Although courts and commentators have failed to apply these
cases of fraud; of unfair self-dealing and, much more rarely negligence. But rarest of
all-and •.. possibly non-existent-would be the case of disinterested business people
making non-fraudulent deals (non-negligently) that meet the legal standard of waste!
See also supra note 100.
115. According to one leading casebook, ''[nhe principal task of corporation law is to create
a governance structure for corporations that promotes an appropriate degree of accountability
among the participants." LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 9
(1994). For a comprehensive treatment of fiduciary obligation and the problem of managerial
opportunism in the corporate form, see ROBERT CHARLES Q.ARK, CORPORATE LAW 141-223
(Francis A. Allen et al. eds., 1986) (chapters 4-7).
116. See SOLOMON ET AL., stipTa note 115, at 750 ("Simply put, the duty of loyalty requires a
manager to place the corporation's best interests (and thus those of the stockholders) above her
own.").
117. See, e.g., Fleigler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976); see also DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 713(b) (Consol. 1994).
118. Fleigler, 361 A.2d at 221; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1), (2); N.Y. BuS.
CORP. LAW § 713(a)(I), (2). For discussion of ratification by disinterested directors of
transactions involving managerial conflicts of interest, see WILLIAM L. CARy &. MELVIN ARON
EISENBERG, CAsES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 684-88 (7th ed. 1995).
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forms of heightened scrutiny to corporate charitable-contributions decisions,119 it is plain that where corporate managers approve such contributions as a means of furthering their personal objectives, such contributions
represent a species of agency costs,120 and are inconsistent with the essential fiduciary fabric of corporate law.
In addition to state corporate law, the federal securities regulations
have functioned to discipline corporate managers (and therefore reduce
agency costs) by requiring disclosure of executive compensation arrangements and other matters potentially involving managerial conflicts of interest. 121 More particularly, under Item 402 of the SEC's S-K regulations,
comprehensive, detailed information about both cash and noncash director
and officer compensation is required to be presented to corporate shareholders. 122 Item 404(a) of the S-K regulations requires disclosure of corporate transactions wherein directors and officers have an interest as
principals. 123 And Item 404(c) of the S-K regulations requires disclosure
of any loans which the company makes to its directors and officers. 124
Furthermore, while the SEC's disclosure mandates have failed to address corporate philanthropy as a general matter, the SEC has recently
recognized one kind of corporate charitable contributions arrangement,
119. Although the duty of loyalty issues existing in the context of corporate contributions
have remained largely unaddressed within legal scholarship, the duty of loyalty is recognized to be
"a residual concept that can include factual situations that no one has foreseen and categorized."
CLARK, supra note 115, at 141. Both courts and commentators have dealt exhaustively with
problems of managerial self-interest (i.e., the contours of the duty of loyalty) in the context of
executive compensation, so-called "interested director transactions," and the doctrine of "corporate opportunities." The fact that benefits accrue to corporate executives from their control over
corporate contributions creates analogies between the contributions function and these classic
conflict scenarios. The explicit connection between corporate philanthropy and executive compensation is discussed below. See infra notes 173-176 and accompanying text.
120. The seminal, early treatment of the agency cost problem in the context of the modem,
public corporation is BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17. For a concise review of modem agency
theory, as applied to corporate charitable contributions, see Jia Wang & Betty S. Coffey,
Board Composition and Corporate Philanthropy, 11 J. Bus. ETHICS 771 (1992). See generaUy
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 98; Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behallior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
Cf. Aleta O. Estteicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation for the Long Term, 45
RUTGERS L. REV. 513 (1993) (arguing that corporate legal scholarship has focused myopically on
agency cost issues, to the detriment of important, alternative aspects of corporate performance).
121. For a discussion of SECmandated disclosure as a response to the problem of agency
costs, see PaulO. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1047 (1995). See also 1 loUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 171-225
(3d ed. 1989). For recent commentary on the goals of SECmandated disclosure, see Edmund W.
Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 764 (1995).
122. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1996).
123. ld. § 229.404.

124.

ld.
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known as "charitable awards" or "director legacies" {collectively, "charitable awards"}, as a form of "disclosable" executive compensation.
125 In
.
1992, in the context of broadly revising the executive compensation disclosure rules, the SEC expressly called for disclosure of any such "charitable
awards" within the executive compensation disclosure presented in proxy
statements and other SEC filings. 126 Thus, the SEC has recognized that
corporate directors and officers may derive personal benefits from corporate
charitable contributions, and has responded with a specific disclosure mandate. However, by confining the scope of required disclosure to charitable
awards, the SEC demonstrated that it has yet to recognize or address the
full extent of the managerial benefits inhering in "ordinary" corporate
charitable contributions.
,

A.

Managerial Discretion and Politicized Philanthropy

Part V of this Article analyzes "politicized" charitable contributions,
which are consonant with the maximization of corporate profit. Of course,
corporate managers may authorize donations to politically active charities as
a means of furthering their own political and ideological preferences, irrespective of the firm's best interests. When corporate managers approve
donations on this self-serving basis, they satisfy the letter of the law l27 but
fail to fulfill their fiduciary obligation to protect corporate shareholders'
property interests. Furthermore, because corporate contributions to politicized nonprofit organizations represent a form of corporate political speech
{and one which is not commonly brought to the attention of shareholders},
such donations also undermine shareholders' free speech and associational
interests, as discussed fully in Part V.
One recent example of politicized charitable co~tributions made irrespective of corporate interests is provided by Morrison Knudsen Corpora125. Executive Compensation Disclosure, Release No. 33·6962, 34·31327, 57 Fed. Reg.
48,126 (Oct. 21, 1992).
Various corporate and other commentators maintained that charitable award or legacy
arrangements need not be disclosed, since the directors are not receiving value through
the arrangement. Other commentators contended that such arrangements should be
disclosed to shareholders since the arrangements clearly relate to directors' board service,
and the premiums can be considerable, particularly relative to amounts paid annually to
directors, and are material in assessing the relationship of directors to the registrant. The
Commission agrees, and thus reaffirms its initial conclusion that such arrangements are
required to be disclosed pursuant to the requirements of Item 402(g).
Id. at 48,137.
126. rd.
127. For a discussion of the lax standards applicable under state law, see supra Part II.
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tion's contributions to a small pro-life charity, "The Nurturing Network."
As reported by The New York Times 128 and Fortune magazine,129 Mary
Cunningham Agee, the wife of Morrison Knudsen's CEO, established The
Nurturing Network consistent with the couple's opposition to abortion. 13o
As the president of the company's charitable foundation,l3l Mary Agee
presided over various direct and foundation-based donations that the company made to The Nurturing Network. While The New York Times
reported that the company's foundation "made grants to the Nurturing
Network, and the corporation itself regularly donated goods and services to
the charity,"132 the full extent of the firm's gifts to The Nurturing Network has remained confidential-because there is no means to obtain information regarding the donations made on a direct basis.
In addition to monetary support, Mr. Agee and his wife also fostered
the connection between Morrison Knudsen and The Nurturing Network by
encouraging the corporation's directors to serve on the charity's board. In
total, in addition to the Agees, three directors and five other directors'
wives assumed board positions at The Nurturing Network. 133 Both the
Diana B. Henriques, A Celebrity Boss Faces Exile from 2d Corporate Kingdom, N.Y.
Feb. 10, 1995, at AI; Diana B. Henriques, Ties That Bind: His Directors, Her Charity, N.Y.
Mar. 21, 1995, at D1 [hereinafter Henriques, Ties That Bind].
129. O'Reilly, supra note 57, at 51.
130. Id. at 56 ("Mary's chief interest was the Nurturing Network, a charity she founded that
offers help, including housing and jobs, to give pregnant college and working women an alternative to abortion. It was an activity that made her highly visible to bishops and cardinals in the
Catholic Church, and even today, much of her life appears to revolve around it. In the days after
Agee was fired, several church leaders sent letters of encouragement to her. j.
13l. Mary Cunningham Agee was appointed president of Morrison Knudsen's corporate
foundation by her husband, the company's CEO. In addition to being the founder of The Nurturing Network, she served as its "unpaid executive director." Henriques, Ties That Bind, supra
note 128, at 04; O'Reilly, supra note 57, at 56 ("[Bill) Agee, who should have been sensitive to
nepotism charges after his experience at Bendix, put Mary in charge of another charity, the
Morrison Knudsen Foundation. It spends close to $1 million a year on social and cultural
causes.").
132. Henriques, Ties That Bind, supra note 128.
133. Therefore, besides the Agees, eight Morrison Knudsen directors were affiliated with the
charity's board. The interlocking directorates between Morrison Knudsen corporation and The
Nurturing Network and, especially, the presence of presumably "independent," outside corporate
directors and their wives on the board of the charity are suggestive of serious departures from
sound corporate governance. These larger corporate governance issues were the focus of the
second New York Times article, The Ties That Bind. Subtitled Did Joining the Agees' Cause Make It
Hard to Say No in the Board Room?, the article suggested that extra-curricular affiliations between
corporate insiders and purportedly "independent" outside directors may have undermined the
outsiders' ability to be objective in the boardroom. Id. at Dl. Although extremely important,
this larger corporate governance question relating to extra-curricular affiliations between inside
and outside directors is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the problem, see, for
example, James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations
and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 84 (1985). This
128.

TIMES,
TIMES,
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financial and administrative support and the directorial connections
through which Morrison Knudsen supported The Nurturing Network came
to light only because the company had become subject to scrutiny on
account of its deteriorating financial conditionY4 The company's proxy
statements and its annual reports to shareholders, consistent with the SEC's
current requirements,135 contained no information about the contributions which the company made to The Nurturing Network or the interlocking directorates existing between the firm and the charity.136
Unfortunately, the generally confidential nature of corporate philanthropy, combined with the fact that politicized donations are especially
likely to be kept confidential from corporate shareholders (and other members of the public), means that it is very difficult to unearth examples of
such politicized, noncommercial charitable contributions. Stories like the
one above come to light only where particular news reporters have gone out
of their way to uncover information. Nevertheless, the self-serving (or
"rationally maximizing") aspect of human nature, the prevalence of politicized philanthropies, and the absence of mechanisms of accountability, in
combination, suggest that politicized charitable contributions that satisfy
managers' (but not necessarily shareholders') interests may indeed be prevalent. 137
B.

Managerial Discretion and Corporate Social Responsibility

Corporate social responsibility may serve as a legitimate rationale for
corporate charitable contributions, as discussed in Part IV. But "social
Article addresses the situation of '~shared" directors between corporate and nonprofits' boards as
it relates to the issue of managerial self-promotion, suggesting that executives use corporate contributions to "purchase" board seats at prominent charities as a system of professional and social
status enhancement. See infra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
134. It is tempting to speculate that mandatory disclosure of the firm's unusual philanthropic
practices might have signaled the presence of other even more costly forms of waste and abuse.
In fact, mandatory contributions disclosure might function, in general, as the proverbial "canary
in the bird cage": Wayward contributions practices might alert shareholders to an overall lack of
discipline and contro\.
135. Item 401(e)(2) of the S-K regulations requires disclosure of directors' other directorships
with public companies, but not directorships with affiliated charitable organizations. Thus if, as
it has been interpreted, the rule is intended to expose potential conflicts of interest, it is highly
underinclusive. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (1996).
136. This assessment is based on my review of the Morrison Knudsen proxy statements and
annual reports covering the years 1990-1995.
137. It is difficult to attest to the magnitude of this problem precisely because this information is unobtainable-hence the need for obligatory disclosure of corporate charitable contributions information.
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responsibility" may also function as a'rationalization for managers to spend
corporate resources to actualize their personal preferences in regard to social
welfare and civic engagement. l38 A survey of the area has uncovered
only one 'public corporation that has systematically empowered its s,hareholders to affect the allocation of the corporation's charitable capital. IJ9
While 'corporate contributions may be legitimated on the basis of corporate
social responsibility, as a general matter, there is no reason that corporate
managers should cOl1trol the decision to constitute the firm as a deliberate
agent of social change. l40 Put simply, by providing for centralized
decision-making in the area of corporate charitable contributions, state law
has afforded corporate managers the equivalent of taxing authority. Where
contributions are not employed as commercial resources (as is consistent
with the charitable deduction under the Code), there is no reason to prevent shareholders from having a meaningful voice in the formulation of
corporate philanthropy policies, a fortiori, for keeping contributions information confidential from them. (This issue is discussed in depth in Part N,
below.)
138. This is consistent with Adolph Berle's views expressed in the essays he exchanged with
Professor Dodd. As he expressed therein, Berle's concern for licensing self-intere,sted conduct by
management led him to oppose legal validation of extra-shareholder obligations on the part of
the firm. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv.
L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932) ("When the fiduciary obligation of the corporate management and
'control' to stockholders is weakened or eliminated, the management and 'control' become for all
practical purposes absolute. The claims upon the assembled industrial wealth and funneled industrial income which managements are then likely to enforce (they have no need to urge) are their
own." (footnote omitted».
'
139. This corporation 'is Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. under the direction of CEO Warren
Buffet. See, e.g., BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, INC., 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 54-55 (1991).
140. The problem of the authority of corporate managers to oversee corporate social activism
has been Widely noted. See, e.g., HENRY O. MANNE & HENRY C. WALLlCH, THE MODERN
CoRPORATION AND SOCIAL REsPONSIBILTTY 10 (1972) (H. Manne, first lecture) ("The concept of
corporate responsibility flatters businessmen that they are the divine-elect, as Andrew Carnegie
would have had it••.. [B]usinessmen as a group are at best only slightly more expert in economic theory than the general population. ").
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C.

Managerial Benefits Arising from Corporate Charitable Contributions

1.

Managerial Utility and the Theory of the Firm

In constructing the theory of the business firm, classical economists
and law-and-economics scholars have employed profit maximization as the
primary incentive of management. Alternatively, various other economists, 141 legal scholars, 142 and academics in other fields l43 have taken
141. Various economists studying corporate charitable contributions have included "managerial utility maximization" within their hypotheses. See, e.g., Q.OTFELTER, supra note 22, at 190
("[AI company's charitable contributions may enter the utility functions of managers. Accordingly, the management may choose to sacrifice profits in order to make such contributions.");
Armen A. Alchian & Reuben A. Kessel, Competition, Monopoly and t~ Pursuit of Money, in
AsPECTS OF LABOR ECONOMICS 157 (1962) (business' contributions are one facet of the attempt
to acquire status, prestige, and goodwill for management and the firm); Ferdinand K. Levy &
Gloria M. Shatto, T~ Evaluation of Corporate Contributions, 33 PUB. CHOICE, Issue 1978, at
19-28 (managers use contributions as a "preferred expensej; Webb, supra note 54, at 82 ("Managers may give because they are altruistic or because they enjoy the prestige associated with being
a big giver (thus contributions might be viewed as part of the compensation package for upper
management). ").
142. Henry G. Manne has argued that corporate managers have a fund of discretionary
resources (including funds available for "pet charities") that is roughly equivalent to the transaction costs of removing them from office. MANNE & WALLlCH, supra note 140. Addressing the
incentives problem in another context, scholars have suggested that certain executives have
pursued corporate growth (and thus, enhanced perquisites) independent of concerns over shareholder wealth maximization. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: T~
Strain in t~ Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1986); Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers:
T~ory, Evidence and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 148-49 (1992) (observing that managerial ego cannot be dismissed as an incentive to engage in takeovers). Of course, the agency cost
problem has been exhaustively analyzed in the context of managerial resistance to takeover bids.
See, e.g., Bryan Ford, In Whose Interest: An Examination of t~ Duties of Directors and Officers in
Control Contests, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 91 (1994). More generally, the desire to win esteem, status,
and fellowship (as an important complement to material or economic objectives) is receiving
increased attention in the legal literature. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and
Conflict: T~ Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARv. L. REv.
1003 (1995) (including citations to recent sociological literature analyzing status production and
group coheSion).
143. Within management science, see Haley, supra note 36, at 485-504. From the
perspective of sociology, see, for example, JOSEPH GALASKIEWICZ, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF AN
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a broader view of managers' objectives in the allocation of corporate resources. In particular, Oliver Williamson has identified the desire for increased power, status, and prestige as being a principal motivational factor
in managerial decision-making. 144
2.

Contributions as a Source of Psychic Rewards

Sociologists have documented the function of gift giving within diverse systems of status enhancement. 145 As documented by the work of
Joseph Galaskiewicz, corporate grant-making partakes of this larger dynamic
of status competition. l46 Galaskiewicz's study of the grant-making economy of the Minneapolis-St. Paul area demonstrated that corporate charitable contributions have served as a medium through which corporate
executives have competed for the fellowship and esteem of elite nonprofit
leaders and other business executives. 147
According to Galaskiewicz, nonprofit leaders have fueled this status
competition by applying various forms of "peer pressure," including threats
of social and professional ostracism.l 48 Galaskiewicz described peer pressure as operating through themes of reciprocity (executives approved corporate contributions requests in the expectation that their own solicitations
would be favorably received in the future)149 and. themes of community
URBAN GRANTS ECONOMY (1985); Lisa Atkinson & Joseph Galaskiewicz, Stock Ownership and
Company Contributions to Charity, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 82, 82-100 (1988).
144. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR:
MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM 28-37 (1964). Williamson identified seven
objectives: salary, security, status, power, prestige, social service, and profeSSional excellence.
145. This literature is summarized by Joseph Galaskiewicz. See GALASKIEWICZ, supra note
143, at 14-30. Galaskiewicz described commonalities in the status-driven gift-giving rituals practiced by Indian tribes of the Pacific Northwest (in the form of the Potlach), id. at 26-27, by the
"Big Men" of the New Guinea Highlands and the Solomon Islands (in various feasts and rituals),
id. at 27-28, and in the more contemporary settings of American and British "nouveau riches,"
id. at 28-30.
146. ld, at 214. For a recent critique of charitable giving by individuals as a system of social
status enhancement, see FRANCIE OSTROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE: THE CULTURE OF
ELITE PHILANTHROPY 133 (199;;) (concluding on the basis of interviews with wealthy New Yorkers that the very affluent use charitable contributions to create a distinct social and cultural life
that fosters their elite status).
147. GALASKIEWICZ, supra note 143, at 214.
148. ld. at 74 ("Of the 26 respondents, 19 made some reference to the fact that individuals
would either lose face before their peers in the business community or would be excluded from
certain community events •••• Several others talked about individuals losing esteem, respect, and
standing among their business peers. H).
149. ld. at 72. One of Galaskiewicz's survey respondents stated: "Peer pressure is responding
to friends. Essentially, if you don't go along with their requests and pet projects, they won't
support yours." ld.
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{executives valued the' ability to participate in local professional and social
networks, and therefore authorized' corporate contributions as part of the
'''price' of admission"}.I50 Galaskiewicz also discovered that local nonprofit leaders had superior professional and social credentials than their peer
group of CEOs. lSI Galaskiewicz thus concluded that corporate executives
approved substantial corporate contributions as a means of qualifying for
membership in an elite social and professional network that, as part of its
function, oversaw substantial philanthropic activity.
Galaskiewicz also observed that firms that contributed at substantial
levels were more likely to be regarded as financially successful business
ventures. 152 According to his research, this effect was created "independent of actual average annual pretax. earnings and. performance indicators. "153 Thus, corporate contributions have functioned as complex
signifiers in the eyes of local commercial and philanthropic leaders. 154 By
communicating a favorable message about their firm's financial robustness
through the authorization of substantial corporate contributions, the executives were also communicating a message about their own status as modem
day, financial "Big Men." Galaskiewicz's work supports the view that
corporate executives have sought to "upgrade" their own professional and
social credentials through the currency of corporate charitable contributions.
Galaskiewicz also sought to document the relative importance of commercial factors, in comparison to sociological ones, as determinants of
corporate giving behavior. He reported finding "considerably more support
for the Contributions-as-Social-Currency thesis than the Contributions-asPublic Relations thesis." 155. In fact, Galaskiewicz concluded that apart
from firm cash-flow, sociological factors relating to executives' social standing had had a greater effect on contributions levels than did either the
market position of the firm or its dependency on the local community for
150. ld. at 73 ("More commonly, executives portrayed peer pressure as a sort of ritual
whereby people are integrated into the business community and attain social standing. For
example, being solicited is a sign that one is part of the g.:oup. Responding to a solicitation indicates that one accepts membership. ').
151. ld. at 76 ("For example, 56.7% of the [philanthropic) elite had been the president,
CEO, or chairman of a Fortune 500 or 50 firm as compared to only 20.4% of the 98 CEOs.").
152. Id. at 71-78.
.
153. Id. at 71.
154. Usha Haley's work has also analyz~d this signalling function of corporate contributions.
Employing the terminology of Renaissance dramaturgy, he described corporate contributions as
"masques"-i.e., complex symbolic messages communicated to a diverse set of publics. Haley,
supra note 36, at 485-504.
155. GALASKIEWICZ, supra note 143, at 79.
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employees, for example. 156 Galaskiewicz concluded that none of these
commercially-based criteria had "had a statistically significant positive
effect" on the level of firm contributions. 157
3.

Nonprofit Board Service as Form of Benefit

In addition to increased prestige, esteem, and fellowship, the social
currenCy accruing to corporate executives from their power over corporate
charitable contributions frequently translates into tangible rewards. Most
notably, charitable organizations commonly make invitations to senior
corporate executives to serve on their boards of directors, especially when
the firm's charitable support has been extensive or when additional contributions may be anticipated. 158 Consistent with the previous discussion,·
such board positions are regarded by many people as evidence of heightened
social status. Moreover, the position on the charitable board would itself
represent an increase in the executive's personal power in most cases,
because the directors of nonprofit organizations exercise considerable discretion in the administration of the arts, education, environmental conservation, and the provision of social services, for example.
Yet even if nonprofit board service was not in itself considered a
valuable fringe benefit of the corporation's philanthropy, most executives
would value such charitable board positions for the collateral benefits likely·
to accrue therefrom-in terms of both personal and profeSSional opportunities. For example, the directors of nonprofit organizations typically enjoy
special invitations to gala benefits and opening night performances, and
special audiences with politicians and celebrities. The accretion in professional capital arising from multiple board service was a central focus of
Michael Useem's work, The Inner Circle. Useem documented the existence
of a super-stratum of elite business leaders (the "inner circle") active in the
formulation of American and British industrial and public policy.159 One
of his central findings was that multiple board service, including service on
high profile nonprofit organizations' boards, has played a crucial part in the
grooming process by which qualified corporate executives have ascended to
156.
157.

ld. at 70-80.
ld. at 70.

158. See Michael Useem, Corporate Philanthropy, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 340, 344
(Walter W. Powell ed., 1987) ("A conventional fund-raising strategy used by many nonprofits is
to invite a senior manager onto the governing board as a first step toward soliciting large-scale
support from his or her firm. ").
159. MICHAEL USEEM, THE INNER CIRCLE (1984).
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the upper echelons of the power elite. Nonprofit board service has provided executives with experience and connections that have contributed to
their professional ~cendancy ~oth within the corporate hierarchy and
beyond the firm. Thus, Useem's work also supports the view that corporate
charitable contributions are a valuable currency through which corporate
senior executives have purchased a variety of benefits, including enhanced
professional power:
' .
4.

When Insiders Establish Charities and Subsidize Them ,
Through Corp~rate Contri~utions

The above analysis is incomplete in representing CEOs and corporate
directors as passively waiting to exchange a commi~ent for increased
corporate support for an invitation to serve on a prestigious nonprofit organization's board of directors. The reality is that corporate executiyes often
seize the initiative to establish charitable organizations reflecting their
personal interests and then seek to have them subsidized thro,ugh the firm's
contributions.
The connection between insiders' pet causes and corporate contributions was illustrated by the relationship between Mary CUnningham Agee,
the .wife of Morrison Knudsen's CEO, and that company's gifts to The
Nurturing Network (e~tablished by Ms. Agee), as described above. l60 But
an example of more extraordinary managerial hubris is provided by Occidental Petroleum Corporation's ("OPC") commitment to fund "The
Armand Hammer Museum and Cultural Center" through corporate charitable contributions in the amount of $85 million dollars. 161 Although it
was approved by a committee of OPC's board of directors, the plan for the
museum was initiated by Dr. Hammer himself. 162 In fact, Dr. Hammer
had planned to donate his art collection to the Los Angeles County Art
Museum, but when that museum failed to acquiesce to his extraordinary
demands, Dr. Hammer informed them that he "had decided to create [his]
own museum"-hence his proposal to OPC's board. 163 Because of the
substantial sums involved, and Dr. Hammer's obvious self-interest in the
160.

See supra notes 128-132 and accompanying text.
161. The facts relating to ope's comminnent to fund the museum project through its charitable contributions are set forth in Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 52-57 (Del. 1991). For further
discussion of Dr. Hammer's life and career at Occidental, see EDWARD JAY EpSTEIN, DosSIER:
THE SECRET HISTORY OF ARMAND HAMMER (1996).
162. Kahn, 594 A.2d at 52.
163.

ld.
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project, two groups of OPC shareholders filed suit challenging the propriety
of the gift. l64 Operating on the baSis of the loose standard of reasonable,
ness described earlier, the Delaware courts upheld a settlement in one of
the derivative suits, which left OPC's plans for the museum largely intact.
Nevertheless, both the Chancery Court and the Supreme Court went out of
their way to articulate their displeasure with OPC's board's approval of the
charitable contributions. 165
D.

Corporate Charitable Contributions as Income to Corporate Insiders

Because corporate managers may retain control over corporate charita'
ble contributions, and may therefore "substitute" corporate contributions
for personal ones, such contributions have sometimes been analogized to
dividends or additional compensation to management. 166
1.

Tax Jurisprudence

The current approach within federal income tax jurisprudence is to
honor the separate identity of the corporate contributor, 167 but certain
early tax court rulings dealing with close corporations' contributions had
suggested that the correct approach would be to "look through" the corp~
rate entity to view the company's contributions as a constructive dividend
to the controlling shareholders, followed by a personal contribution on
164. Because of the lax standards applicable in the area of corporate charitable contributions
(as described above), as well as the loose definition of "independence" applied to determining the
objectivity of "outside" directors, the shareholders had virtually no chance of succeeding in their
challenge to the gifts. For discussion of the relevant state law standards applying to corporate
charitable contributions, see supra notes 91-114 and accompanying text.
165. See Kahn, 594 A.2d at 58 n.23 ("If the Court was a stockholder of Occidental it might
vote for new directors, if it was on the Board it might vote for new management and if it was a
member of the Special Committee it might vote against the Museum project.").
166. As Nancy Knauer has observed, "If a corporate transfer to charity is really a substitute
for a transfer by a corporate manager, then the ability to claim the deduction at the corporate
level produces a favorable tax benefit for the corporate manager." Knauer, supra note 77, at 48.
As Knauer explains, the individual level income tax deduction for the charitable contribution
may not produce a neutral tax consequence for individual taxpayers receiving corporate dividends.
167. For an excellent critique of the tax code's failure to examine who is responsible for
making the contribution (and hence who should enjoy the deduction) in the case of corporate
level gifts, see Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax Treatment of Corporate
Philanthropy, N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997).
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their part. l68 Under this earlier approach, corporate level contributions
that "serve only the personal interest of the shareholder,"169 could be
treated as constructive income to such controlling shareholders. Tax juris,
prudence has subsequently moved away from this position, validating the
distinction between corporate level gifts and controlling persons' personal
contributions. 170 And dividends to controlling shareholders are distinct,
formally, from additional compensation to corporate management. Never,
theless, the existence of this earlier, alternative approach in the tax treat'
ment of corporate charitable contributions underscores the fact that con'
trolling parties (controlling shareholders in close corporations, and mana'
gers in public corporations) accrue personal benefits in their administration
of corporate charitable contributions-especially when such contributions
are not required by law to advance the interests of the corporate donor.
2.

Required Disclosure of "Charitable Awards"

Although tax jurisprudence has moved away from treating corporate
charitable contributions as income to those persons authorizing them, the
SEC has recently taken a position reminiscent of the earlier tax cases. l7l
168. See Rev. Rul. 68-658, 1968-2 C.B. 117 (superseding Rev. Rul. 68-314, 1968-1 C.B. 101;
revoked by Rev. Rul. 79-9, 1979-1 C.B. 125):
It has been held that a payment or gratuitous disposition of property by a corporation to
a third person on behalf of or for the benefit of the controlling shareholder is a distribution to the shareholder if the payment serves only the personal interests of the shareholder. (Citations omitted.) Thus, a charitable contribution by a corporation to an
organization described in section 170 (c)(2) of the Code, which contribution in reality
serves only the personal objectives of its sole shareholder, is tantamount to a distribution
to the shareholder followed by a donation on his part to the charitable organization.
But cf. Knott v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 681 (1977), acq. 1979-1 C.B. 1.
169. Rev. Rul. 68-658, 1968-2 C.B. 117. This more thoughtful approach addressed who, in
particular, should qualify as making the gift and being eligible for the deduction-the entity or
the individuals in control. But, unintentionally, it also raised the problem of whether gifts that
did serve corporate objectives (rather than insiders') could still qualify as "charitable" for purposes
of § 170.
170. In refuSing to disallow the corporate level charitable contribution in the case of Knott II.
Commissioner, the tax court also emphaSized the absence of the receipt of tangible benefits by the
controlling shareholders as a result of the corporation's contribution. Knott, 67 T.e. at 681.
171. In October 1992 the SEC completed its long-standing project of revising the executive
compensation disclosure provisions under Item 402 of the S-K regulations. Recognizing that
disclosure operates as a significant check on managerial overreaching in the area of compensation, the SEC sought to require more accurate and comprehensive disclosure of all forms of compensation arrangements. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Release No. 33-6962,
34-31327,57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (Oct. 21, 1992).
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In 1992, in order to provide for greater clarity and comprehensiveness
therein, the SEC amended the executive compensation disclosure requirements pertaining to proxy statements and periodic reports. 172 In the final
release implementing the new rules, the SEC indicated that it viewed
"charitable award or legacy arrangements" as forms of management compensation subject to required disclosure. 173 In the typical charitable
award arrangement, the corporation makes a commitment to fund a charitable contribution in the name of the specified director or officer for the
benefit of a charity of his or her choice, at a specified future date. l74 The
contributions are characteristically funded from insurance plans, typically in
the amount of $1 million dollars, which are purchased by the corporation
for this purpose. The insurance plan pay-out is usually tied to the named
executive's retirement or death. 175 The fact that the executives never
directly receive any payments in these arrangements had created confusion
regarding whether such awards would be considered part of executive compensation by the SEC. However, in the final release implementing the
revised executive compensation disclosure rules, the SEC stated its view
that charitable awards confer substantial benefits on the named executives,
and would hence be regarded as part of the required disclosure. 176
172. Id. at 48,137.
173. The release described charitable awards as follows:
Under such programs, registrants typically agree to make a future donation to one or
more charitable institutions in a participating director's name, payable by the registrant
upon the director's death or retirement, or some other designated event. Funding vehicles for these programs commonly take the form of corporate-owned insurance policies on
the lives of participating directors.
Id.
174. See Lawrence Brody et aI., Insurance-Related Compensation, 386-2d Tax Mgmt. (BNA)
A-22 (1994) ("One of the more innovative executive perks in recent years has been executive
legacy programs .... These programs give focus to a corporation's charitable giving strategy and
tum it into a 'benefit' for executives. Even though nothing goes directly to the executive under
the program, there is a perceived benefit in haVing a major charitable gift made in the executive's
name.").
175. Id.
176. Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. at 48,137. It should also be noted
that charitable awards are not a form of incentive-based compensation: Neither the establishment
of the award nor the circumstances that trigger a pay-out are typically related to the firm's financial performance. Scholars, commentators, and even the SEC have increasingly advocated increased levels of incentive-based compensation. See, e.g., id. at 48,126; see also Geoffrey S.
Rehnert, Note, The Executive Compensation Contract: Creating Incentives to Reduce Agency Costs,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (1985). Forbes magazine recently reported on the increasing use of charitable awards as part of compensation to outside directors. See Dana Wechsler Linden et aI., The
Cosseted Director, FORBES, May 22, 1995, at 169-73. Of particular note were the following (ag-
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Ordinary Contributions Versus Charitable Awards

Thus, charitable awards are subject to mandatory disclosure under
existing securities regulations, while "ordinary" corporate contributions are
subject to no such disclosure requirement-despite the fact that corporate
insiders may use ordinary contributions to confer substantial benefits on
themselves, as described above. Indeed, the differences between charitable
awards and ordinary contributions are frequently essentially formalistic. In
both instances, the corporation funds the contributions. In the case ;of
charitable awards, the corporation purchases an insurance policy that r will
generate funds for the contributions, whereas regular charitable contributions are funded from corporate earnings. In both situations, corporate
directors or officers may have dispositional authority over the gift-whether
through the formalized arrangements of the charitable award or through the
ordinary dispositional authority that executives may retain over corporate
contributions. In the case of charitable awards, the executive's name is
formally associated with the donation-but this may be equally true in the
case of regular contributions, as was illustrated by the example of the
Armand Hammer Museum and Cultural Center. 177 Even when the executive's name is not formally associated with the firm's charitable gifts, he or
she stands to gain both psychic income and tangible benefits from authorizing them. Indeed, these benefits more readily accrue to corporate
executives in the context of ordinary contributions, because in the case of
charitable awards the corporate official is typically retiring or may even be
deceased.
In sum, the differences between charitable awards and ordinary corporate charitable contributions do not support disparate disclosure treatment.
The managerial benefits that the SEC has recognized in the context of
charitable awards may just as frequently inhere in the context of ordinary
corporate contributions. The SEC's current disclosure mandate is thus
substantially underinclusive: Comprehensive disclosure of corporate charitable contributions information is the appropriate standard that should be
implemented by the SEC.
gregated) charitable awards: Vernon Jordan, Jr. ($3.25 million), Frank Carlucci ($2 million),
Clayton Yeutter ($1.5 million), Harold Brown ($1 million), and Ann McLaughlin ($1 million).
According to the Forbes article, Ayco Co. (a financial advisory firm) indicated that it was setting
up charitable awards for directors at the rate of one every two weeks. ld. at 170.
177 . See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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Disclosure and the Problem of Managerial Self.Dealing

The federal securities laws reflect the view that systematic, required
disclosure of corporate information, in conjunction with the operation of
the marketplace, will operate as a check on various forms of managerial
opportunism. 178 This view is evident in the SEC's regulations requiring
disclosure of interlocking corporate directorships, loans to insiders and
other "interested" corporate transactions, executive compensation ·gener.
ally, and charitable awards in particular .179 In each of these cases, state
corporation law and federal disclosure requirements (taken in combination)
reflect a consensus that, while the underlying behavior should be (or must
be, in the case of executive compensation, for example) permitted, a system
of accountability based on required publicity is needed to deter corporate
waste and mismanagement. Corporate charitable contributions present
analogous problems of managerial conflicts of interest, and yet there are
strong arguments for continuing to permit corporations to make charitable
contributions. l80 Moreover, the argument in favor of a precise system of
substantive regulation, and attendant penalties for noncompliance, is under·
mined by the difficulty of measuring and offsetting potential gains to
178. The extensive legislative history surrounding the enactment of the Securities Acts is
presented in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES Acr OF 1933 AND SECURITIES
EXCHANGE Acr OF 1934 Oack S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973) [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY). Concerns over insider overreaching and the disempowerment of public
shareholders are expressed, in particular, in S. REp. No. 73-1455, at 30 (1934) (the "Fletcher
Report"), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at Item 21, which describes trading and
operational abuses and the need to enlighten shareholders through enhanced disclosure and
improved mechanisms of shareholder suffrage, and H.R. REp. No. 73·1383, at 13 (1934) (the
"Rayburn Report"), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at Item 18 (section entitled
"Control of Unfair Practices by Corporate InSiders''). The classic statement of disclosure's operation as a prophylaxis against abuse is that of Louis D. Brandeis: "Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policemen." LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OrHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY 92 (1914). Also noteworthy is President Roosevelt's statement upon the enactment of
the Securities Act: "What we seek is to return to a clearer understanding of the ancient truth
that those who manage banks, corporations, and other agencies handling or using other people's
money are trustees acting for others." S. REp. NO. 73-47, at 6-7 (1933), quoted in 1 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 121, at 178-79. For analysis of the SEC's mandate, pursuant to the
Exchange Act, to effectuate systematic corporate reporting for the protection of investors, see Jill
E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129 (1993).
179. For the relevant S-K disclosure requirements, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401, .402, .404
(1996). The release announcing the amended executive compensation disclosure rules' also describes disclosure as a means of deterring abuse. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed.
Reg. at 48,137. For recent commentary on the relationship between rigorous financial reporting
standards and the promotion of effective corporate governance, see Louis Lowenstein, Financial
Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335
(1996).
180. These arguments are presented infra note 187.
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insiders from corporate contributions, potential gains to corporations therefrom, and the increased costs of shareholder litigation arising from such a
regulatory initiative. Nevertheless, the ability of managers to use corporate
contributions to benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders, without
there necessarily being any offsetting benefits to the corporation, is not
only a real and significant potentiality, but one that is presently condoned
by state. and federal law. Consistent with the general philosophy of the
federal securities laws and regulations, required disclosure of corporate
charitable contributions is likely to import an appropriate measure of hldiciousness in corporate executives' oversight of corporate contributions
programs'. The means to effect the professionalization of the contributions
function are increasingly available to corporate management, so are the
means to inquire about shareholders' preferences in regard thereto. A
disclosure requirement would signal to managers, and to shareholders, the
need to value contributions as strategic resources, or alternatively, the need
to evaluate philanthropic practices in light of shareholder preferences.

N.

CoRPORATE DoNATIONS AND CoRPORATE SocIAL REsPONSIBILITY

Many public corporations donate millions of dollars each year in the
name of "corporate social responsibility. "181 Corporate executives frequently cite corporate social responsibility as the principal motivation
behind their charitable donations,I82 and public corporations' reports to
181. The definitional problems presented by the term "corporate social responsibility" are
discussed infra note 191. At this juncture. I wish to clarify that this Article does not take a
position in the debate over the propriety of philanthropically motivated corporate charitable
contributions. Rather. my central objective in this Part of the Article is to emphasize that views
on corporate social responsibility (including philanthropically motivated corporate contributions)
are inherently political. I argue. therefore. that they should be subject to a more democratic
decisional process than applies in regard to traditional, commercial corporate conduct. See David
L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1. 1 (1979) ("The resolution of nearly every issue of corporate social responsibility depends heavily on one's beliefs
about'how our political process operates and one's convictions about the ideal political process. ").
182. See"e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 582-83 (N.J. 1953) (testimony of
Smith company executives describing corporate social responsibility as a basis for corporate philanthropy); NEIL J. MITCHELL, THE GENEROUS CORPORATION: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF
ECONOMIC POWER passim (1989); Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American
Competitiveness March 1990,46 Bus. LAW. 241 (1990); Linda D. Lerner &. Gerald E. Fryxell,
CEO Stakeholder Attitudes and Corporate Social Activity in the Fortune 500, Bus. &. SOC'Y, Apr.
1994. at 58,59 ("Top managers iricreasingly operate from a perspective that recognizes the importance of managing or balancing the needs and demands of a variety of constituencies or stakeholder groups. "). Various studies have documented executives' favorable views of corporate social
responsibility and of corporate charitable giving as a vehicle for fulfilling corporate obligations to
society. See, e.g., Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate Contributions to Charity: Nothing More than a

626

44 UCLA LAW REVIEW 579 (1997)

shareholders have frequently spoken in terms of corporate "citizenship" and
"corporate obligations to the community" in describing corporate charitable
contributions. The media, too, has fostered the image of the socially
responsible corporation in its popular reportil1g on corporate gifts. 183
Some of the statements about business' social responsibilities have reflected
shrewd business strategy,l84 but arguments about business' "enlightened
self-interest" have not replaced the notion of the truly philanthropic corporation. 18S
In light of its durability throughout this century,l86 the
Marketing Strategy?, in PHILANTHROPIC GIVING 246, 249-50 (Richard Magat ed., 1989) (describing 1982 study for Council on Foundations finding that "[albout 7 in 10 [executivesl claim to be
motivated by a desire to help the needy in the communities in which their company has
plants/locations and by a desire to do what is ethically correct," along with less altruistic goals);
Charles Peter Corcoran, Corporate Philanthropy: Attitudes of Institutional Shareholders, Individual Shareholders, and Corporate Philanthropy Executives 201 (1987) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Minnesota) (on file with author) (finding broad-based support among corporate
executives for the proposition that "shareholders' interests go beyond purely economic considerations," notwithstanding that "profits from corporate philanthropy are uncertain"); John J.
Siegfried & Katherine Maddox McElroy, Corporate Philanthropy in the U.S. (1980) (Working
Paper No. 81-W26, Vanderbilt University, Department of Economics) (surveys indicated that
corporate managers overseeing philanthropy programs regarded corporate social responsibility as
the most important reason for making contributions), cited in CLOTFELTER, supra note 22, at 172.
183. Prior to the late 1980s, the media routinely described corporate charitable contributions
in terms of social responsibility. This has changed, however. The current trend in media reporting, and in executives' remarks describing contributions, is to highlight the "strategic benefits"
that may accrue to the firm therefrom-for example, favorable publicity, public goodwill, and
political favor. In this vein, see, for example, RICHARD STECKEL & ROBIN SIMONS, DoING BEST
BY DoING GooD (1992); Smith, supra note 47.
184. The goodwill generated from the firm's reputation for generosity may be translatable, in
certain instances, into monetary gains. For this reason, corporate charitable contributions are
frequently described as being a matter of business' "enlightened self-interest." For an influential
treatment of the concept of business' enlightened self-interest, see W.J. Baumol, Enlightened SelfInterest and Corporate Philanthropy, in COMMISSION ON FOUNDS. AND PRIVATE PHILANTROPY,
supra note 49, at app. VI (1970). The term has gained widespread currency. For further discussion, see Part VI infra.
185. From a philosophical perspective, various authors have questioned the soundness of
speaking of the firm as capable of acting "charitably." See, e.g., Bill Shaw & Frederick R. Post, A
Moral Basis for Corporate Philanthropy, 12 J. Bus. ETHICS 745 (1993); Menlo Smith & Patrick
Mendis, Should Corporations Be Charitabk?, 89 Bus. & SOC'Y REv. 19 (1994). More generally, for
a discussion of altruism within economic theory, see, for example, Natalie S. Glance & Bernardo
A. Huberman, The Dynamics of Social Dikmmas, SCI. AM., March 1994, at 76; John Haltiwanger
& Michael Waldman, The Rok of Altruism in Economic Interaction, 21 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
1 (1993); Herbert A. Simon, Altruism and Economics, AM. ECON. REV., May 1993, at 156; Robert
Sugden, Thinking as a Team: Towards an Explanation of Nonselfish Behavior, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y,
Winter 1993, at 69.
186. The belief that corporations should affirmatively embrace social responsibilities beyond
wealth maximization has had distinguished critics. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at 32; see
also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-34 (1962); MANNE & WALLlCH, supra
note 140; STUART NOLAN, PATTERNS OF CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY (1994); Eugene V.
Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsibk?, in THE
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notion of the philanthropic corporation (as one incident of the socially
responsible corporation) deserves distinct consideration as a matter of law
and policy.187

A.

Managerial Control over Corporate Social Responsibility

As described above, state law has validated corporate authority to
make donations irrespective of benefit to the firm .. But because the law has
stopped short of mandating corporate charitable giving, decisions regarding
the allocation of corporate capital for charitable purposes must be made
individually by each firm. For this reason, the establishment of a corporate
philanthropy program as part of the firm's objectives is inextricably linked
to the question of the allocation of decision-making power within the firm.
The centralized administration of corporate resources has traditionally been
legitimated on the basis of managerial expertise,188 but this rationale is
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1960); Paul H. Weaver, After
Social Responsibility, in THE U.S. BUSINESS CORPORATION: AN INSTmmON IN TRANsmoN 133
(John R. Meyer & James M. Gustafson eds., 1988). Corporate social responsibility has also had
formidable advocates. See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
(1976); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975).
187. Although they are too complex to be discussed in depth, some of the arguments both in
favor of and against philanthropic corporate contributions may be summarized as follows. (Only
the first rationale is directly tied to shareholders' interests.) First, the centralized administration
of corporate contributions s'aves shareholders time: and effort, in comparison to the process of
individual contributing. Of course, the very serious trade-off is a loss of individual choice in the
selection of beneficiaries. Moreover, tax expenditures are meant to foster individual choice and
diversity, values that are undermined when the federal subsidy is located at the corporate level.
Second, the current tax system provides a substantial'incentive for firm-level giving. If one (or
society) is primarily concerned with m:iximizing the value of contributions received by charities,
corporate giving is superior to individual giving after the receipt of corporate dividends. Of
course, at least theoretically, ~he tax system could be changed to eliminate this preference, but no
such change is likely to be forthcoming. Third, the centralized administration inherent in corporate grant-making, and the ability of corporate grant makers to wield substantial resources, may
increase accountability and good management at charitable organizations. On the other hand, it
is inherently risky for charitable organizations to become too dependent on a small group of large
donors, such as corporations. Fourth, in an environment of underregulation, corporate charitable
contributions may reflect the internalization of costs which would otherwise be imposed on innocent third parties (e.g., gifts to environmental groups reduce the effects of pollution). Firms may
attempt to forestall further, mandatory regulation in this manner, potentially reducing costs overall. However, the potential for firms effectively to address larger social problems in this ad hoc
manner, in the absence of stated public policies and objectives, is uncertain. Also, certain commentators argue that contributions function as fancy bribes, thereby undermining the political
(and regulatory) process. Lastly, the distt:ibution of benefits to the community (i.e., free-riders)
through philanthropic contributions, as a side-effect of benefits targeted at employees, may be
regarded as an acceptable cost of doing business.
188. For the alternative argument that claims of managerial expertise within corporate law
operate as political' sops desigiled to legitimize the status quo, see Frug, supra note 98.
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inapposite in the context of corporate altruism. Thus, the present managerial control over philanthropically motivated corporate contributions has
failed to offer a sufficient account of its legitimacy.
In fact, the problem of legitimacy or decisional authority in regard to
philanthropically motivated corporate charitable contributions is ultimately
a crucial one. Serious consideration of the corporate social responsibility
debate yields the conclusion that there cannot be a definitive, authoritative
resolution to the problem of allocating responsibility between government,
busir-ess, and individual persons. 189 Rather, assertions regarding corporate
social responsibility mask complex, normative conclusions about the interrelation of the public and private sectors, the functioning of the capital
markets, the power of corporate management, and the nature of corporate
shareholdership. The existing empirical analysis in this area fails to resolve
the problem of defining (or designing) optimal institutional arrangements.
Because questions relating to corporate social responsibility and philanthropically motivated corporate contributions are properly regarded as
matters of social policy or politics, principles of consensus-building and
accountability must be substituted for objective assertions of right. With
respect to the best interests of shareholders, therefore, the question of
whether the firm should make philanthropically motivated charitable contributions is best addressed through a process of controlled experimentation
in an environment promoting managerial accountability and receptivity to
shareholders' concerns. 190
B.

The Definition and Development of Corporate Social Responsibility

1.

Defining Corporate Social Responsibility

There is no authoritative definition of corporate social responsibility ,191 but its central tenet can be described as the belief that busi189. Engel, too, concluded that these fundamental normative questions cannot be resolved
on the level of generalities, but rather require issue by issue analysis in particular substantive
areas. See Engel, supra note 181, at 3-4.
190. In this vein, see Medical Committee for Human Rights II. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir.
1970), lIacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
191. The profound difficulty in arriving at an acceptably clear definition of corporate social
responsibility has been noted throughout the literature. For a good working definition, see Engel,
supra note 181, at 5-6: "The term [corporate social responsibility] is most useful if taken to denote the obligations and inclinations, if any, of corporations organized for profit, voluntarily to
pursue social ends that conflict with the presumptive shareholder desire to maximize profit." See
also MANNE & WALLICH, supra note 140, at 3-8. In light of definitional and other conceptual
difficulties, a substantial portion of the social responsibility literature has existed at a high level of
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nesses, especially large, public corporations, have an obligation to contri,
bute to the betterment of society in a manner distinct from the maximiza,
tion of corporate profit and obedience to the law. 192
Typically, the arguments in favor of corporate social responsibility can
be reduced to three distinct conceptual grounds. 193 First, there is an ap,
peal to social necessity: The financial needs of arts, education, and commu,
nity service organizations exceed the capacity of individuals and the
government to fund them. 194 Second, there is an appeal based on corp~
rate capacity: As a result of their vast scale and scope, American business
corporations are in a position to be agents of social progress. 195 LaStly
there is an appeal based on morality, in which the corporation is likened to
a "citizen" having moral and ethical responsibilities analogous to those of
natural persons. 196 In sum, the ideology of corporate social responsibility
abstraction or, otherwise, has addressed the problem of "means" without resolving other basic
issues. For an important critique of the means literature, and particularly the notion that a system of independent directors might resolve social responsibility issues, see Victor Brudney, The
Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982). For an
intelligent critique of the corporate social responsibility debate as a dialectic about the scope of
public and private affairs, see Alan Wolfe, The Modem Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor?,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1673 (1993). See also William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception
of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 261 (1992) (arguing that corporate law's inability to choose between private property and social responsibility norms reflects the fundamental
duality of human nature). Definitional problems have also hindered economic analysis of the
relation between corporate social responsibility expenditures and corporate financial performance.
See, e.g., Kenneth E. Aupperle et aI., An Empirical Examination of the Relationship Between Corp~
rate Social Responsibility and Profitability, 28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 446-63 (1985); Arieh A Ullmann,
Data in Search of a Theory: A Critical Examination of the Relationships Among Social Performance,
Social Disclosure, and Economic Performance of U.S. Firms, 10 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 540 (1985).
192. Within the management science literature, see, for example, William C. Frederick,
From CRS J to CRS 2: The Maturing of Business-and-Society Thought, Bus. & SOC'Y, Aug. 1994, at
150. See also Lerner & Fryxell, supra note 182.
193. This intellectual construct is based on my interpretation of the charitable contributions
cases, as well as a survey of the commentary on corporate social responsibility, as cited herein.
194. See, e.g., Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969); AP.
Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A2d 581, 585-86 (N.J. 1953) ("With the transfer of most of the
wealth to corporate hands and the imposition of heavy burdens of individual taxation, [individuals] have been unable to keep pace with increased philanthropic needs. They have therefore,
with justification, turned to corporations to assume the modem obligations of good citizenship in
the same manner as humans do."); MANNE & WALLlCH, supra note 140; Blumberg, supra note
46. For influential arguments in favor of corporate responsibility efforts, see NADER ET AL., supra
note 186; STONE, supra note 186.
195. A.P. Smith, 98 A2d at 584 ("Control of economic wealth has passed largely from individual entrepreneurs to dominating corporations, and calls upon the corporations for reasonable
philanthropic donations have come to be made with increased public support.").
196. Such personification is evident in the ALI's treatment of the subject of corporate purpose, for exa: •. ;Jie. See ALl, supra note 14. In defining the objective and conduct of the corporation, § 2.01(b) provides, in pertinent part:
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holds that in light of pressing social needs, the vastness of corporate wealth
and power, and evolving ethical norms, corporate America should make
increased social expenditures. 197
2.

A Brief Intellectual and Legal History

The evolution of corporate social responsibility as a distinct perspective on industrial and social organization has been associated with economic and intellectual developments occurring within the United States
early in the twentieth century. By the teens and the twenties, with the
themes of Progressive-era politics in the air, there was no denying the increasing concentration of wealth in corporate hands. 198 According to
Neil Mitchell's The Generous Corporation, .by this time the notion of free
competition no longer supplied satisfactory justification for the visible
accumulation of corporate wealth. Corporate executives therefore turned
to corporate "social" spending as a means to persuade both labor and the
general public that business' wealth and power would not be subversive to
the public interest. l99 According to Mitchell, most of these expenditures
were directed at employees and their families. They included corporatefunded pension benefits, life insurance,· access to medical care, improved
working conditions generally, and of course, charitable contributions. 2OO
From a legal perspective, it was during this period that certain states first
enacted statutes authorizing corporate charitable contributions. 201
Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation,
in the conduct of its business: ...
(2) May take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as
appropriate to the responsible conduct of business; ....
Id. § 2.01(b). The question of corporate moral agency has, historically, been related to discussions of the nature of the corporation. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 191; David Millon, Theories of
the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201. For a slightly different ·perspective, see Jeffrey Nesteruk,
Bellotti and the Question of ~rporate Moral Agency, 1988 COLUM. ~US. L. REv. 683.
197. As others have noted, the combined operation of the corporate philanthropy statutes
and the business judgment tule has meant that exeCl,ltives' social responsibility decisions will
generally be immune from shareholder attack. See Davis, supra note 46. Defenses Of managerial
prerogative in this area have often been couched in the language of long-term benefit to the firm,
as noted by Davis and Chancellor Allen. See Allen, supra note 191, at 273 ("The longterm/short-term distinction preserves the form of the stockholders oriented property theory, while
permitting, in fact, a considerable degree of behavior consistent.with a view that sees public
corporations as owing social responsibilities to all affected by their operation.").
198. See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 17; see also MrrCHELL,.supra note 182.
199. MrrCHELL, supra note 182, at 10-25.
200.
201.

Id.

See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text ..
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Thereafter, the problem of business' social responsibilities received
serious academic consideration in the early 1930s in a series of polemical
essays exchanged between Columbia Law School's Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and
Harvard Law School's E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. 202 In The Modem Corporation
and Private Property, Berle and Means had described the increasing separation of ownership from control in the public corporation as having "placed
the community in position to demand that the modem corporation serve
not alone the owners or the control but all society."203 In light of his
concern over licensing managerial overreaching, Berle backed away from
this position in his essay, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust. But it was
too late to quell debate. In 1932, Dodd argued that the new institution of
the modem corporation was consistent with business assuming increased
responsibility to address social problems. 204 In fact, Dodd argued that
"public opinion" had already made "substantial strides in the direction of a
view of the business corporation as an economic institution which has a
social service as well as a profit-making function. "205 And, consistent
with Dodd's view of the matter, Congress enacted a federal income tax
deduction for corporate charitable contributions in 1935. 206
Claims regarding business' social responsibilities and the propriety of
managers allocating corporate capital on this basis have been made
throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Consistent with what
Jeffrey Gordon has described as the "high tide of benevolent managerialism"207 and in light of the various economic advantages enjoyed by Amer
ican business at the time, the 1950s witnessed the enactment of unrestric202. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1931);
Berle, supra note l38, at 1365; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?,
45 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932) !hereinafter Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?];
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciilry Duties of Corporate Managers
Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 194 (1935); see also A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the
Corporation SeTlle? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33 (1991)
(describing issues addressed in the Berle-Dodd debate in relation to the evolving jurisprudence on
hostile tender offers).
203. BERLE &. MEANS, supra note 17, at 356.
204. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, supra note 202, at 1153.
205. ld. at 1148.
206. The enactment of the corporate charitable conrribution deduction in 1935 must be
viewed as congressional validation of genuinely philanthropic corporate conrributions, because
business-related donations would already have been deductible under existing Code provisions.
Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648, 1661 (1936); see also Union Pac. R.R. v. Trustees,
Inc., 329 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah 1958) ("In 1935 Congress encouraged corporate conrributions to
eleemosynary causes by allOWing a deduction for tax purposes in such cases. H).
207. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COWM. L. REv. 1931, 1982
(1991).
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tive corporate philanthropy laws by many states. In fact, without conceding that he had been wrong, Berle acknowledged in 1954 that the theory of
corporate social responsibility advocated by Dodd (consistent with Dodd's
prediction) had come to occupy the field of popular opinion and the
law. zOB Thereafter, throughout the social upheaval of the late 1960s and
early 1970s, increasingly vocal demands were made on business to take part
in ameliorating social problems. ZOO
3.

Recent Developments

Despite the increasingly conservative tone of political debate since the
early 1980s, notions of corporate social responsibility have become embedded in public policy discourse and in the law. Several U.S. presidents,
including former Presidents Reagan and Bush, have called for increased
corporate social spending. zIO And from a legislative perspective, in 1981,
208.

Twenty years ago, the writer had a controversy with the late Professor E.
Merrick Dodd, of Harvard Law School, the writer holding that corporate
. powers were powers held in trust for shareholders while Professor Dodd argued
that these powers were held in trust for the entire community. The argument
has been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favor of Professor
Dodd's contention.
ADoLF A. BERLE JR., THE TwENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954); see also
A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (N.J. 1953) ("[Mlodern conditions require that
corporations acknowledge and discharge social as well as private responsibilities as members of
the communities within which they operate. H).
209. Engaging .in some hyperbole, the Delaware Chancery Court, in the case of T~odora
Holding Corp. v. Henderson, described the corporate philanthropy statutes in the states as reflecting "[tlhe recognized obligation of corporations towards philanthropic, educational and artistic
causes." Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 404 (Del. Ch. 1969) (emphasis
added). The same sensibility is reflected in Blumberg, supra note 46. Also, the Project on Corporate Social Responsibility initiated "Campaign OM" in 1970, in which approval of OM's
shareholders was sought in regard to a number of social responsibility initiatives. For description
and commentary, see Donald E. Schwartz, T~ Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on
Campaign OM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 419 (1971); and for a history of the development of the shareholder proposal system, which has been used as a vehicle for substantial shareholder advocacy in
the area of social responsibility since the 1970s, see Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access to t~
Proxy Revisited, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 37 (1990); Fisch, supra note 178.
210. On December 3, 1981, President Ronald R,eagan announced the establishment of the
Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives, which called upon businesses to devote time and money
to working with community organizations to address social problems (in light of reduced public
sector aid). See Reagan Names 44 to Special Group on Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1981, at 027;
see also Reagan Delivers ChaUenge to Business, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1982, at K1; Reagan Study
Group Urges Donations of 5% for Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1982, at A26; Roundtable Urges
CEOs to Increase Volunteerum, INDUSTRY WEEK, June 28, 1982, at 14; 32 State Private Sector
Initiative Panels Formed, INDUSTRY WEEK, June 28, 1982, at 14. As part of his America 2000
educational reform initiative, President Bush announced the establishment of the New American
Schools Development Corporation, which immediately raised $30 million "from business interests
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in the context of enacting the Economic Recovery Act, Congress reinforced its commitment to encouraging corporate philanthropy by increasing
the' annual ceiling pertaining to the corporate. charitable deduction from
5% to 10% of annual corporate profits,2l1 In so doing, Senators Byrd and
Kennedy spoke emphatically about the need for increased corporate philanthropy and the importance of corporate social responsibility in general. 212
Within corporation law, certain commentators have interpreted the
enactment of the so-called "constituency statutes" by many states during
the 1980s as evidence of the continued currency of theories of corporate
social responsibility.213 Enacted in the context of an active market for
corporate control, these statutes describe the discretion of corporate managers to consider the interests of. employees, customers, creditors, and the
community, as well as shareholders' "long-term" interests, within their
decision-making. 214 Although their obvious application is to takeover defense, the expanded discretion they afford corporate managers is not confined thereto according to the express language of the statutes. 215 In the
absence of interpretive precedent, the full significance of the constituency
~tatutes remains unclear, but their express terms provide authority for corporate executives to make decisions based on expanded social responsibility
criteria.
represented on the board." See Janet Bass, Corporation Fanned to Raise Money for New Schools,
UPI, July 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File (listing group's leaders drawn from
bUSiness, government, and education); Short Ta~s: New Schools' Funding, WASH. POST, July 9,
1991, at A17; see also Karen De Witt, Brought to You by Exxon-School Reform, N.Y. TIMES, July
21, 1991, (Week in Review), at A4; Margaret Spillane & Bruce Shapiro, Bush's New American
Schools: A Small Qrcle of Friends, 258 NATION 278 (1992). It is ironic and fascinating that the
conservative push towards privatization has sparked ren~wed interest in corporate social expenditures.
211. I.R.C. § 170(b) (1994). For commentary on the increase in the annual upper limit of
deductible contributions pursuant to the Economic Tax Reform Act of 1981, see Knauer, supra
note 77, at 19-20, 28-32.
212. 127 CONGo REc. S8353 (1981) (statement of Sen. Byrd); id. at S5352 (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
213. For citation and commentary, see, for exampl~, William W. Bratton, Confronting the
Ethical Case Against the Ethical Case for Constituency Rights, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1449
(1993); David Millon, New DirectionS in Corporate Law, Communitarians: Contractarians, and the
Cruis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1373 (1993); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A
Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REv.
579 (1992); Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992).
214. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(d) (West 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14A:6-1(2), 6-14(4) (West 1995); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988); PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 515-16 (West 1995).
215. See sources cited supra note 214. According to Mitchell, by 1992,28 states had enact~d
some form of constituency statute. See Mitchell, supra note 213, at 579 n.1.
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The continuing legal vitality of corporate social responsibility is evident also in certain judicial opinions analyzing the permissible rationales for
the deployment of takeover defenses. Certain Delaware cases have
described the "community of interests" making up the corporation in defining the circumstances justifying management's resistance to unsolicited
takeover bids. 216 In addition, the American Law Institute's Principles of
Corparate Governance, finalized in 1994, describes corporate managers as
having authority to make decisions on the basis of "ethical considerations
that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of
business"-in addition to their particular authority over corporate charitable contributions.217
From a political perspective, with the Republican congressional victory
in 1994 and the presidential race in 1996, discussions of "limited government" and increased private initiative-which inevitably raise the issue of
the social responsibilities of business-moved to the forefront of national
debate. 218 Irrespective of particular political outcomes, the notion that
business must give something back to the community will continue to play
a part in the evolution of modem political debate.
C.

Democratizing the Social Responsibility Debate

The question of corporations' social responsibilities has been debated
throughout this century. Yet the centralized administration of corporate
216. See especiaUy Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1989); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see also Allen, supra note
191; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets and CoUTtS, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1931 (1991) (suggesting that the Paramount decision reflected judicial concern over the nonmonetary costs
imposed on shared community values by an unrestrained market in corporate control). More
generally, the idea that takeovers imposed undue costs on nonshareholder constituencies gave rise
to renewed concern during the 1980s for creditors, employees, and the larger community surrounding the corporation. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the
Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989); Millon, supra note 196.
217. ALI, supra note 14, § 2.01(b)(2), (3).
218. The issue of corporate social responsibility was highly visible in the political debate
surrounding the 1996 presidential race. See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, Republicans and Democrats
Jumping on the Issue of Corporate Social Responsibility, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1996, at B15. Beginning on March 3, 1996, The New York Times published a series of seven special reports on the
subject of corporate downsizing that explicitly faced the question of corporate social responsibilities and the effect of corporate layoffs on employees and local communities. See also Robert B.
Reich, How to Avoid These Layoffs?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1996, at AZl (arguing in favor of expanded legal and political support (e.g., public sector subsidies) for corporations which are solicitous of the needs of employees and other nonshareholder constituencies); c[. William Safire, The
. New Socialism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1996, at A13 (arguing that calls for increased corporate
social responsibility amount to a revivified form of SOCialism).
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affairs has hindered a more democratic approach to the issue, particularly
one that would take account of the views of corporate shareholders-the
parties who fund such expenditures. While a perfectly democratic system is
unattainable in light of the collective-action problems affecting the shareholder franchise in the public corporation, the lack of an ideal system of
shareholder participation has too readily functioned as a justification for
maintaining the status quo. The dangers implied by the concentration of
not only the factors of production, but also communal resources in the
hands of corporate management, mandates in favor of implementing reasonable measures to involve corporate shareholders in decisions regarding
philanthropic corporate contributions.
D.

Disclosure and Philanthropic Contributions: From
Information to Action

A variety of mechanisms would serve to facilitate shareholder involvement in corporate philanthropy. The proxy-voting mechanism established
by federal law and SEC regulation is readily adaptable to this purpose: The
system adopted by Berkshire Hathaway corporation under Warren Buffett's
direction provides a working, practical modeL219 The increased opportunities for intrashareholder communication created by recent amendments to
the proxy rules may also facilitate the ability of shareholders to express their
views on corporate philanthropy.22o Additionally, the shareholder proposal system under the federal proxy rules should provide a vehicle for
shareholders to communicate their views on corporate philanthropy to
management. 221 Finally, shareholders may express their views on corpoFor citations to the company's annual reports, see supra note 140.
See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No.
34-31326,57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (1992).
221. There is a long history of shareholders submitting proposals on corporate philanthropy
under Rule 14a-8. As provided under Rule 14a-8(c)(7), companies may omit a proposal that
"deals with a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the registrant."
17 C.F.R. § 240-14a-8(c)(7) (1996). For many years, the SEC's position had been that the allocation of corporate funds by management among various charitable recipients, as well as other
matters pertaining to corporate philanthropy, involved significant matters of corporate policy and
hence, could not be excluded as "ordinary business." See Union Pacific Corp. (Feb. 5, 1993);
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. (Mar. 7, 1991); McDonnell Douglas Corp. (Feb. 8, 1990); Quaker Oats
Co. (Aug. 4, 1987); Archer Daniel Midland Co. (Aug. 14, 1987); International Business
Machines Corp. (Mar. 7, 1988); E.l. du Pont de Nemours and Co. Oan. 25, 1984); Dow Chemical
Co. Oan. 18, 1979); Humana, Inc. (Oct. 10, 1979). However, in the early 1990s, the staff of the
Division of Corporate Finance "reconsidered" certain of its prior determinations and held that a
firm's decision to commence contributions to a particular cause or group would be viewed by the
staff as a matter of "ordinary business." See, e.g., Aema Life and Casualty Co. (Feb. 13, 1992);
219.

220.
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rate philanthropy, and corporate social responsibility in general, when
voting for directors and through their investment decisions, if they so
choose. 222 However, shareholders will be able to pursue these avenues for
involvement and assume a meaningful role in the formulation of corporatephilanthropy policies only if corporations provide them with accurate and
complete information regarding their charitable contributions-something
that most firms have failed to do voluntarily.223

V. THE

POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY

Corporations engage in political advocacy in order to increase the
rewards and reduce the penalties accruing to them through political and
legal channels.
Certain forms of corporate political activity are
overt-namely, lobbying and campaign-finance spending conducted through
political action committees ("PACs").224 Less obviously, but no less deliberately, corporations have used technically philanthropic donations225 to
politicized charities226 to promote their long-term financial interests in
the political arena. Corporate philanthropy obtains expressly political
SCE Corp. (Feb. 20, 1992); PacifiC Telesis Group (Feb. 20, 1992). Therefore, the ability of shareholders to employ the shareholder proposal process as a means of affecting corporations' giving
practices remains in doubt under current SEC practice.
222. Certainly, the continued development of computer-based information technology will
increasingly facilitate the process of information gathering and communication between shareholders and managers in these matters.
223. Corporations' resistance to disclosure of charitable contributions information is illustrated, for example, by companies' attempts to exclude shareholder proposals requesting such
disclosure. See, e.g., IBM Corp. (Jan. 31, 1994); Superior Oil Co. (Mar. 9, 1982); The Upjohn
Co. (Feb. 17, 1982); E.I. du Pont de Nemours (Leeds) (Jan. 16, 1981); American Telephone and
Telegraph Co. (Jan. 9, 1979); Marriott Corp. (Sept. 17, 1976); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. (Oct. 2,
1979).
224. Corporate PACs are increasingly being studied by political scientists. See, for example,
DAN CLAWSON ET AL., MONEY TALKS: CORPORATE PACS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE (1992);
THEODORE J. EISMEIER &. PHILLIP H. POLLOCK, BUSINESS, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF
CORPORATE PACS IN AMERICAN ELECfIONS (1988); FRANK' J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN
FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES (1992); M. Margaret Conway &. Joanne Connor Green, Political
Action Committees and the Political Process in t~ 1990s, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 155 (Allen
J. Cigler &. Burdett A. Loomis eds., 4th ed. 1995).
225. I have elected to continue to refer to the donations described herein as "charitable" and
"philanthropiC" in order to emphasize that they are made to charitable organizations qualified
under § 501(c)(3) of the Code-as opposed to PACs or other entities.
226. For a technical analysis of the lobbying and campaign finance limitations pertaining to
charitable organizations under the Code, see Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Lobbying and Political
Expenditures, 613-2d Tax Mgmt. (BNA) (1996). For an insightful discussion of the issue, see
Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organi~ation Advocacy: Matching t~ Rules to t~ Rationales,63 IND. L.J.
201 (1987). Many of the charitable organizations described in this section of the Article skirt the
outer boundaries of permissible nonprofit advocacy.
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dimensions in corporate gifts to politicized foundations, legal defense funds,
and special interest groups-all of which may constitute themselves taxexempt, charitable organizations under § 501(c)(3) of the Code, as described
below.
Charitable contributions that are made for the purpose of advancing
the corporation's political interests are consonant with traditional corporate
legal norms (Le., wealth maximization). At least theoretically, they pose no
threat to shareholders' property interests. Nevertheless, because politicized
corporate charitable contributions are a form of corporate political speech,
they may impinge on shareholders' speech and associational interests. In
light of the fact that shareholders are typically not provided with information regarding the firm's charitable contributions, the investment decision
cannot represent a legitimate proxy for shareholder consent to politicized
charitable contributions. 227 As commentators have elsewhere noted, a
deep conflict exists between the firm's right to promote its political interests and the shareholders' interest in not being compelled to subsidize
speech with which they are in disagreement. This section of the Article
analyzes this conflict in the context of politicized corporate charitable
contributions.
A. The Legal Basis for the Politicization of the Nonprofit Sector
Politically motivated corporate philanthropy is used to influence a
variety of constituencies within the United States, including members of
Congress and the judiciary, organized interest groups, and the public in
general. 228 Of course, corporate charitable contributions would be relatively ineffective political instruments were it not for the increasingly political nature of many charitable organizations. 229
227. See Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 WM. & MARy
BILL RTS. J. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment];
Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE
L.J. 235 (1981) [hereinafter Brudney, Business Corporations]; cf. Alan J. Meese, Umitations on
Corporate Speech: Protection for Shareholders or Abridgment of Expression?, 2 WM. & MARy BILL
RTS. J. 305 (1993); Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109
(1992).
228. The diverse forms of political influence that may be exerted through corporate charitable contributions are discussed in NEIHEISEL, supra note 32. See also Haley, supra note 36, at
496-97.
229. That is, the charitable organizations function as conduits for corporate political advocacy. Many charities engage in political advocacy as a crucial aspect of furthering their public
service objectives. Karen W. Arenson, Legislation Would Expand Restrictions on Political Advocacy
by Charities, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,1995, at AI0 ("'Those at the bottom of the ladder very often
need both the social services and the advocacy .... '" (quoting Sara Melendez, president of
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While the language of § 501(c)(3) would seem to deny charitable organizations a meaningful political life, this has not been the case. The lobbying limitations and absolute proscription on campaigning that apply to
charitable organizations ·under § 501(c)(3)Z30 have not prevented charitable organizations from beco~ing politically active. The inclusion of
"education" as a charitable purpose under § 501(c)(3),Z31 and the Treasury
regulations' broad definition thereof,Z3Z has supplied a basis for considerable advocacy on the part of charitable organizations, and especially educational foundations.Z33
In light of the relevance of constitutionally
Independent Sector». Nonprofit political advocacy has been a source of recent controversy. In
July 1995, three representatives introduced legislation that would "sharply circumscribe not just
lobbying efforts, but also all other attempts to influence public policy at the national, state or
local level by [nonprofit) recipients of Federal grants." Id. For related discussion, see infra
note 239.
230. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). An organization qualifyi!tg for charitable status pursuant
to § 501(c)(3) is one in which
no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h», and
which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for
public office.
Id. In response to the ambiguity surrounding the "substantial part" test, the IRS enacted
§ 501(h) as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-455,90 Stat. 1720, 1723 (1976).
Section 501(h) is a safe harbor permitting qualified electing organizations to spend a precisely
defined amount of their funds on lobbying without tunning afoul of the § 501(c)(3) substantial
part test.
231. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
232. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)·(d)(3) (1996) ("An organization may be educational even
though it advocates a particular position or viewpoint so long as it presents a suffiCiently full and
fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to form an indepen·
dent opinion or conclusion."). However, the "full and fair exposition" test was held unconstitu·
tionally vague by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v.
United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The IRS has therefore resorted. to a "methodology test," which identifies various factors for consideration in making the distinction between
education and advocacy. See Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986·2 C.B. 729. Of course, the IRS cannot base
any such determinations on the content of the ideas expressed without running afoul of the First
Amendment.
233. The issue of political advoca.cy by nonprofit organizations has received congressional
attention, but is not susceptible to easy resolution. See Hearings on Lobbying and Political Activities
of Tax-Exempt Organitatioru Before the Subcomm: on 'Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 100th Cong. (1987); SUBCOMMI1TIE ON OVERSiGHT OF THE CoMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 100TH cONG., REpORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON LOBBYING AND POLITICAL
ACTIVITIES OF TAX·ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (Comm. Prip.t ~987). For an important discussion
of the Code's and Treasury regulations' treatment of the definition of "education" 'in the context
of foundations identified with particular politicians, se~ Francis R. Hill, Newt Gingrich and Oliver
Twist: Charitable Contributions and Campaign Finance; 66 TAX NOTES 237 Oan. 9,1995); see also
Laura Brown Chisolm, Sinking the Think Tanks Upstream: The Use and Misuse of Tax Exemption
Law to Address the Use and Misuse of Tax.Exempt Organitations by Politicians, 51 U. Pm. L. REV.
577 (1990). Political spending by charitable foundationS had attracted substantial controversy in

Corporate Philanthropy

639

guaranteed liberties, the IRS has had a difficult time distinguishing between
permissible educational activities, permissible advocacy, and impermissible
lobbying, propagandizing, and campaigning. 234 Furthermore, § 501(c)(3)
itself provides a basis for some lobbying by charitable organizations, so long
as such lobbying does not constitute a substantial part of the organizations'
activities. 235 The Treasury regulations have further facilitated the political
empowerment of charitable organizations by providing particular, itemized
exceptions to the-definition of prohibited lobbying,236 and by distinguishing judicial, executive and administrative bodies from those
"legislative bodies" that may not be lobbied consistent with
§ 501(c)(3).237
Thus, the porous nature of § 501(c)(3)'s requirements and that of the
accompanying regulations, combined with the increasingly factionalized,
interest-group-based nature of society and politics,238 has meant that the
universe of politically empowered § 501(c)(3) charitable organizations has
expanded dramatically in th~ last three decades.239 Many of these entities
the mid- and late 1960s. Congress took steps to prevent future abuses by enacting new rules and
penalties pertaining to foundations as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. For historical background on the controversy and on Congress' reaction thereto, see COMMISSION ON FOUNDS.
AND PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY, supra note 49. Congress failed to confront the problem of direct
corporate giving, however.
234. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, From Big Mama Rag to National Geographic: ~ Controversy
Regarding Exemptions for Educational Publications, 41 TAX L. REv. 693 (1986). For additional
commentary on the tax-based limitations pertaining to political advocacy by nonprofit organizations, see Chisolm, supra note 226; Laura Brown Chisolm, Political Advocacy Meets the
Internal Revenue Code: 'There's Got to Be a Better Way' (1994) (New York University School
of Law, Program on Philanthropy and the Law).
235. See supra note 230.
236. Most Significantly, pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(1)-(4) (1996), charitable organizations may engage in "nonpartisan" analysis and make their finding available to governmental
bodies, may examine and discuss broad social and economic problems (including problems government would ultimately be expected to address), may address governmental bodies if they do so
in response to an invitation therefrom, and may appear before governmental bodies in regard to
matters affecting the powers and duties of the charitable organization itself.
237. See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(d)(3) (1996) ("'Legislative body' does not include executive,
judicial, or administrative bodies. H).
238. Political scientists have observed that organized interest groups have played an increasingly critical role in politics since the 1970s. See, e.g., KAy LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T.
TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986); see also INTEREST GROUP
POLITICS, supra note 224.
239. The problem of distinguishing the appropriate characteristics and limits of charitable
organizations (as opposed to "advocacy" organizations) is at the heart of the recent controversy
regarding the Combined Federal Campaign (the "CFC"), a federally-sponsored charity fundraising effort through which federal employees make charitable contributions (to the groups they
select). In June of 1995, Representative John L. Mica (R-Fla.) criticized the presence of
"advocacy-oriented" charities within the CFC, and held hearings to consider banning them from
continued participation therein. See, e.g., Statement of Chairman John Mica: Hearing on Combined
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are unrelated to the classes of causes and problems historically associated
with philanthropy, and many of them, as mentioned above, are at least
informally committed to influencing public policy.240 Thus, the breadth
of politicized causes and entities qualifying for § 501(c)(3) charitable status
has enhanced the opportunities for corporations to use philanthropic contributions to accomplish political objectives.
B.

The Limitations and Disincentives Attaching to Traditional Corporate
Political Advocacy

Significant legal limitations apply to traditional corporate campaignfinance activities 241 and substantial tax-based, financial disincentives pertain to traditional corporate lobbying.242 Corporate philanthropy has
therefore become an especially attractive vehicle for corporate political
advocacy. By pursuing political objectives through technically philanthroFederal Campaign Before the Subcomm. on alii! Sew. of the House Comm. on GOlI't Reform, Federal
Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, June 7, 1995, allailable in LEXIS, Legis
History, CNGTST File; Testimony of Charles Stephen, Senior Staff Attorney NAACP Legal Defense
Fund: Hearing on Combined Federal Campaign Before the Subcomm. on allil Sew. of the House
Comm. on GOlI'i Reform, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, June 7,
1995, allailable in LEXIS, Legis History, CNGTST File. Prior to the 1980s, the CFC was limited
to charitable organizations providing direct services in the area of human health and welfare;
however, litigation brought by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund succeeded in opening the CFC
to a wider group of charities. Although it has received some support, groups across the political
spectrum have criticized Mica's proposal to ban the "bad," advocacy groups from the CFC,
noting the impossibility of distinguishing between "advocacy" and "non-advocacy" oriented
charities. Mica himself acknowledged that he had not entirely figured out how to distinguish
advocacy groups from charities. See Constance Casey, Congress Targets 'Good,' 'Bad' Charities,
CLEV. PLAIN DEALER July 10, 1995, at 3E (quoting Mica as stating, "I know what they
aren't.... It's sort of like pornography. I'd know what one was when I saw it."). Mica's initiative, conducted as chairman of the House Civil Service Subcommittee, has understandably been
viewed as part of recent Republican efforts to "defund the left". See Jeff Shear, The Ax Files, 27
NAT'L J. 924 (1995); ·War on Nontn'ofits" Heats Up, NONPROFIT WORLD, Jan.lFeb. 1996, at 8.
240. See sutn'a note 229. In addition to the limitations described above, § 501(c)(3) requires
that qualifying organizations be "organized" and "operated" exclusively to fulfill a charitable
purpose. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). These organizational and operational requirements are further elaborated in Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)-(c) (1996). Entities which engage in impermissible advocacy are classified as "action organizations." See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.50 1(c)(3)-1 (c)(3)(ii), (iv) (1996).
241. For discussion of the Federal Election Campaign Act, see infra notes 246-263 and accompanying text.
242. In 1993, the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 amended § 162(e) of the Code to
eliminate the deduction for business lobbying expenses (except those pertaining to local lobbying). An analysis of the 30-year life of the business lobbying deduction is presented in
Cummings, sutn'a note 226.
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pic contributions, corporations may lawfully avoid the limitations and disincentives pertaining to traditional corporate political advocacy.
1.

Laws and Regulations Affecting Traditional Corporate
Political Activity

The most important laws governing traditional corporate political
activity are' the·Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA")243 (and analogous state laws)244 and the Code's provisions governing the deductibility
of business lobbying expenses. 245 The significance of the under-regulated
nature of corporate philanthropy becomes apparent when compared to the
heavily regulated nature of traditional corporate political activity.
a. Corporate Campaign Spending and FECA
FECA absolutely prohibits corporations and labor unions from making
contributions and expenditures to federal election campaigns.246 These
243. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994). There are
a variety of other federal laws affecting lobbyists' activities. In fact, Congress passed significant
lobbying reform measures in 1995, in the form of rules limiting gifts that could be accepted by
Members (these rules were enacted separately by each House). It also passed the Lobby Disclosure Reform Act of 1995, which requires for the first time that public disclosure be made of paid
lobbyists' efforts to influence the legislative and regulatory process in both the legislative and the
executive branches. See Alice A. Love, CongTess Appro\les First CNerhaul of Lobby Disclosure Law
Since '40's, ROLL CALL, Nov. 30, 1995; Refonning CongTess; Changing the Way Washington Works,
HERITAGE FOUND. REps., Dec. 1995, No. 29, at 1. In addition, see Lobbying Disclosure Act of
1995,2 U.S.C.S. §§ 1601-1611 (Law. Co-op. 1996); Truth in Lobbying Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1352
(1994).
244. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-330(a) (West 1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55,
§ 7 (Law. Co-op. 1990); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 169.254 (West 1992); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 130.029 (West 1980); N.Y. ELEC. LAw § 14-116 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1996); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 3599.03(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1995); 25 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3253 (West 1994). For
further citation to the states' campaign finance laws, see State Capital Law Finn, Lobbying, PACs
and Campaign Finance, 50 STATE HANDBOOK (1994). For commentary on the states' campaign
finance laws, see COMMON CAUSE, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM IN THE STATES 14 (Aug.
1985); Christopher Cherry, Note, State Campaign Finance Laws: The Necessity and Efficacy of
Refonn, 3 J.L. & POL. 567 (1987); John M. Hamilton, Note, State Campaign Finance Schemes and
Equal Protection, 61 IND. L.J. 251 (1986). See also Austin V. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding constitutionality of state campaign finance law prohibiting corporations from using corporate funds for independent expenditures in support of or in opposition to
candidates running in state elections).
245. I.R.C. § 162(e) (1994).
246. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a). For a politically savvy account of FECA's effect on the federal
election process, see SORAUF, supra note 224.
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prohibitions reflect the view that unrestrained corporate campaign spending
would pose a substantial threat to the democratic political process, and
create at least the appearance of unseemly political quid pro quOS. 247
FECA also reflects concern for the potentially coercive nature of corporate
(and union) campaign spending vis-a-vis the individual political beliefs of
dissenting shareholders and union members.248
FECA's seemingly absolute prohibition on corporate campaign spending is mitigated by the fact that the Act permits corporations to establish
and administer "separately segregated funds"-commonly referred to as
PACs. 249 Under FECA, corporations may establish a PAC and pay all of
its administrative expenses (including its office space, salaries, phone bills,
bank charges, and solicitation expenses, etc.),250 but the funds that the
PAC will donate to federal election campaigns must come from voluntary
contributions from stockholders, employees, and their families.251 Such
contributions cannot come from corporate treasury funds. 252 These requirements are intended to prohibit corporations from using their PACs as
conduits for corporate campaign contributions. 253
b. FECA's Regulations Affecting Corporate PACs
While the distinction between corporate funded administrative costs
and "pass-through contributions" is problematic, FECA imposes other
regulatory safeguards on corporate PACs' involvement in federal election
247. These views are enunciated in the various Supreme Court cases testing the constitutionality of FECA's provisions. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); United States
v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957); United States v. Painters Local Union, 79 F. Supp. 516 (D.
Conn. 1948). For discussion of the historical antecedents of FECA, see Jeremiah D. Lambert,
Corporate Political Spending and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033 (1965).
248. UAW, 352 U.S. at 567; United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); United States v.
Pipefitters Local Union No. 562, 434 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir. 1970), rell'd in part and lIacated in part,
407 U.S. 385 (1972); Ash v. Cort, 350 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd by 471 F.2d 811 (3rd
Cir.1973).
249. Organizational matters pertaining to PACs (or "Separately Segregated Funds") are prescribed under 2 U.S.C.S. § 432 (Law. Co-op. 1996). See also United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d
755 (1973); 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(b) (1996).
250. 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(b) (Separate Segregated Funds-Use of Treasury Monies); id.
§ 114.1(b) (Definitions-Establishment, Administration and Solicitation Costs).
251. 2 U.S.C.S. § 441b(a)(4)(A) & (B).
252. ld. § 441b(a); see also 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.2(b), 114.5(b).
253. 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b), 114.5(b). The distinction is somewhat artificial, of course. To the
extent that corporations fund the administration and basic operations of a PAC, they free up
other capital to go to election campaigns.
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campaigns. In particular, FECA limits the amount that individuals and
other noncorporate .organizations254 may contribute to PACs. 255 It also
imposes various procedural requirements and amount limitations on the
contributions that PACs may make in federal election campaigns. 256
. FECA also imposes stric;t reporting obligations on PACs and on politicians. 257 All PACs are required to register with the Federal Election
Commission within ten days of their establishment. 258 And FECA requires PACs to' disclose the total contributions that they have received,259
as well as to identify information regarding any contributors who have
given more than $200 to the PAC in a given year. 260 The PAC, in tum,
must disclose information regarding all campaign contributions it makes,
irrespective of amount. 261 Finally, FECA imposes disclosure obligations
on feder~1. election candidates themselves: They must disclose the amounts
of PAC contributions they receive and identify information pertaining to
PAC contributors. 262 These disclosure. obligations provide. additional
legal prophylaxis against the invisible political exercise of corporate wealth
in federal elections. 263
.
c. The Nondeductibility of Business Lobbying Expenditures
In comparison to other business related expenses, the Code has placed
a disincentive on traditional corporate lobbying. In 1993, pursuant to the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Congress amended § 162{e) of the
Code to deny corporations (and other business taxpayers) a deduction for
most lobbying expenses. 264 With the exception of expenses attributable
to lobbying local government, the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993
eliminated the deduction for expenses incurred in direct attempts to influ254. Again, corporations may not make any contributions to the PACs' campaign funds;
they are only permitted to fund the PACs' operations. See supra note 252.
255. 2 U.S.C.S. § 441a(a).

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

ld.
ld. § 434.
ld. § 433(a).
ld. § 434(b)(2).
ld. § 434(b)(3).
ld. § 434(b)(4) & (5).
ld. § 434(b)(5) & (6) ..
See Pichlery. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).

264. I.R.C. § 162(e) (1994).
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ence legislation, expenses attributable to communicating with high federal
executive office personnel (whether or not in connection with specific
legislation), trade association dues attributable to state and federal lobbying,
and grass roots lobbying expenses. 265

2.

In Comparison to Political Philanthropy

As the previous discussion illustrates, corporations get a three-fold
benefit from structuring their political activity as philanthropy. First, charitable contributions to foundations associated with particular politicians or
party platforms provide an alternative to traditional campaign contributions, which corporations are prohibited from making, at least on a direct
basis, under FECA and analogous state laws. Second, so long as a firm's
annual charitable contributions do not exceed ten percent of its taxable
income, such donations would generally be tax-deductible for the corporation under § 170 of the Code-in contrast to the currently nondeductible
status of corporate lobbying expenses. Third, by using technically philanthropic contributions to accomplish political objectives, corporations lawfully avoid the disclosure requirements applicable under FECA.
C.

Politicized Philanthropies: Foundations Identified with Politicians and
Party Platforms

Because of the difficulty of arriving at a constitutionally sound, justiciable standard for distinguishing education from advocacy,266 § 501(c)(3)
"educational" foundations have been relatively free to engage in campaignrelated and legislative advocacy. This readily occurs in situations where a
politician has developed a particular affiliation with an educational foundation. 267 In such cases, with a modicum of care paid to the partisan nature
of its statements, the foundation may serve as a mouthpiece for the candidate, one dedicated to disseminating his or her political message and, indi265. See Cummings, supra note 226, at A-4 ("The reasons for this abrupt about face are not
entirely clear. In part, the 1993 revision was revenue driven. The Congress may have intended
to penalize and possibly reduce business lobbying, which may be further explained as a change of
view about 'neutrality' in the tax treatment of lobbying expenses." (footnote omitted». For an
argument that Congress went too far in disallowing the deduction for business lobbying, see
Jasper L. Cummings Jr., Tax Policy, Social Policy, and Politics: Amending Section 162(e), 9 EXEMPT
ORO. TAX REv. 137 (1994). For discussion of the issue of. the Tax Code's "neutrality" in the
matter of nonprofit organizations' advocacy, see Chisolm, supra note 234.
266. See Shaviro, supra note 234.
267. See Chisolm, supra note 233.
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rectly, advancing his or her political career.268 The problems raised by
affiliations between candidates, office holders (that is, potential candidates),
and educational foundations are particularly nettlesome. Describing the
"candidate organization dilemma" as "virtually unaddressed," Francis Hill,
a tax expert in the area, has indicated that such fO),lndations provide a
mechanism for enterprising politicians to "treat themselves as their political
supporters' favorite charities. "269
Hill has described politician-charity links as being common across the
political spectrum,270 but a particularly striking example is provided by
Newt Gingrich's affiliation with several nonprofit educational foundations,
and especially The Progress and Freedom Foundation ("PFF").271
268. Tax Notes described the broad boundaries of what Mr. Gingrich could talk about in
conducting his college course without running afoul of the Code's limitations on' nonprofits'
advocacy: "[HIe could say pretty much whatever he wanted, as long as it did not include 'and
vote for me,' or 'join the Republican Party,' or something like that." See Lee A. Sheppard, Is
Gingrich's Think Tank Too Partisan for Exemption?, 65 TAX NOTES 1173, 1173 (1994).
269. Hill, supra note 233, at 249. As Hill notes, campaign finance reform may actually
exacerbate "political overreaching" by educational foundations. "Congress has never found the
political courage to enact a meaningful package of campaign finance reforms ... for determining
whether § 501(c)(3) organizations are participating impermissibly in electoral politiCS." ld. at 238.
Hill does an excellent job of elucidating the labyrinthine rules pertaining to charitable foundations' political advocacy. In addition to the education-advocacy distinction, pertinent issues
include whether the politicized foundation's work has conferred a benefit on a charitable class,
whether it conferred an impermissible private benefit on Mr. Gingrich as a politician or on the
Republican party, whether Gingrich received private inurement as a product of the arrangement,
and whether the charitable organization functioned merely as a conduit for contributions to flow
to Gingrich or other organizations affiliated with him. See also David Shenk, Nonprofiteers: How
to Lobby Like a Corporation and Pay Taxes Like a Charity, WASH. MONTHLY, Dec. 1991, at 35
("Because the groups span the political spectrum, nonprofit reform isn't any party's plank, and
cozy relations between established nonprofits and incumbent politicians mean that Congress isn't
likely to press the IRS for tighter" overSight. H).
270. Hill, supra note 233, at 238.
271. Like the other foundations under discussion herein, PFF was recognized as a § 501(c)(3)
educational foundation by the IRS. For discussion of the charitable purposes described in PFF's
application for tax exemptions, see Sheppard, supra note 268, at 1173; more generally, see Glen
R. Simpson, New Addition to Gingrich Family Tree: The ProgTess and Freedom Foundation, ROLL
CALL, Sept; 12", 1994, at 1, and Glenn F. Bunting, Gingrich's Politics Got Boost from Nonprofits,
L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1996, at A1 (describing the network of five nonprofit foundations associated with Mr. Gingrich). Of these several foundations, PFF and The Abraham Lincoln Opportunity Foundation ("ALOF") were the most important to the fulfillment of Mr. Gingrich's larger
political strategy. From 1990-1993, tax deductible contributions to ALOF funded nationally
broadcast satellite television programs featuring Mr. Gingrich and his political message. In 1993,
PFF largely took over this function. Aside from The American Opportunity Foundation, which
was funded and run directly by Mr. Gingrich, these foundations were each organized and operated by persons affiliated with GOPAC, the political action committee that Mr. Gingrich chaired
from 1986-1995. The"foundations typically shared GOPAC's officers, staff, office space, and
telephone number. Some even took loans from GOPAC. ld.; see David E. Rosenbaum, Middle
Ground on Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1996, at A1.
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Although Mr. Gin~ich was deeply connected to PFF ~d its work ,272 he
shrewdly eschewed any official connection to the foundation. 273 (Because
the foundations are' i'ntended to be organized and operated exclusively to
fulfill a charitable purpose, the absence of a formal tie between the politi,
cian and the foundation helps to forestall (but does not preclude) charges of
tax and campaign finance abuses.)274 PFF was established in 1993 by
Jeffrey Eisenach, a close associate of Mr. Gingrich, who had served as exec,
utive director of GOPAC from 1991' to 1993.275 Eisenach. is reported to
have launched PFF from GOPAC's offices,276 where he had. spent "several
272. In a 1993 PFF newsletter, Eisenach credited the idea for the establishment of PFF to "a
series of conversations with my friend Newt Gingrich." Mary Beth Regan & Richard S.
Dunham, A Think Tank with One Idea: The Newt World Order, Bus. WK., July 3, 1995, at 49; see
also Jeanne Cummings, Gingrich Confidant; Eisenach: A Whit Behind the Scenes, ATLANTA J. &
CoNST., July 25, 1995, at 4A [hereinafter Cummings, Gingrich Confidant] ("Although Gingrich
and Eisenach do not see each other on a daily baSiS, Eisenach routinely communicates with the
speaker's office by fax and refers to himself as a close adviser to Gingrich.").
273. As Hill makes plain, such a formal connection is unnecessary to the advancement of the
politician's platform. Hill, supra note 233, at 245-46 ("The officeholder or candidate may simply
appear at organizational events or endorse the organization's positions on issues. Fund-raising
solicitations mayor may not refer to the politiCian, but will prominently invoke his or her views.
The § 501 (c)(3) organization commonly solicits contributions from the section 527 political orga~
nization's contributors. H).
.
274. See, e.g., American Campaign Finance Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C: 1053 (1989);
see also United Cancer Council v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 162 (1993). The extraordinarily
high-profile nature of Mr. Gingrich's politicized foundations, and their formal connection 'to
GOP AC, ultimately resulted in Democratic representatives filing ethics charges. These charges
lead to an investigation by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct (the "Ethics Committee") and the appointment of a special counsel, James M. Cole.
On January 17, 1997, the subcommittee announced its determination that Mr. Gingrich had
failed to conform to the House's standards of conduct in that he had failed to be appropr~ately
attentive (in regard to seeking legal counsel, etc.) to whether his network of politicized charitable
foundations conformed to tax law requirements. (It also concluded that he had failed to supply
accurate, complete, and compr~hensive information to the panel.) On this basis, on the same
day, the full Ethics Committee voted to reprimand the Speaker and to fine him $300,000; See
Adam Clymer, Panel, Citing Pattern Clf Ethics Flaws, Seeks a Gingrich Reprimand, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 1997, at AI. (Mr. Gingrich had been reelected as Speaker of the House on January 7, 1997.)
On January 21, 1997, the full House voted overwhelmingly in favor of the reprimand and the
fine. See Adam Clymer, House, in a 395-28 Vote, Reprimands Gingrich, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,
1997, at AI. Nevertheless, the Ethics Committee failed to reach a determination regarding
whether Mr. Gingrich's network of politicized foundations constituted a violation of the tax laws.
Thus, there still remain many fundamental, unresolved issues regarding the scope of permissible
advocacy activities by educational foundations affiliated with individual politicians and political
parties.
275. See Cummings, Gingrich Confidant, supra note 272, at 4A.
276. According to RoU <AU (a Capitol Hill newspaper), only the lower-level employees of PFF
lacked any prior association with Gingrich. See Simpson, supra note 271.
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months" organlZlng Mr. Gingrich's college course.277
The course,
"Renewing American Civilization," was funded from charitable contributions made to PFF.27B Designed to foster a grass roots citizens' movement
of conservative political activists, the course and Mr. Gingrich's cable television show played a significant role in paving the way for him to assume
the position of Speaker of a Republican-dominated House.279 Business
Week magazine reported that "PFF appears to have almost single-mindedly
promoted the Speaker. During its first twenty months, roughly forty-three
percent of the group's $1.4 million budget 'went to funding Gingrich's
televised, college lecture series ... and his cable television show. "280
While other politicians have established affiliations with educational
foundations, none have been as daring as Mr. Gingrich. Clearly, the activities of PFF, and the other educational foundations with which he has been
associated, have tested the outer limits of what is "educational," as opposed
to "political." According to one account, PFF's founders "readily admit
that they are trying to convince people to become what might loosely be
called 'conservatives,'" but the more trenchant question is "whether [PFF]
is trying to make [the college] students into Republicans"-an objective
inconsistent with its status as a § 501(c)(3) educational foundation. 281
Clearly the distinction is an abstruse one, and there is no clear answer to
whether PFF's and ALOF's activities resulted in Mr. Gingrich having re277. Regan & Dunham, supra note 272, at 49. Mr. Gingrich taught his course in 1993 at
Kennesaw State College, and in 1994 and 1995 at private Reinhardt College, both in Georgia.
It was broadcast around the country on cable television networks, and was available to tens of
thousands of students. The central theme of the course was the need to replace the "welfare
state" with the "opportunity society," which was also GOPAC's central message. See, e.g.,
Charles R. Babcock, Use of Tax-Exempt Groups Integral to Political Strategy, WASH. POST, Jan. 7,
1997, at A1.
278. Contributors to PFF were able to earmark their contributions to go exclusively to
Gingrich's course. Sheppard, supra note 268, at 1174. Mr. Gingrich came under special criticism from Reinhardt College for including laudatory statements about large corporate contributors to GOPAC and PFF within the course's materials "with scant mention of their financial
support." Id. at 1175. Furthermore, "contributors to the Foundation were expressly told that
they could participate in the development of the Renewing American Civilization course for a
$25,000 or $50,000 donation, according to an internal memo obtained by Roll Call." ld.
279. In regard to the partisan nature of the course, "[m]emos promoting the course said it
would train thousands of Republican activists." Ethics Panel Looks at Outside Counsel,
COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), Aug. 8, 1995, at 4A.
280. Regan & Dunham, supra note 272, at 49. For discussion of PFF projects that have been
unrelated to Gingrich's course, see Sheppard, supra note 268, at 1174-75.
281. Sheppard, supra note 268, at 1176. For an excellent discussion of the IRS' approach to
distinguishing educational from partisan activities, as applied to PFF, see id. at 1175.
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ceived an improper taxpayer subsidy.282 In addition, PFF and ALOF provided Mr. Gingrich (and the Republican party more generally) an opportunity to benefit from corporate charitable contributions (as described
immediately below)-contributions that would have been unlawful under
FECA if made directly to him or to his political action committee; and thus
important and unresolved campaign finance issues have also been raised by
Mr. Gingrich's political affairs. 283
After the November 1994 election, PFF assumed a highly' visible role
in public policy debates. Having become "a major source of research for
the new Republican leadership's reform plans," the foundation afforded
business contributors and wealthy individuals the potential to affect policy
formation at the highest levels. 284 The "darling think tank of the Republican Revolution," PFF released three policy papers during the summer of
1995 285 and has remained an important influence on congressional policy
initiatives. 286 The foundation underwent "explosive growth" during this
period. 28? PFF's staff reportedly included twenty-six full-time employees
by the summer of 1995;288 and the foundation had projected revenues of
$6 million for that year. 289 Described by Business Week as "flush with
corporate cash," PFF's success was subsidized in part by charitable contribu282. See Hill, supra note 233. Although ultimately unresolved, the issue of tax abuse was
central to the Ethics Committee investigation. For an argument that Mr. Gingrich violated the
tax laws and should be held financially liable, see Michael J. Graetz, What Gingrich Owes Us,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,1997, at A15.
283. While the House subcommittee gave extensive consideration to the issue of tax abuse, it
failed aqequately to address the campaign finance issues raised by Gingrich's partisan use of PFF
and ALOF. See Text of 'Analysis and Conclusion,' from Report by House Ethics Counsel, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1997, at All ..
284. See Cummings, Gingrich Confidant, supra note 272, at 4A; see cilio Regan &.. Dunham,
supra note 272, at 49 (statement of American Enterprise Institute scholar J. Gregory Sidak, who
worked as an adviser on PFF's FCC study: "We're getting the ear of people on Capitol Hill who
really matter").
285. Regan &.. Dunham, supra note 272, at 49 ("Flush with corporate cash, its pumping out
policy prescriptions for dumping the Federal Communications Commission, axing federal block
grants, and privatizing safety and efficacy reviews of prescription drugs and medical devices. H).
286. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Constnlatilles SpUt on How to Regulate the Internet, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1995, at D4 (describing PFF as helping to "lead the push for a self-regulatory approach"
to screening material from the Internet).
287. Cummings, Gingrich Confidant, supra note 272.

288.

Id.

289. Regan &.. Dunham, supra note 272, at 48 ("Since the election, times have been good.
Revenues are expected to hit $6 million in 1995, putting PFF on the same financial footing as
seasoned groups such as the libertarian-leaningCato Institute. For fiscal 1994, which ended Mar.
31, 1995, PFF raised $2.2 million, up from $656,000 in 1993. And in the first three months of
1995 alone, it took in $866,000 with $650,000 in contributions mostly from large corporate sponsors."
(emphasis added».
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tions from AT&T, Bell Atlantic, Bristol Myers Squibb, Coca Cola, Eli
Lilly, and Marion Merrell Dow, among other business contributors. 29O
Because of PFF's charitable status, these contributions would generally have
been deductible for their corporate donors under § 170, unlike sums ex·
pended in traditional corporate lobbying efforts. In light of PFF's bold
deregulatory initiat~ves in the pharmaceuticals and telecommunications
areas and its continued favor in congressional Circles, such technically
philanthropic contributions to PFF may prove to have been shrewd business
investments.
Notwithstanding the legal controversy that surrounded the activities of
PFF, in April 1995 Robert Dole (then Senate Majority Leader and a presi·
dential candidate) and Mr. Gingrich (then Speaker of the House and a
potential presidential candidate) announced their creation of The Econ·
omic Growth and Tax Reform Commission ("EGTRC").291 In June of
1995, the group applied for status as an educational foundation under
§ 501(c)(3).292
Dole and Gingrich appointed Jack Kemp (a former
presidential candid:~.te, housing secretary, and congressman, and subsequent
to EGTRC's creation, the Republican vice.presidential nominee for the
1996 presidential campaign) to ,act as EGTRC's chairman. Dole and
Gingrich also appointed the group's thirteen other members.293 Report.
edly all Republicans,294 EGTRC's members-former politicians, govern·
ment officials, business executives, and entrepreneurs 295-have been
charged with "studying" the subject of tax reform and designing "a 21st
century tax code," in the words of Mr. Kemp.296
290. Id. at 48 ("Donations overwhelmingly come from companies in telecommunications and
medicine, areas where PFF is crafting bold deregulation plans.'); see also Sheppard, supra note
268, at 1174 (noting that by December 1994 PFF had ,amassed $1.5 million in donations, with
approximately half of the sum coming from other conservative foundations and the other half
"about equally from corporations, indudin"g many telecommunications businesses, and wealthy
individuals").
291. Barbara Kirchheimer, Kemp Tax Reform Commission Meets, Files for Tax.Exempt Status,
67 TAX NOTES 1559, 1559 (1995).
292. The group filed for § 501(c)(3) status as a charitable trust. Id.
293. Barbara Kirchheimer, Flat Tax Enjoys Wide Support Among Members of Kemp
Commission, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 108-4, June 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, Tax Library, TNT
File.
294. Bennett Minton, Kemp Commission to Meet in'Ways and Means Hearing Room, 95 TAX
NOTES TODAY 125-5, June 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, Tax Library, TNT File.
295. A list of EGTRC's members appears in Kirchheimer, supra note 293. For the names of
EGTRC's full time staff, see Kirchheimer, supra note 291, at 1559.
296. Kirchheimer, supra note 291, at 1559. The text of the EGTRC's official charge is presented in National Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform, 'Charge' of National
Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform Available at Commission Hearing, 95 TAX NOTES
TODAY 190-41, Sept. 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, Tax Library, TNT file [hereinafter Charge of
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As of January 1997, the IRS had still failed to reach a determination
regarding EGTRC's charitable status. 297 As described earlier, the lobby,
ing limitations present under § 501(c)(3) would appear to prevent EGTRC
from formulating specific legislative proposals to be enacted by Congress as
part of tax reform. 298 Nevertheless, the ambiguities present within cer,
tain Treasury regulations prescribing the scope of permissible legislative
advocacy by charitable organizations 299-particularly, the ability of chari,
table organizations to provide "technical advice or assistance to a govern,
ment body" in response to a written request therefrom3OO-may provide a
basis for the group to issue "a report that will lead to changes" fundamental
to federal tax policrol while maintaining its status as a charitable organi,
zation.
Tax experts agree that the issues raised by the creation of EGTRC are
not addressed in the existing precedent. 302 Some have wondered whether
"the group's activities won't be inherently political, either in the form of
lobbying or participating in a presidential campaign. "303 With Jack Kemp
as its chairman, and Dole and Gingrich as its founders, .it is inevitable that
EGTRC's work will be intimately tied to the development of these politi,
cians' platforms as well as their political careers. And while Mr. Kemp has
described the group as "like a think tank,"304 it has not pursued its educa,
tional objectives in the ivory tower. During the summer of 1995, EGTRC
held information· gathering sessions on the subject of tax reform, with spe,
cial consideration regarding the implementation of a business,friendly "flat
tax," in the House Ways and Means Committee hearing room. 30S Thus,
EGTRC has taken on many of the attributes of a congressionally sponsored
National CommissionJ. The author of that report wryly noted that the group's creation has raised
more tax policy questions than it has resolved.
297.

See Tax Reform, Kemp Commission Asking AU Donors for Permission to Release Names,

Daily Rep. for Executives, Feb. 13, 1996, at 029 [hereinafter Asking AU DonorsJ. A search of the
relevant records and databases failed to uncover such a ruling.
298. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
299. See especiaUy Treas. Reg. § 56.491l-2(c)(1), (3) (1996).
300. See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(3).
301. This is the group's stated objective, as set forth in its official charge. See Charge of
National Commission, supra note 296.
302. Kirchheimer, supra note 291, at 1560 (quoting Francis R. Hill and Greg Colvin).
303. Kemp's Tax Reform Committee Redefines Irony, 65 TAX NOTES 1557, 1557 (1995). The
issue was exacerbated by Jack Kemp's status as the O.O.P. vice'presidential nominee, of course.
304. Kirchheimer, supra note 291, at 1559.
305. Barbara Kirchheimer, Kemp Tax Commission Borrows Ways and Means Hearing, 68 TAX
NOTEs 7, 7 (1995). This arrangement was regarded by commentators as highly unusual.
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commission,306 except that its members are privately appointed, it is
funded from private donations, and because of its (pending) charitable
status, the identities of its contributors need not be diselosed.307 Thus,
EGTRC appears to represent a radical experiment in privatizing congres~
sional policy formation through the nonprofit sector. 308
Both .PFF and EGTRC represent high-profile, ostensibly educational
foundations that have contributed to the political ascendancy of current
and· former members of Congress and the promotion of policies friendly to
big business. And of course, PFF and EGTRC .are not the only examples of
these extraordinary entities. By supporting candidate-identified, educa~
tional foundations through charitable contributions, corporations have contributed to the ascendancy of particular policies and politicians, and have
sought to ensure that their own political fortunes will remain ascendant.
D.

Contributions to Public Policy Institutes in General

1.

Policy Institutes of National Prominence

As described above, PFF and EGTRC have been closely associated
with the careers of particular politicians. But there are many policy institutes (or think tanks) u~affiliated with particular politicians that have significantly influenced the general development of American politics and
public policy. Important policy institutes that have § 501(c)(3) status in~
elude: The American Enterprise Institute, The Brookings Institute, The
Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Heritage Foundation,
The Urban Institu!e, and more recently, The Progressive Policy .Institute
306. ·In fact, EGTI~.c' s spokesperson, Ari Fleischer, referred to the organization as a "congressionally sponspred commission" in speaking to the ·press. ld. Nevertheless,. Kemp and other
commission members insisted that EOTRC is not an "official governmental commission." ld.
307. If EGTRC qualifies as a charitable organization, it is under no legal obligation to disclose its contributors-in comparison to PACs, which are subject to stringent"disclosure requirements under FECA. (For a discussion of FECA's disclosure requirements, see supra notes
257-263.) Soon after EGTRC's formation, Mr. Gingrich promised that information regarding
EGTRC's contributors would be made public. Kirchheimer, supra note 291, at 1559. However,
notwithstanding that at least $375,000 in donations have been received, no donor information
appears to have been made public. Asking AU Donors, supra note 297, at G29. Representatives
Sam Gibbons (D-Fla.) and John Dingell (D-Mich.) had written to EGTRC asking for this information. ld.
308. House'Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Archer (R-Tex.) described EGTRC
as "the 'lever-pull' for whatever action Congress takes on tax reform." Kirchheimer, supra note
305, at 7.
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and The Cato Institute. 309 Various studies have documented the flow of
corporate funds to these and other policy institutes. 3lO While there is no
basis to conclude that such contributions have co--opted public policy de'
bate at these institutions, they have undoubtedly helped to assure corporate
America a seat at the negotiating table.
The Cato Institute's recent rise to prominence provides an interesting
example of the synergy between corporate charitable contributions and
public policy initiatives. 311 Cato's founder, Edward Harrison Crane III,
has indicated that seventy percent of the foundation's annual budget of
approximately $6 million is derived from individual contributions, but
corporations have also been substantial contributors. 312 According to the
Los Angeles Times, corporate contributors have included oil companies such
as Exxon, Shell Oil, and Tenneco Gas; tobacco and alcohol companies
such as Joseph A. Seagram & Sons and Philip Morris Companies, Jnc.; and
financial interests, including Prudential Securities and the Chase
Manhattan Bank. 313 The businesses that have contributed, which have
also included Federal Express and Tele,Communications Inc., have had an
309. These policy institutes are each described in the appendix to JAMES ALLEN SMITH, THE
IDEA BROKERS, THINK TANKS AND THE RISE OF THE NEW POLICY ELITE (1991). See also Robin
Toner, New, Old Think Tanks Compete faT Funds, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 17, 1986, at 17.
310. The most explicit data is made available in the report on corporate public affairs giving
published annually by The Capital Research Center ("CRC"), under the title "Patterns of
Corporate Philanthropy." CRC relies on voluntary responses to surveys mailed to Forbes 250
corporations as well as a review of corporate foundations' Form 990s. CRC's publications have
argued that corporate public affairs giving reflects a persistent liberal bias. The CRC has estimated total annual corporate public affairs giving at approximately $28 million in recent years.
See, e.g., NOLAN, supra note 186, at 11.
311. The Cato Institute is a libertarian organization founded in the late 1970s by Edward
Harrison Crane III. Cato has become extraordinarily prominent in recent years, especially since
the November 1994 congressional elections. According to the Los Angeles Times, in one week in
February of 1995, for example, Cato staffers made appearances on 7 radio and TV shows, had 8
op-ed pieces in major papers, and had citations in 22 news stories. The Los Angeles Times also
reported that "Cato's policy directors testified before congressional committees 20 times in the
first month of the current seSSion"; and the institute has published a 358-page "Handbook for
Congress." Nina J. Easton, Making America WOTk: Red, White and SmaU, L.A. TIMES, July 9,
1995, (Magazine), at 14.
312. Id. at 29.

313.

Id.
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obvious interest in promoting the "less-regulation, lower-taxes" program
that is at the heart 6f Cato's libertarian philosophy.314
2.

State-Level Conservative Think Tanks

The political influence enjoyed by think tanks having national prominence and headquarters in the nation's capital has recently led to growth,
in terms of both influence and numbers, of conservative, state-level policy
institutes. 315 As the political climate has changed so that ideas relating
to federalism and limited government have become more central to political debate, conservative organizations have sought to use state level think
tanks to influence state and local governments towards their free market,
laissez-faire views. 316 In February of 1995, The Washington Times reported
on the recent establishment of thirty-two such conservative policy institutes
(qualified as § 501(c)(3) educational organizations), describing their influence on state and local policy as "formidable. "317 The newspaper also
described the work of the affiliated national organization, The State Policy
Network, which reportedly conducts research on policy issues, helps to
establish new state policy institutes, and advises them on "how to become
influential forces in local policy-making. "318 In addition to the thirty-two
organizations with which it was already affiliated, The State Policy
314. Cato appears to have prevented itself from becoming a pawn of either big business or
the Republican party. See, e.g., STEPHEN MOORE &- DEAN STANSEL, CATO INST., ENDING
CORPORATE WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT (1995).
315. For the factual basis of this section of the Article, I have relied on Joyce Price,
Conservative Think Tanks Gain in NumbeT, Respect Nationwide; OTowing Influence Shows in State,
Local Policy-Making, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at A4.
316. Writing in The Washington Times, Byram Lamm, executive director of The State Policy
Network, described his organization as endorsing "free-market solutions to public policy, with an
emphasis on individual rights and fiscal responsibility." The newspaper also quoted Joe Dolan,
former treasurer and finance committee chairman of The State Policy Network: "Behind a lot of
the new ideas coming from governors these days are state policy think tanks." It also cited a
letter from Michigan Governor John Engler to the Mackinac Center, describing the Center's
work as "critical" to the progress his Republican administration had made in "putting government in its proper place and liberating the entrepreneurial spirit." Id.
317. ld.
318. ld.
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Network was described as being actively involved in establishing new conservative policy institutes in six additional states.319 This network of
state-level policy institutes has afforded corporations the opportunity to use
charitable contributions to influence the political environment at the level
of state and local government.
3.

Affiliations Between § 501(c)(3) Educational Organizations
and Politically Active § 501(c)(4) Organizations

Both the candidate-identified foundations and the public policy institutes discussed above have relied principally on the educational purposes
provision of § 501(c)(3) as the basis for their charitable status, and therefore, their eligibility to receive donor-deductible philanthropic donations. 32o
But despite its extraordinary malleability, the educational
purposes provision of § 501(c)(3) is not sufficient to accommodate unlimited
political advocacy by charitable organizations. Most significantly, when
legislative lobbying is part of an organization's principal objectives, such an
organization would be classified as an "action organization" and hence,
ineligible for charitable status under § 501(c)(3).321 Alternatively, "social
welfare" organizations, haVing tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4), are
unencumbered by any lobbying limitations, but the Code does not afford
their contributors a tax deduction for such contributions.
In response to this dilemma, organizations seeking to offer potential
donors the financial incentive of tax deductibility,322 but wishing to avoid
the lobbying limitations existing under § 501(c)(3), have adopted a strategy
known as the "c3/c4 split."323 In this arrangement, politically ambitious
groups splinter themselves into twin organizations, legally distinct but
319.

ld.
320. Section 170 permits taxpayers a federal income tax deduction for their gifts to
§ 501 (c)(3) charitable organizations. No such allowance exists for donations to § 501(c)(4) social
welfare organizations (also referred to as "action organizations"), which are frequently committed
to substantial lobbying as part of their charitable objectives. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), (c)(4) (1994).
321. Section 501(c)(3) requires that charitable organizations be "organized and operated"
exclusively for charitable purposes. I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3) (1994). An organization that is deemed an
"action organization," by virtue of engaging in (or stating that it shall engage in) impermissible
political advocacy; cannot qualify for tax exempt status under § 501(c)(3). For the attributes of
action organizations, see Treas. Reg. § 501(c)(3)-I(c)(3)(ii), (iii) & (iv) (1996).
322. The federal income tax deduction applying to charitable contributions is regarded as a
crucial stimulus to charitable giving.
323. Shenk, supra note 269.
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ideologically and functionally entwined.324 One piece is constituted as
a § 501(c)(3) organization-thus able to receive tax-deductible charitable
contributions, but unable to engage in substantial lobbying. The other
piece of the entity is qualified as a § 501(c)(4) tax-exempt social welfare
organization-thus permitted to engage in unlimited lobbying, but ineligible
to afford its donors a tax deduction for their donations. Such hybrid organizations were relatively uncommon until the late 1970s. Tax planners
generally regarded the arrangement as overly clever.325 This changed
with the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Regan v. Taxation with
Representation. 326
In reviewing a charitable organization's First
Amendment challenge to § 501(c)(3)'s lobbying limitations, the Court
noted that "[t]he constitutional defect that would inhere in § 501(c)(3)
alone is avoided by § 501(c)(4)."327 In effect, the Supreme Court invited
charitable organizations to establish affiliated § 501(c)(4) entities under
their control,328 to administer any lobbying activities connected to the
accomplishment of their charitable purposes.
Accordingly, most prominent advocacy organizations have established
an affiliated "research and education" entity, qualified under § 50 1(c)(3) ,
through which they fund activities not directly connected to lobbying.329
Section 501(c)(4) organizations have become extraordinarily prominent on
324. The organizations commonly share headquarters, staff, mailing lists, etc. They also
frequently combine their solicitation materials so that contributors may "check the box" to allocate their contributions among the "c3" or the "c4" parts of the organization. As stated in the
text, this system of organization was sanctioned in Regan II. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S.
540,545 n.6 (1983): "The IRS apparently requires only that the two groups be separately incorporated and keep records adequate to show that tax-deductible contributions are not used to pay
for lobbying." See also Cummings, supra note 226, at A·38 ("[1lhese opinions suggest that the
(c)(4) organization may be the 'alter ego' of the (c)(3) organization so long as records show that
their finances are kept separate. ").
325. Cummings, supra note 226, at A·38.
326. Regan, 461 U.S. at 540; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 175 (1991). For further
discussion of charitable organizations' use of "non·(c)(3)" affiliates, see Chisolm, supra note 226;
Cummings, supra note 226, at A-37 to A-38.
327. Regan, 461 U.S. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
328. ld. at 553 ("Should the IRS attempt to limit the control these organizations exercise
over the lobbying of their § 501(c)(4) affiliates, the First Amendment problems would be insurmountable. It hardly answers one person's objection to a restriction on his speech that another
person, outside his control, may speak for him. ").
329. It is now relatively easy to ascertain whether a charitable organization has a related
§ 501(c)(4) body. In January 1993, the IRS released a new Schedule A to accompany the Form
990 Informational Return required of all public charities. The Schedule A requires presentation
of information about affiliated § 501(c)(4) organizations and any other noncharitable affiliates.
See 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 43-15, Jan. 1, 1993, allailable in, LEXIS, Tax Library, TNT File.
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the domestic policy landscape. They include the National Rifle Associa,
tion, the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League, the
American Conservative Union, the American Association of Retired Per'
sons, People for the American Way, the NAACP, and the Sierra Club, for
example. 330 Each of the former organizations has established a comple,
mentary § 501(c)(3} entity dedicated to disseminating its views and prodUcing the analysis that forms the basis of its lobbying efforts. 331
Notwithstanding serious questions regarding whether these organizations in
fact segregate their funds as legally required, and the limited capacity of the
IRS to monitor potential abuses,m the principle behind these hybrid
c3/c4 organizations is sound. From the perspective of this analysis, how,
ever, the important observation is that the c3/c4 split has facilitated the
politicization of the nonprofit sector, and hence has expanded the political
uses of corporate charitable contributions.
E.

Corporate Donations to Corporate,Oriented PILFs

Corporations have contributed to the politicized nonprofit organiza,
tions described above in order to effect favorable electoral and legislative
outcomes. In yet another form of philanthropic advocacy, corporations
have used charitable contributions to pro-business legal defense funds,
constituted as § 501(c)(3} organizations, to influence the development of
the law. Professor Oliver Houck has written a comprehensive history of the
development of public interest legal foundations ("PILFs") "created, funded
and ... largely directed by leaders of American business corporations. "333
These PILFs included, for example, the Pacific Legal Foundation (the fore'
runner of the "business" PILFs), the Mountain States Legal Foundation, the
Gulf and Great Plains Legal Foundation, the Mid,American Legal Founda,
tion, the New England Legal Foundation, the Southeastern Legal Founda,
tion, and the Capital Legal Foundation. 334
'
According to Houck, politically conservative, business,funded PILFs
were established en masse after the mid,1970s, as a result of business lead,
ers' perception that liberal PILFs (and especially pro-environmental PILFs)
were leveraging their nonprofit advantages in ways that represented a threat
330. These examples are drawn from Shenk, supra note 269.
331. ld. at 37.
332. 'Shenk accuses several organizations of lax oversight and loose control over separate
accounts. He is also highly skeptical of the IRS' capacity to monitor this conduct, describing it
as the "see no evil IRS. " Shenk, supra note 269, at 35.
333. Oliver A. Houck, With Charity fOT AU, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1419 (1984).
334. ld. at 1420.
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to corporate interests. 335 Donations to these corporate,funded PILFs have
most commonly funded appearances as amicus curiae on behalf of prD'
business positions in litigation involving commercial development and
general environmental matters. 336 Nevertheless, prD'business PILFs have
also become active in advocating business,friendly legal reform outside of
the litigation context. 337
Houck's research examined the existence and practices of business
PILFs from the perspective of tax policy. In particular, his work analyzed
whether these entities had violated prohibitions on private inurement, and
whether their practice of law could be reconciled with the established
definitions of charity under tax law and jurisprudence.338 From the per'
spective of this analysis, the existence of business,funded legal foundations
constituted as § 501(c)(3) charitable organizations demonstrates that corpD'
rate charitable contributions have been used, both within and beyond the
courtroom, to influence the law in the corporate interest. 339
F.

A Critique of Politicized Corporate Philanthropy as Corporate Speech

Corporate expenditures in support of political and cultural affairs have
been recognized by the Supreme Court as speech entitled to protection
under the First Amendment. 34O .Yet the fact that such speech emanates
335.
336.
337.

Id.
Id. at 1421.
For example, the Washington Legal Foundation ("WLF") publishes a newsletter entitled
The Legal Backgrounder. See, e.g., Jared G. Carter, Reduce Incentives That Encourage Activist
Environmental Lawsuits, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Aug. 11, 1995; Daniel J. Popeo, It's Time to
SCTUtini~e HUD Funding of Activist Groups, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, July 21, 1995; Lawrence
Savell, Guidelines to Keep Advertisers out of Court, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Sept. I, 1995. During
the summer of 1995, WLF joined with drug and medical device companies to limit FDA restrictions on "off-label" or unapproved uses of drugs. See Pharmaceutical Cos: ChaUenging Marketing
Rules, HEALTH LINE, Aug. 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. WLF has
also petitioned OSHA to adopt rules safeguarding employers' rights during inspections and investigations. See OSHA Should Honor Employer Rights During Inspection, WLF Recommends,
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY LETTER, Aug. 21,1995.
338. Houck, supra note 333, at 1416.
339. For further discussion of corporate advocacy in the area of legal reform, see, for example,
ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUSTICE FOR SALE: SHORTCHANGING THE PUBLIC INTEREST FOR
PRIVATE GAIN (1993).
340. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (application of
FECA's campaign expenditure limitations to chamber of commerce held constitutionalnotwithstandi~ the recognition of the chamber's free speech interests-in light of state's interest in
avoiding the potential for political corruption); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238 (1986) (application of FECA's.campaign expenditure limits to nonprofit corporation
created expressly to advance political and ideological views held unconstitutional under the First
Amendment); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) {Public
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from a legal entity, rather than from the natural persons who compose it,
means that corporate speech implicates multiple layers of associational and
free speech interests-those of the corporate entity and those of its individual shareholders.341 Furthermore, both of these speech interests are at a
zenith where the entity's speech obtains political dimensions,342 as it does
in the politicized corporate charitable contributions discussed above.
Therefore, the corporation's right to free participation in the marketplace
of ideas must be reconciled with, or at least weighed alongside, the free
speech and associational interests of corporate shareholders.343
Notwithstanding the recognition of corporate-level speech rights, the
judiciary has in a variety of contexts taken note of the unfairness resulting
from forced subsidization of entity-level expression. Thus, the ratepayers of
a publicly regulated utility, 344 persons governed by an agency shop arrange-

Service Commission's order prohibiting utility from including policy statements in monthly
billing inserts held to abridge utility's First Amendment rights); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,435
u.S. 765 (1978) (Massachusetts law limiting corporate spending on referenda held unconstitutional under First Amendment). On the relation between spending and speech, see, for example,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam): "Mirtually every means of communicating
ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.".
341. The protection of indi\liduals' rights of free speech and association, of course, predates
the recognition of speech rights at the entity level. For a comprehensive consideration of the
intersection of individuals' and entities' speech rights, see Brudney, Association, Ad\locacy, and the
First Amendment, supra note 227.
342. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15 (although First Amendment protections are not confined
thereto, extraordinary solicitude is afforded speech concerning political, governmental, or civic
matters).
343. For discussion of the problems generated by corporate level political speech, see
Brudney, Business Corporations, supra note 227, at 235; Michael ]. Garrison, Corporate Political
Speech, Campaign Spending, and First Amendment Doctrine, 27 AM. Bus. L.]. 163 (1989). For a less
troubled view of corporate political speech, see Ribstein, supra note 227. See also Meese, supra
note 227.
344. Cahill v. Public Servo Comm'n, 556 N.E.2d 133 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that commission's
policy authorizing utilities to include cost of charitable contributions within rate payments
impinges upon ratepayers' First Amendment rights).
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ment,345 and members of an .integrated bar association346-with narrow
exception347-cannot constitutionally be compelled to subsidize entity.
level political speech with which they are in disagreement. Of course, the
former contexts ~e distinguishable from involuntary shareholder funding of
corporate charitable contrib4tions on the basis that state action is absent in
the corporate context. 348 For this re~on, the speech and associational
interests of corporate shareh9lders, as they are affected by the speech.
related acts. of the corporate entity, do not obtain federal constitutional proportions. 349
.
Nevertheless, the dangers inherent in compelled speech have long
been recognized-even outside the area of governmental coercion. When
Thomas Jefferson declared that "to compel a man to furnish contributions
345. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 4Ji U.S. 209 (1977) (holding that First Amendment
prohibitS funds received illider agency shop arrangement from being used to support political or
ideological affairs nongermane to collective bargaining against the will of the contributors).
346: Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (mandatory bar membership dues may not be used
to fund ideological activities unrelated to regulation of legal profession against contributors' objections); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961). For commentary on the bar association
cases, see James B. Lake, Comment, Lawyers, Please Check Your First Amendment Rights at the Bar:
The Problem of State-Mandated Bar Dues and CompeUed Speech, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1833
(1993).
347. The union and bar association cases illustrate the scope of the permissible curtailment of
members' free speech interests, as required by the operation of compelling state interests. See,
e.g., KeUer, 496 U.S. at 1 (state bar association expenditures of compulsory dues on matters necessarily or reasonably related to the regulation of the legal profession held constitutional; whereas
expenditure of compulsory fees on politil::al and ideological activities not thus related violated
petitioners' First Amendment speech rights); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks,
466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood, 431 U.S. at 209; Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S.
225 (1956) (union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act held constitutional based on importance of collective bargaining and disruptive effect of free-riding employees, despite compromise
of First Amendment principles).
348. Business corporations-even those described as "public" on the basis that they have
raised financing from the national securities markets-are regarded as private entities.
349. State action is a predicate to the operation of federal constitutional guarantees. See,
e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,936-37 (1982).
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of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and
tyrannical, "350 there is no reason to believe that he meant to confine his
observation exclusively to governmentally imposed coercion. Shareholders
have an interest in avoiding compelled subsidization of corporate level
speech even if the interest is not cognizable under the United States Con'
stitution. Although mainstream corporate speech jurisprudence has focused
principally on entity level speech rights, shareholders' "negative speech
interests" have been recognized in a variety of legal contexts. For example,
FECA's limitations on corporate campaign spending are regarded as reflect'
ing a concern for the free speech interests of dissenting shareholders351 in
addition to other societal concerns. 352 Concern over, dissenting share,
holders' speech interests in the presence of corporate level speech has also
been expressed in the Supreme Court's corpus of free speech cases, and has
gained some increased support in recent years. 353 Furthermore, Victor
Brudney, a noted corporate legal scholar whose treatment of shareholders'
speech interests has been cited by the Court,354 has argued that a statu'
350. ' For Jefferson's quotation and explication of the historical context, see IRVING BRANT,
JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST, 1780-1787, at 354 (1948). Jefferson's statement is quoted
in the majority opinion in Abood. See 431 U.S. at 235 n.3l.
351. Extensive discussion of FECA's legislative history and the concerns underlying its enactment appears in Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 414-15 (1972)
("The dominant concern in requiring that contributions be voluntary was, after all, to protect the
dissenting stockholder or union member."). For further commentary on Congress' long-standing
concern over compelled speech in the context of unions and corporations, see United States v.
UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); Ash v. Cort, 350 F.
Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd Iry 471 F. 2d 811 (3rd Cir. 1973).
352. FECA is recognized as acknowledgment of the danger that corporate wealth (amassed
with the cooperation of the state) might otherwise dominate the democratic process, swaying
election outcomes in a manner inconsistent with the political views of individual persons. See,
e.g., Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990) ("Regardless
of whether this danger of 'financial quid pro quo' corruption may be sufficient to justify a restriction on independent expenditures, Michigan's regulation aims at a different type of corruption in
the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public's support for the corporation's political ideas." (citation omitted».
353. See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260 (1986)(noting legitimacy of concern that corporations may use shareholders' money for political purposes not favored
by such indiViduals). A strong defense of shareholders' (and union members') interests in avoiding forced subsidization of entity level speech appears in Justice Brennan's concurrence in Austin,
494 U.S. at 674-75 (Brennan, J., concurring). A similar concern for dissenting shareholders'
"negative speech interests" was articulated by Justice White in his dissenting opinion in BeUotti.
See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 818 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) ("Clearly the
State has a strong interest in assuring that its citizens are not forced to choose between supporting the propagation of views with which they disagree and passing up investment
opportunities. ").
354. Austin, 494 U.S. at 675 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Brudney, Business Corporations,
supra note 227, at 247).
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tory requirement of absolute shareholder consent for corporate level politil
cal expenditures would be constitutionally sound, based on the state's interl
est in protecting sharehold~rs' rights. 355
In contrast, other scholars have portrayed corporate political speech as
merely an alternative form of profit maximization or, otherwise, as a public
good (in the tradition of First National Bank v. Bellottf56) , and have thus
been less solicitous of shareholders' speech interests. 357 These scholars
have argued that market mechanisms, the nature of the corporation as a
"nexus of contracts,"358 and efficiency concerns (e.g., the problem of free l
riding dissenters enjoying unpaidlfor financial benefits) either reduce the
potential for coercion or otherwise mandate against imposing limitations on
corporate political speech in the interest of protecting dissenting sharel
holders. These divergent views of corporate speech and of the interests
furthered thereby are not easily reconciled. .
O.

Shareholders' Negative Speech Rights and the Remedial
Limits of Disclosure

My contribution at this juncture, in this discussion of politicized corl
porate charitable contributions, is the observation that theories of corporate
speech-from the libertarian (and entitylfriendly) viewpoint advocated by
Professor Ribstein, for example, to the more pr~regulatory (and thus
shareholderlfriendly) one advocated by Professor Brudney-in each case
depend on some notion of shareholder consent. Brudney's model conteml
plates a requirement of consent in fact. 359
Alternatively, scholars
defending the status quo rely on the notion that shareholders consent to all
profitlmaximizing acts, including corporate political speech, when they
make their investment decision (or, secondarily, on the idea that sharel
holders, at least theoretically, have the ability to alter charter terms to
prescribe optimal standards of corporate conduct, and thus should be
deemed to have consented to corporate speech).
355. Brudney, Business Corporations, supra note 227.
356. 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) ("If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would
suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable
to decisiorunaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a cor.
poration rather than an individual. ").
357. Ribstein, supra note 227; Meese, supra note 227.
358. For a critique of the nexus-of-conttacts model of the corporation, see Wolfe, supra note
191, at 1676-83. See also BLAIR, supra note 14, at 17-93; Bratton, supra note 216; Henry N.
Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON UNIV. L. REv. 99 (1989).
359. Brudney, Business Corporations, supra note 227.
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The problem is that each of these notions of shareholder consent
depends on an assumption about the existence of adequate infor~
mation,360 and in the area of corporate charitable contributions, such
information rarely has been made available to shareholders. The perval!ive
inability of shareholders to acquire accurate and complete inform~tion
regarding their firms' charitable contributions subverts the operation of any
meaningful notion of shareholder ~onsent in regard thereto, thus delegiti~
mating corporate charitable contributions as a form of corporate political
expression. Although Congress has given the SEC th~ authority to promul~
gate disclosure requirements in the public interest and for the protection of
investors,361 the SEC has yet to acknowledge this facet of shareholders'
rights or to protect them by requiring disclosure of corporate charitable
contributions.
This is not to suggest that disclosure of politicized charitable contribu~
tions will resolve the conflict between corporate and individual speech
rights. On the contrary, initially, disclosure will serve merely to make the
conflict visible. Of course, coercion cannot be addressed if it is not visible,
and disclosure will at least allow dissenting shareholders to seek partial
redress through advocacy or disengagement .(selling). Future legal and
practical developments will have to address, and will reflect, the accomm~
dation that we as a society endorse between these potentially conflicting
corporate~ and individual~level speech rights.

VI. DoNATIONS BENEFITING TI-lE BUSINESS
Both courts and corporate executives have described corporate charita~
ble contributions as a source of financial benefits for the firm.36z Such
360. All metaphors based on freedom of contract depend on assumptions of adequate, or at
least equal, information. This is readily apparent in the context of patient informed consent to
medical procedures, for example.
361. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994).
362. As described supra in notes 62-64 and accompanying text, prior to the enaconent of
the enabling statutes, courts upheld donations when they believed benefits would accrue to the
firm as a result thereof. See, e.g., Armstrong Cork Co. v. H.A. Meldrum Co., 285 F. 58, 58-59
(W.D.N.Y. 1922) (describing the potential benefits accruing from donations supporting improved
business education, as well as the value of the goodwill of influential citizens and patrons);
Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Pacific Grape Prod. Co., 290 P.2d 481, 483 (Cal. 1955) (describing the
benefits potentially accruing to employees from more accessible and improved hospital facilities as
the basis for finding that the president was within his authority to authorize the gifts); cf. Kahn v.
Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 62 (Del. .1991) (though benefit to the firm was' not required, the court
observed that public relations benefits were likely to arise from the company-funded museum). Of
course, corporate managers have an incentive to describe contributions in terms of revenue enhancement, in order to insulate such contributions (and their decision-making'in regard' thereto)
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profit-maximizing charitable contributions have included a broad spectrum
of corporate conduct, some of it closely analogous to traditional marketing
and advertising, with other contributions having a more attenuated connection to revenue creation or cost reduction. 363 Donations made in the
interest of benefiting the corporation are consistent with the traditional,
commercial norms of corporate law. From the perspective of corporate law,
profit-maximizing charitable contributions are uncontroversial.
Part of the problem in this area is practical. Without systematic disclosure, shareholders have no ability to assess whether corporate managers
have administered the firm's charitable contributions according to valuemaximizing criteria. Because managers may accomplish self-serving objectives through their allocation of the firm's charitable contributions, as
described above, some system of accountability is required. Additionally,
the dearth of company-specific data in the area of corporate philanthropy
has hindered the progress of empirical analysis. 3M Systematic disclosure
would provide economists and other analysts the data required to assess the
profit-maximizing claims made in regard to corporate charitable contributions.
There is also a deeper, conceptual problem inhering in the notion of
profit-maximizing charitable contributions. Donations that are foreseeably
profit maximizing should not rightly be considered philanthropic. Under
both tax policy and the common understanding of "charity," the donor
cannot anticipate a net gain from a charitable contribution. 365 Thus,
while profit-maximizing charitable contributions are uncontroversial from
from scrutiny.
363. For academic discussions of the strategic benefits that may arise from charitable contributions, see, for example, Galaskiewicz, supra note 182, at 246-60; Haley, supra note 36, at 485504; Peter Navarro, Why Do CoTPorations Gille to Charity?, 61 J. Bus. 65-93 (1988). Within the
tax literature, Nancy Knauer has described contributions as commercially driven (and has thus
argued for the repeal of the corporate charitable deduction under § 170). Knauer, supra note 77,
at 96. The empirical studies analyzing the connection between corporate charitable contributions and corporate profit maximization are summarized in Webb, supra note 54, at 77-132. And
within the marketing-oriented and popular literature see, for example, STECKEL & SIMONS, supra
note 183; Philip Maher, What CoTPorations Get Iry Giving, Bus. MARKETING, Dec. 1984, at
80-89; Timothy S. Mescon & Donn J. Tilson, CoTPorate Philanthropy: A Strategic Approach to the
Bottom-Une, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1987, at 49-61; Smith, supra note 47, at 105.
364. See, e.g., Navarro, supra note 363, at 65 ("rrJhe empirical efforts have been hampered
by the lack of firm-specific data."); Craig Smith, Desperately Seeking Data, 9 CORP.
PHILANTHROPY REP. 10-11 (Oct. 1993); see also Maher, supra note 363, at 84 ("Despite the
billions of dollars donated each year, there is a remarkable dearth of hard data on its use or,
especially, its effectiveness. ").
365. Knauer has confronted this analytic problem directly, arguing that the mercenary nature
of these transfers should disqualify them from being deductible as charitable contributions.
Knauer, supra note 77, at 96.
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the perspective of corporate law, they are highly controversial as a general
theoretical matter, and from the perspective of tax policy analysis.
The transfers most readily observed to be profit maximizing, that is,
those arising from cause-related marketing ("CRM") promotions and corporate special-event ("CSE") sponsorships, are most directly in conflict with
the charitable paradigm operative under § 170. 366 Because the expectation of a quid pro quo underlies these arrangements, such transfers fail to
satisfy the "contribution or gift" requirement of § 170.367 On this basis,
contributions arising from corporate marketing programs are increasingly
being regarded as forms of business transfers distinguishable from charitable
giving,368 ones more appropriately deducted as business expenses under
§ 162 than as charitable contributions under § 170.369 And, indeed,
contributions arising from CRM promotions and CSE sponsorships are not
included in the annual aggregate corporate charitable contributions figures
presented in Giving USA, and elsewhere. 37o
Alternatively, outside of CRM and CSE promotions, most charitable
contributions by corporations have had only a tenuous connection to revenue enhancement or cost reduction. 371 The resulting "gossamer civic
366. My analysis is consistent with the holding in Hernandez II. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680,
691 (1989), which adopts a quid pro quo oriented analysis in relation to the "contribution or gift"
requirement pertaining to charitable contributions. For commentary on the Hernandez decision,
see Knauer, supra note 77, at 35-41. See also United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477
U.S. 105 (1986) (holding that no portion of individual taxpayers' premium payments constitutes a
charitable contribution).
367. Section 170(c) defines the term "charitable contribution." I.R.C. § 170 (1994). Of
further relevance is Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1 (c)(5) (as amended in 1990). See supra note 7.
368. See, e.g., STECKEL &. SIMONS, supra note 183, at 76 ("Cause-related marketing is just
that: marketing. It happens to have a philanthropic result, but its primary purpose is sales."); P.
Rajan Varadarajan &. Anil Menon, Cause-Related Marketing: A Coalignment of Marketing Strategy
and Corporate Philanthropy, 52 J. MARKETING, July 1988, at 58-74, 59-60 (describing essential
marketing thrust of CRM promotions); see also Knauer, supra note 77, at 11 ("In practice, corporate managers and fundraisers agree that corporate transfers to charity represent a calculated
purchase of advertising services or goodwill. ").
369. From the perspective of the corporation, the classification of the transfer as charitable or
as a business-related expense is generally not a substantial concern (outside of the context of
lobbying). The transfers would be deductible under § 170 in the former case, or under § 162 in
the latter case. However, where § 170 treatment is inapposite, the company's costs might have
to be capitalized pursuant to § 263 in some instances, thus rendering the distinction between
business related expenses and charitable contributions of greater practical relevance. See I.R.C.
§ 263 (1994).
370. See supra note 22.
371. See supra note 364; see also Galaskiewicz, supra note 182, at 248 ("Research on the
relationship between company giving and public opinion is scanty and inconclusive."). For a
skeptical view of the touted strategic benefits accruing from charitable contributions, see USEEM,
supra note 159, at 146-49; Haley, supra note 36, at 492: "Despite managerial claims, there are
almost no corporate data to verify that contributions affect corporate profits."
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goodwill"372 has too readily supplied a justification for unlimited managerial discretion in the area of corporate philanthropy.373
Thus,
systematic disclosure is required in order to provide an appropriate
accommodation between shareholders' interest in accountability and
managers' interest in flexibility, and to advance the study of corporate
philanthropy.
A.

Contributions-Based Corporate Marketing

There is considerable empirical evidence that charitable contributions
have been assimilated into corporate marketing and advertising functions,374 either as a complement to or as a substitute therefor. 375 CRM
and CSE promotions have allowed firms to publicize both their individual
products and the corporation's "good image" generally.376 These highly
372. Cahill v. Public Servo Comm'n, 556 N.E.2d 133, 137 (N.Y. 1990).
We agree and understand that charitable contributions may enhance important quality of
life aspects in selected spheres of the affected communities, thus benefiting in many
intangible ways the utilities' employees, customers and boosters ..•. But the effects of
this gossamer civic goodwill on the elementary provision of utility services are at best
speculative ....
373. Although a corporation is not required to demonstrate that financial benefits will result
to it as a result of its contributions (as described in Part II), courts have uniformly responded
favorably when the potential for a benefit has been alleged. See, e.g., Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A,2d
48, 62 (Del. 1991). On a related point, I would argue that the business judgment rule should
apply to donations that are foreseeably profit-maximizing-but the dilemma is discerning which
gifts should properly be so categorized.
374. Economist~ regard advertising as an attempt to enhance revenues by manipulating the
demand for the firm's product. For a summary of the literarure on commercial advertising, see
David W. Schumann et aI., Corporate Advertising in America: A Review of Published Studies on Use,
Measurement and Effectiveness, 20 J. ADVERTISING, Sept. 1991, at 35. The variables affecting a
firm's propensity to advertise are discussed in Richard E. Caves & Peter J. Williamson, What Is
Product Differentiation, Really?, 34 J. INDUS. ECON. 113, 113-32 (1985).
375. Empirical srudies finding a complementary relationship between advertising and contributions are discussed in ROBERT S. BURT, CORPORATE PROFITS AND COoPTATION 197-221
(1983) (presenting evidence that firms with greater consumer dependencies engage in higher
levels of charitable contributions as support for the notion that contributions are part of corporate efforts to coopt consumers); CLOTFELTER, sUlJ'ra note 22, at 188-89 (assessing the existing
empirical evidence and concluding that "there is good reason to believe that at least some portion of a corporation's contributions have a profit-related motive attached to it, much of it serving to improve the company's public image"); Galaskiewicz, sUlJ'ra note 182, at 247-48; Navarro,
sulJ'ra note 363, at 89 (collecting empirical evidence "lending support to the conclusion here that
contributions are a form of advertising"-but noting the existence of contradictory evidence).
For a more circumspect view of the correlation between contributions and advertising expendirures, see Haley, sUlJ'ra note 36, at 488 ("Contradictory findings exist about relationships between
contributions and advertising budgets. H).
376. For a discussion of the marketing objectives that may be realized through CRM promotions, see, for example, Varadarajan & Menon, S~lJ'ra note 368, at 60-64.
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structured, contributions-based marketing programs achieved prominence
during the 1980s,377 yet on an informal basis, corporations have for
decades attempted to attract consumers by publicizing certain of their charitable contributions. 378
1.

Cause-Related Marketing

The distinguishing feature of a CRM program is that the firm's commitment to transfer a percentage of the revenues earned from the promotion to the specified charitable organizations is used as the basis of an
appeal to consumers. 379 The popularity of CRM from the corporate perspective has been based on its consumer appeapso and on the ability of
corporations to adapt CRM promotions to their precise commercial
needs. 381 The principal variables in CRM promotions include the selection of the charitable beneficiaries, the duration of the promotion, the
particular consumer· group targeted, and the breadth of the campaign (Le.,
local, national, or intemational).382 In addition, CRM promotions have
often garnered attention from the news media, so the participating corporations (and charities) have frequently received favorable publicity independent of their own advertising. 383
While CRM promotions have generally proved beneficial for the participating charitable organizations,384 they are fundamentally regarded
both by the business community and by nonprofit leaders as part of corporate marketing efforts. 385 The essential marketing thrust of CRM promo377. A comprehensive survey of the development of CRM and CSE promotions appears in
Knauer, supra note 77, at 60-71.
378. Perhaps the most famous example is Texaco's "Live at the Met" broadcasts, which
commenced in 1940. Mescon &. Tilson, supra note 363, at 55.
379. See Varadarajan &. Menon, supra note 368, at 60.
380. See, e.g., STECKEL &. SIMONS, supra note 183, at 75-87.
381. ld.; see also Varadarajan &. Menon, supra note 368, at 63-67.
382. Varadarajan &. Menon, supra note 368, at 63-67.
383. See STECKEL &. SIMONS, supra note 183, at 76-78 (describing media interest in American Express' CRM promotions). CRM promotions receive a great deal of publicity: ALexisNexis search in the Current News file retrieved approximately 500 stories discussing corporate
CRM promotions for the years 1993-1995. These press accounts rarely included any precise
details about the terms of the promotions, however.
384. STECKEL &. SIMONS, supra note 183, at 78 (describing large charities, such as Big Brothers Big Sisters, the Special Olympics, the American Cancer Society, and the American Heart
Association as having raised millions of dollars from corporations' CRM campaigns).
385. See Knauer, supra note 77, at 53-60.
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tions is illustrated, for instance, by the fact that contributions arising from
CRM promotions are typically funded from advertising and marketing
budgets, as opposed to corporate philanthropy budgets. 386 Also significant is the fact that corporate advertising and administration costs in CRM
promotions, which frequently amount to millions of dollars, typically exceed the amount contributed to charities by a substantial sum. 387
As stated above, CRM promotions are a relatively recent innovation
in contributions-based marketing. American Express launched the first
national CRM promotion in 1983.388 The company committed itself to
contributing one cent for each use of its charge card and one dollar for each
new card to the Statue of Liberty/Ellis Island Foundation's restoration
project throughout the duration of the campaign. 389 According to company officials, as a result thereof, card use increased by more than 20% and
applications increased by 45% during the promotion. 390 From a total corporate marketing expenditure of $6 million, the restoration project received
contributions from the company totalling $1. 7 million. 391 In light of
American Express' successes, many other companies have sought to implement CRM programs. 392 Especially in industries where product differentiation is difficult and rate competition severe (as in the case of credit card
386.

Varadarajan & Menon, supra note 368, at 59.

387.

Id.

388. The most comprehensive discussion of American Express' 1983 CRM campaign in
support of the Statue of LibertylEllis Island restoration appears in Mescon & Tilson, supra note
363, at 57 (citing Wendy L. Wall, Companies Change the Ways They Make Charitable Donations,
WALL ST. J., June 21, 1984, at 1). Similarly detailed descriptions of other early CRM promotions appear in Maher, supra note 363.
389. Varadarajan & Menon, supra note 368, at 59.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. For instance, more recently, Salant Corporation is reported to have ignited a trend in
men's neckwear by incorporating designs and logos associated with the Save the Children organization on its neckties. Under the terms of Salant's CRM promotions (which subsequently expanded to include additional charitable organizations), five percent of the revenues produced
from the necktie sales were pledged to the charities. Other men's apparel firms have sought to
duplicate Salant's successes. Randa Corp. entered into a licensing agreement with C.A.R.E. in
1993 under which a portion of the neckties' sales proceeds were pledged to C.A.R.E. through a
CRM promotion. And Wemco, Inc. has marketed a line of "Endangered Species" ties under
CRM promotions benefiting a variety of environmental conservation organizations. Elena Hart,
Tie Makers Still Sticking Their Necks out for Good Causes, DAILY NEWS REc., June 13, 1994, at 16,
available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
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companies,393 long distance telephone carriers, 394 and airlines395) businesses have increasingly relied on CRM promotions to attract and retain
consumers.
2.

Corporate Special-Event Sponsorships

Like CRM programs, CSE sponsorships represent strategic partnerships
from which both the corporation and the nonprofit organization anticipate
financial benefits. Corporate executives have described CSE sponsorships
as even more efficient than traditional advertising in terms of the cost of
publicity in comparison to the resultant media exposure. 396 The typical
arrangement in a CSE sponsorship is that the charity's special event will
prominently display the corporation's name, logo, or products in exchange
for the receipt of a substantial sponsorship payment. 397 Because the IRS
has defined "acknowledgments" very broadly, the charity can generally
avoid having unrelated business income tax on the sponsorship payments. 398 Thus, CSE sponsorships are essentially exchange transactions
393. See, e.g., STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 183, at 80-81 (describing 1987 CRM campaign by MasterCard that allowed consumers to select among a variety of charitable recipients);
see also Valerie Block, Blockbuster and NationsBank Cobranding a Visa Card, AM. BANKER, Mar.
22, 1995, at 1 (describing cobranded Visa card under which two companies cosponsored a CRM
campaign to benefit the "End Hunger Network"); Robert Jennings, First USA Goes Angling for
Outdoor Types with Cause-Tied Orvis Conservation Card, AM. BANKER, July 19, 1995, at 10;
Robert Jennings, Fleet Joins Charity Marketing Race with a Card Tied to Specid Olympics, AM.
BANKER, July 3, 1995, at 12.
394. See, e.g., Shelby Gilie, Long-Distance Is Reaching Out to Left and Right, SEA1TLE TIMES,
Aug. 9, 1995, at El, available in LEXIS, News library, CURNWS File; MCI Sponsors Kenny
Loggins Tour, PR Newswire, July 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, News library, ARCNWS File (describing "MCI Friends and Family Tour" benefiting the National Park Foundation).
395. See STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 183, at 84 (describing CRM campaign by Continental Airlines to benefit Colorado's homeless); Airline Partners with Others to Expand Its Giving, 51
PR News: May 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, Market library, IACNWS File (describing CRM
promotion sponsored by Northwest Airlines); Mescon & Tilson, supra note 363, at 57 (discussing
American Airlines' CRM campaign to benefit Dallas Symphony).
396. Companies "piggyback" on the news coverage aSSOciated with the event. Mescon &
Tilson, supra note 363, at 54 (SCM executives estimated that $200,000 museum sponsorship
payment produced publicity that would have cost $51 million per year for five years in advertising
payments to reach equivalent customers).
397. As Knauer has observed, CSE sponsorships invert the commercial relationship present
in the CRM context.. In CRM promotions, the corporation pays the equivalent of a licensing fee
(the "contributions") in order to tie the charity to the company's marketing campaign. In special
event sponsorships, in contrast, the company lends its name to the charity's event. Knauer, supra
note 77, at 67.
398. In 1991 the IRS issued a technical advice memorandum addressing college bowl sponsorship payments in which the payments were classified as unrelated business income to the
donee nonprofit organizations. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Aug. 16, 1991). After an extensive lobbying campaign by nonprofit organizations, the IRS issued proposed regulations in
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in which the corporation receives substantial media exposure and favorable
acknowledgements (if not "advertising") in exchange for the contributions
it makes to the nonprofit organization hosting the event. 399 Highly flexible arrangements, CSE promotions can be coordinated with CRM programs
as well as traditional advertising campaigns in order to produce the maximum favorable publicity for the corporation. 400 The most common event
sponsorships, for obvious reasons, have been arts performances and amateur
athletic events-the regular401 and Special Olympics402 and college bowl
football games 403 being the most salient examples of the latter.
Because CRM campaigns and CSE sponsorships represent contexts in
which corporate contributions have been closely assimilated to traditional
corporate marketing efforts, the profit-maximizing claims made in regard
thereto are highly credible. Accordingly, in light of their commercial
nature, such contributions should not be deductible under § 170 as charitable contributions. Transfers to charitable organizations arising from CRM
campaigns appear to be the most ill-suited for treatment under § 170, because the existence of the contribution is directly tied to the occurrence of
a revenue prodUcing transaction for the firm. There is little precedent
addressing the tax treatment of CRM campaigns,404 but the IRS has continued to support the charitable framework supporting CSE sponsorships,
perhaps as a result of extensive lobbying by charitable organizations. 405
Nevertheless, companies continue to derive a valuable package of services

1993. These regulations adopted a significantly more liberal approach to CSE sponsorships.
Most importantly, they focused on the nature of the services performed by the donee organization
(as opposed to the corporate donor's motivation or resulting publicity), and prOVided that nontaxable "acknowledgments" would be defined broadly. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-(e), 58 Fed.
Reg. 5687, 5689 (1994); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4, 58 Fed. Reg. 5690 (1993).
399. See Prop. Treasury Reg. § l.512(a)-(e); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4. For a transactional
approach to CSE sponsorships, see Francis R. Hill, Corporate Sponsorships in Transactional
Perspective: General Principles and Special Cases in the Law of Tax Exempt Organizations (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
400. See, e.g., STECKEL & SIMONS, supra note 183, at 82 (describing linkages between CRM
campaigns and CSE sponsorships).
401. Marlis L. Carson, Corporate Sponsorship and the Olympics, 68 TAX NOTES 651, 651-52
(1995).
402. See Kate Fitzgerald, Special Olympics Wins oller Sponsors, ADVERTISINO AOE, Apr. 10,
1995, at 2; Kirk Johnson, The SeUing of the Special Olympics, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1995, at Bl,
B4 (describing sponsorship payments, largely from big corporations, as reaching $28 million in
1995).
403. See Nathan Wirtschafter, Fourth Quarter Choke: How the IRS Blew the Corporate
Sponsorship Game, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1465 (1994).
404. But see Sierra Club Inc. v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996).
405. The 1993 proposed regulations are the latest official word from the IRS on CSE sponsorships. See supra note 398.
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from CRM promotions and CSE sponsorships (and tax experts continue to
question the charitable nature of the arrangement}.406 In sum, there· is
considerable consensus that CRM campaigns and CSE sponsorships are
profit ·maximizing for the donor corporation, but for· this very reason the
charitable nature of the payments arising therefrom is suspect.
3.

Advertising the Firm's Philanthropic Image to Influence Consumers

Since the late 1970s, corporations have increasingly sought to adver,
tise their contributions in order to improve the public's perception of the
firm in general. 407 The most popular form of contributions,based, firm,
level advertising is the mar~eting of the "socially responsible" corpora'
tion. 408 Corporations have frequently publicized their efforts to support
environmental conservation,409 education,410 and women's and minori,
406. Thus the law in this area is far from settled. See Hill, sutn'a note 399; Knauer, sutn'a
note 77.
407. For discussions of consumer interest in socially responsible products ~nd firms, see
Varadarajan & Menon, sutn'a note 368, at 71-72. For a discussion of increasing corporate interest
in strategic philanthropy, see, for example, Smith, sutn'a note 47, at 105-16; EdwardJ. Stendardi,
Corporate Philanthropy: The Redefinition of Enlightened Self-Interest, 29 SOC. SCI. J. 21, 21-30.
(1992). Recent developments of strategic partnerships of many varieties are described in
ROSABETH Moss KANTER, WORLD CLASS: THRIVING LOCALLY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
(1995).
408. Of course, the socially responsible corporation is not the only persona marketed by
business. Corporations have frequently advertised their affiliations with prestigious or avant garde
performing arts organizations as a way of communicating a message to the public about the firm's
sophistication, financial success, or savvy. See Smith, sutn'a note 47, at 109 (describing the
AT&T Foundation's decision to support avant garde arts performances in ·order to communicate
a message to the public about the state of the art nature of the company's goods and services).
409. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. POOLE, HERITAGE FOUND., THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLEX:
PART III (Institution Analysis No.4, June 1982) (documenting proenvironmental work on the
part of nonprofit organizations created with the help of corporate funds); Environmental Groups'
Corporate Marketing Policies, GREEN MARKETALERT, March 1994, at 4 (describing nonprofit
conservation groups'· policies and efforts to establish strategic partnerships with corporations);
Jeffery D. Zbar, Firms GQ Green with Conservancy, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 11, 1993, at 16 (describing corporate donations to The Nature Conservancy); Corporate Environmental Philanthropy,
GREEN MARKETALERT, October 1993, at 4 (describing substantial corporate contributions to
major environmental groups); James T. Harris, Working with Environmental Groups, PUB. REL. J.,
May 1992, at 24 (same); Keith Schneider, Natural Foes BankroU Environmental Groups, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23,1991, atA12 (same).
410. Educational groups, defined very broadly, receive the greatest percentage (33.5%) of
corporate charitable contributions. See GIVING USA 1996, sutn'a note 23, at 91. In fact, Exxon
has a separate "Educational Foundation." See Smith, s$a note 47, at 107-08. Also notable
was President Bush's plans for the "New American Schools Development Corporation"envisioned as a private think tank largely funded by business donations that would produce research and recommendations for reVitalizing American education. See sutn'a note 210.
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ties' rights,411 as well as other programs, through corporate charitable con#
tributions. Surveys attest to considerable consumer support for socially re#
sponsible products and firms, as do the resounding successes of consumer
consciousness publications such as Shopping far a Better War[d412 and the
establishment of socially conscious mutual funds. 413
The practice of touting the firm's contributions, along with any other
socially#conscious expenditures, has become common in the consumer
products area. For example, Ben & Jerry's Ice Cream and The Body Shop
have aggressively sought to appeal to consumers on the basis of their su~
port for the environment and other progressive causes. From a different
perspective, petroleum, chemical, and automotive manufacturers have used
charitable contributions to pr~environmental causes, in combination with
extensive advocacy advertising,414 to counter their negative images as
polluters. 415 Thus, while corporate social responsibility represents a dis#
tinct explanation for corporate philanthropy, as discussed previously,
contributions#based social#responsibility expenditures have also been used as
part of corporate marketing efforts. Ironically, notwithstanding that firms
have made substantial investments in these areas, the evidence regarding
the ability of such expenditures to enhance revenues or reduce costs is
conflicting and inconclusive.416
B.

Other Profit#Maximizing Strategies Involving Contributions

1.

Donating Products to Increase the Consumer Base

Contributions might also contribute to revenue enhancement by secur#
ing or enlarging the firm's consumer base. 417 Particularly prevalent has
been the practice of computer and other technology firms contributing
equipment and other products to schools. For example, IBM, Apple, and
411. See NOLAN, supra note 186.
412. See, e.g., SHOPPING FOR A BETTER WORLD (1994).
413. See infra note 427.
414. See S. PRAKASH SETHI, ADVOCACY ADVERTISING AND LARGE CORPORATIONS (1977);
see also Anne Louise Page, We're Good Guys: Image Propaganda from Mobil Oil, Bus. & Soc.
REv., Spring 1995, at 33. For a discussion of advocacy advertising in conjunction with charitable
contributions, see Haley, supra note 36, at 501.
415. For citations, see supra note 409. See also NEIHEISEL, supra note 32, at 60-61.
416. See Smith, supra note 364; supra note 32.
417. Galaskiewicz, supra note 182, at 247-48.
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Hewlett Packard have annually made contributions of computer equipment
to schools valued in the tens of millions of dollars. 418

2.

Charitable Contributions and Research and Development

Corporations have used charitable contributions to university science
programs to "out-source" some of their research and development
("R&D").419 Contributions to R&D conducted at universities may either
substitute for research that would be too costly to fund internally or complement intrafirm R&D.420 Contributions supporting university R&D
may provide the donor-firms with access to research programs and faculty
members' technical expertise. Corporations active in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, defense technology, and telecommunications (including computer
technology) have been particularly apt to use contributions to university
science departments in conjunction with intrafirm research and development. 421 In order for these contributions to be revenue enhancing for the
donors, they must sow the seeds of the firms' future technological innovations. 422
3.

Donations That Benefit Employees

Employee-matching grant programs confer obvious benefits on employees. The matching grant affords the employee the psychic gratification of
augmenting the gift that he or she is responsible for making without increasing the employee's personal expenditure. In addition, the employee
can exercise his or her discretion to direct the gift to local charitable orga418. Section 170(e)(4) of the U.S. Code (enacted in 1981) created a special tax incentive for
businesses to contribute property and equipment to educational instirutions for research purposes.
I.R.C. § 170(e) (1994). For discussion of corporate donations of computer equipment, see, for
example, Useem, supra note 158, at 341, which describes tens of millions of dollars worth of
computer equipment donated by computer companies in the 1980s. See also Maher, supra note
363, at 86 (describing IBM's practice of combining gifts of computer equipment with
multimillion-dollar educational grants in the area of information technology).
419. One commentator has described the program run out of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, in which "hundreds of corporations contribute tens of thousands of dollars annually,» as the "grandaddy" of all such corporate contributions-based research programs. STECKEL
& SIMONS, supra note 183, at 24.
420. See, e.g., Haley, supra note 36, at 488 ("[Clontributions may substirute for corporate
R&D by funding basic innovation at research instirutions. More often, contributions may complement corporate R&D by funding 'extensions of corporate projects. ").
421. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 47.
422. Haley, supra note 36, at 488.
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nizations, such as hospitals, arts organizations, or community services organizations, from whose services the employee may benefit. For this reason,
such matching programs are generally regarded as corporate efforts to improve employee morale and loyalty to the firm.
Of course, corporations may directly contribute to charitable organizations that benefit employees apart from employee-matching grant
programs. Corporations have contributed to community day care and
geriatric care, as well as to community hospital and health organizations,
domestic violence programs, and specific local publidprivate partnerships.423 Corporate charitable contributions that improve community and
educational services and other quality of life variables may affect employees'
morale and productivity, as well as retention rates, and thus increase revenues or reduce costS. 424 The value resulting to firms from such expenditures is, however, difficult or impossible to measure.

4.

Reinforcing the Economic Infrastructure

Another, but even more attenuated commercial justification for corporate charitable contributions has been that such donations help sustain the
educational and communal infrastructure necessary to support markets and
profitable businesses. 425 This rationale has most commonly been applied
in the context of contributions to national charities or colleges and universities haVing national standing-situations where the gifts benefit populations in which the company's employees do not predominate. Because of
the numerous variables involved, unlimited time horizons, and obvious freerider problems, it is impossible to document the existence of any firmspecific benefits resulting from gifts of this nature. 426
423. Smith, supra note 47, at 111.
424. 'See, e.g., NEIHEISEL, supra note 32, at 34-35; Haley, supra note 36, at 498; Navarro,
supra note 363, at 68.
425. The connection between charitable contributions, the economic and social infrastructure, and corporate profitability is described, for example, in A.P. Smith Manufacturing. Co. v.
Barlow,98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953), and Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del.
1969). Nevertheless, the high degree of speculation required to support the connection is noted
by Haley and others. Haley, supra note 36, at 489 ("No systematic evidence exists; yet, anecdotal data suggest that contributions which rebuild infrastructure may reduce corporate costs. ").
426. See Galaskiewicz, supra note 182, at 250 ("Skeptics in the management literature correctly point out that it is impossible to measure the impact of responsible behavior on future sales
and public opinion and that espousing the ethic of enlightened self interest is not rational from
an economic point of view. H).
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Attracting Investor Capital Through Social Responsibility

Investors have become increasingly interested in monitoring corpora~
tions' social responsibility efforts, including their charitable contributions
practices. The second half of this century has witnessed successive waves of
investor social activism, especially in the areas of environmentalism, affir~
mative action, human rights, and product safety. Such interest has recently
been institutionalized in the establishment of socially conscious mutual
funds. 427 It is possible that these funds may facilitate capital formation
for companies having an established record of charitable support, and thus
reduce the costs of capital for such firms. However, the relative novelty of
social~choice funds, as well as the relatively little amount of capital under
their management, suggest that it is unlikely such entities will playa major
role in affecting the cost of capital.
C.

Disclosure and the Question of Profit~ Maximizing Contributions

As the above discussion indicates, obvious financial benefits accrue to
firms as a result of CRM and CSE promotions. However, because of the
quid pro quo nature of such arrangements, the contributions arising there~
from should not be considered part of corporate philanthropy. In contrast,
any financial benefits that accrue to firms from the other charitable contri~
butions described in this section are far more elusive. The charitable status
of such contributions is more secure precisely because their profit maximiz~
ing effects are less certain.
Apart from CRM and CSE promotions, the ambiguous nature of the
financial benefits claimed to arise from corporate charitable contributions
complicates the project of defining the appropriate regulatory approach
thereto. The absence of definitive empirical support for the value~
enhancing function of such expenditures does not mean they should neces~
sarily be considered a form of corporate waste. Alternatively, in light of the
inconclusive empirical evidence and the vested interests that corporate
managers, marketing executives, and fundraisers have in describing contri~
butions in terms of corporate profit maximization, it is equally inappropriate
to regard charitable contributions (outside of CRM and CSE promotions) as
427. For a discussion of the rapidly evolVing field of socially conscious investing, see, for
example, PETER D. KINDER ET AL., INVESTING FOR GOOD (1993); Maria O'Brien Hylton,
"SociaUy Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing WeU in an Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U.
L. REV. 1 (1992), and W. Scott Klinger, Social Investing in a Changing World, BEST'S
REv.-LIFEfHEALTH INSUR. ED., Feb. 1994, at 68.
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being closely analogous to other traditional, value-maximizing forms of
corporate conduct. Courts have too readily deferred to the statements of
corporate managers in this area, or glossed over the problem by asserting
the existence of goodwill benefits. As a matter of legal policy, a middle
ground must be established between absolutely prohibiting corporate charitable contributions and absolutely allowing them without any meaningful
system of accountability.
Of course, the argument for disclosure to shareholders is weakest, and
the argument in favor of deference to managers' business judgment is strongest, where contributions give rise to increased value or reduced cost.
(Indeed, shareholders do not bear the cost of profit-maximizing contributions because th~y involve no net reduction· in profits.) But absent disclosure, it is impossible to assess whether the firm's philanthropic capital has
been employed in the firm's commercial interest. Unlike the traditional
costs of production, corporate contributions are acutely susceptible to being
administered· without regard to the firm's commercial interests and in furtherance of the personal interests of corporate elites. As Louis Lowenstein
has recently written, "You manage what you. measure."428 By failing to
require that corporate charitable expenditures be reflected either in the
narrative portion of corporate reports or in the financial statements accompan:ying them, the SEC has contributed to mismanagement and unprofessionalism in the administration of corporate charitable contributions.
CONCLUSION

This Article has analyzed corporate charitable contributions from the
perspective of corporate legal norms and the interests of shareholders. The
absence of any system ~f accountability in this area-that is, the absence of
substantive regUlation un:der state corporation law, in combination with the
abs~nce of a disclosure requirement un~er the federal securities .(or other)
regulations-has created the· potential for abuse with respect to both shareholde~s' property interests and in regard to their interests in avoiding compelled subsidization of entity-level political expression. Furthermore, firms
have prevented shareholders from having a meaningful voice in the formulation ot corporate philanthropy policies by keeping charitablecontributions information confidential. To the extent that corporate
charitable contributions represent an expression of corPorate social responsibility, this assertion of managerial prerogative is unju.stified, as managers
·428.

See LowensteiIl, su.pra note 179.
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have no special expertise in matters of this nature. In regard to politicized
philanthropy, furthermore, fundamental democratic principles also mandate
in favor of required corporate contributions disclosure.
In light of the rapid development of the charitable sector and the
sophistication of corporate affairs generally, a precisely defined system of
substantive regulation would be difficult and costly to design and to administer. In the alternative, a system of accountability based on required disclosure of corporate charitable contributions would represent a more fruitful
and practicable accommodation between shareholders' interests in accountability and managers' interests in flexibility in the administration of corporate affairs. Congress has afforded the SEC the authority to promulgate
rules in the public interest and for the protection of investors, and the SEC
has responded by implementing an extensive system of required corporate
disclosure. Disclosure of corporate charitable contributions information
should now be made part of this regime.

